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1Recognizing Helen i
TIMOTHY W. BOYD
In Book 4 of the Odyssey, Helen and Menelaus, now home again in Sparta,
are entertaining Telemachus, the son of Odysseus. Along with their
hospitality, they each offer an anecdote about Odysseus as they saw him in
a moment of great stress at Troy.
These anecdotes have been the subject of much scholarly speculation,
not only about their content, but also about the behavior of the tellers.
Froma Zeitlin, for example, sees each of the stories as having two levels. In
the upper, they are "tales from the past that seems to have been forgiven,
transmuted into a play of symmetrical reversals that charm instead of
dismay." In the lower level, they are about Helen as the embodiment of
fiction itself. In a less theoretical vein, Douglas Olson concentrates upon
the possible function of the stories within the greater narrative, suggesting
that the anecdotes "prepare us for what is to come many books later, in
another household, between another couple." Another interpretation, that of
Charles Rowan Beye, is that these are stories both about a missing hero and
about Helen's loyalty—or lack of it.^
That there are so many differing interpretations of these two stories is
not surprising. On the surface, they are what they purport to be: tales of
Odysseus, told to his son, Telemachus. Just below that surface, however,
they do appear to be about something else. Helen's story, for example.
My thanks to the following people for their assistance in creating this essay: Carolyn
Higbie, Gregory Nagy, Victor Ortiz, David Sansone, and the readers at ICS. Thanks as well to
the Center for Hellenic Studies, its directors, Kurt Raaflaub and Deborah Boedeker, and the
fellows for 1998-1999,
^ See F. I. Zeitlin, "Travesties of Gender and Genre," in H. P. Foley (ed.). Reflections of
Women in Antiquity (New York 1981) 203-05; S. D. Olson, "The Stories of Helen and
Menelaus (Odyssey 4, 240-89) and the Return of Odysseus," AJP 1 10 (1989) 387-94; C. R.
Beye, Ancient Epic Poetry: Homer. Apollonius. Virgil (1969; repr. Ithaca 1993) 161. Sheila
Mumaghan would understand the scene as providing Telemachus with a model for enduring
loss: S. Murnaghan, Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey (Princeton 1987) 161-62 n. 23.
M. A. Katz, in Penelope's Renown (Princeton 1991) 192. suggests that the stories of Helen
"refocus the question of Penelope's fidelity around remarriage rather than betrayal." For a very
different view, see Victoria Wohl, who presents the two stories as a dramatizing of the
"problem of the essentially indeterminate and undeterminable quality of (female) speech or
creativity," in "Standing by the Stathmos: The Creation of Sexual Ideology in the Odvssey,"
Arethusa 26 ( 1993) 19-50, specifically 32-35.
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opens with Odysseus entering the city on a spying mission. To do so, he
had changed shape, Helen says {Od. 4. 244-50), but, for all of Odysseus'
masterly disguise, Helen tells Telemachus that she herself was never taken
in (4. 250-56). She explains that Odysseus' subsequent spying was a
success (4. 257-58), and concludes by stating that she was experiencing at
that time a change of heart and had begun to wish for a return to her
husband and family (4. 259-64). Thus, a story whose initial focus is on
Odysseus and his cleverness quickly becomes a story about Helen and her
cleverness, as well as about her (self-described) shift in loyalties.
Rather than comment upon his wife's story, Menelaus uses a variation
of a formula familiar to us as the response commonly made to Nestor in the
Iliad (Od. 4. 266): vai 5fi xauxd ye Tictvxa, yijvai, Kaxa noipav eeiTieq
("yes, indeed, wife, you've told everything in a fitting fashion"). In
Homeric verse, this is always a polite answer, but also commonly the signal
that, whatever has just been said will be put aside immediately after its
saying. Menelaus, therefore, makes no direct comment on Helen's story,
but proceeds to tell his own tale instead. Like Helen's, Menelaus' story
offers Telemachus an example of his father's quick wits and courage. Also
like Helen's, it begins by being about Odysseus, but quickly becomes a
story about Odysseus—and Helen. When the Greeks are hiding in the
wooden horse (4. 271-74), Helen and her current husband, Deiphobus,
appear and Helen attempts to smoke the Greeks out of the horse by calling
to them in the voices of their wives (4. 274-79). The Greeks, including
Menelaus, are seduced and are about to reply when Odysseus hushes them
and Helen leaves, drawn away by Athena (4. 280-89).
Although not a direct comment, this could easily be understood as
Menelaus' response to the previous story and to the behavior of its teller.
Instead of a Helen whose longing for home spurs her to aid the courageous
and cunning Odysseus, we are presented with a Helen who replaces one
Trojan husband with another and who is no more loyal than she was when
she eloped with Paris years before.
Thus, when it comes to the interpretation of this scene, it would not be
difficult to maintain that, at the least, Helen's story functions both as an
encomium for Odysseus and as a piece of self-justification, and that
Menelaus' story acts as a mini-praise-poem for Telemachus' father as well
as a criticism of Helen in Troy. Without disagreeing with this or with the
wealth of other interpretations, I would suggest that we might approach this
pattern of story-counterstory from a new direction, focusing not upon Helen
and Menelaus, as has often been the approach, but upon the two main
characters within the stories, Helen and Odys,seus. By doing so, I believe
that we may add new facets not only to our understanding of this trading of
stories, but of Helen and Odysseus, of Helen in comparison with other
female characters in the Odyssey, and, perhaps most important, of the real
power of Helen in the story of Troy.
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As she seems to dominate the scene, let us begin with Helen. In her
story, Helen lays particular emphasis upon the contrast between the
Odysseus one might encounter among the ships and the spy who slips into
Troy. To become the latter, Odysseus takes special care, not only to wear
the right clothes, but even to disfigure himself by giving himself the marks
of the kind of beating which one would expect on the body of an unruly
slave. ^ The hero who is a mainstay of the Achaean army has become
"Nobody" for the first time—and yet Helen recognizes him at once and it is
at this point in the story that the emphasis has changed from Odysseus to
Helen.
At first glance, one might understand this change as a part of Helen's
attempt to show herself in the best light possible. For those in Sparta who
question her loyalty, this is a reply; "Odysseus was the enemy, but, though
I might still have been in Troy, I was now so friendly to the Achaean cause
that I sheltered an Achaean spy." If this were completely true, however,
what do we make of the fact that she compromises that spy, first by
identifying him and then by bathing and clothing him, thereby removing the
very disguise he had assumed to spy on Troy?
Further, Helen implies that, somehow, she then aided Odysseus in his
reconnaisance. Odysseus, since we subsequently hear that he goes back to
the Achaeans with information (4. 258), clearly has gathered it in the city.
We have, however, no evidence in Helen's story that, once she had
recognized him, she actually helped him to do so. It would also appear that,
stripped of his convincing disguise by Helen, Odysseus could not slip out of
Troy so easily as he had slipped in. He may have been forced to fight his
way from the city (4. 257-58) and Helen makes no mention of aiding him in
his escape.'' Since she does not really help him and, in fact, seems actually
to have endangered him, it would not appear that this story puts Helen in a
favorable light—or does it?
Consider how Helen has constructed her tale. Odysseus has done
something that no Achaean warrior has done in years: He has succeeded in
penetrating the defences of Troy, fooling the entire city of Trojans with his
cunning disguise, but Helen recognizes him. He attempts to avoid her
probing, but, after a bath, oiling, fresh clothes, and a great oath by Helen not
to betray him to the Trojans, he has fallen, at least in her telling, completely
Is there, in these few Mnes, the echo of a longer story which parallels that of Sinon the later
Greek spy? Sinon is disfigured, either by himself (Triphiodorus' 3rd- or 4th-century A.D.
Taking of lUoii, 219-20), by the Greeks as part of his disguise (the anonymous Excidium
Troiae, p. 14, lines 12-14), or by the Trojans, in order to make him reveal the Greek plans
(Quintus of Smyrna, 12. 36-37). Odysseus' disguise and purpose here may also, as Norman
Austin suggests, act as a foreshadowing of Odysseus' secret penetration of his own home, later
in the Odyssey {Helen of Troy and her Shameless Phanlom [Ithaca 1 994] 79).
"* For a further—and very probing
—
questioning of the credibility of Helen's story, see A, L.
T. Bergren, "Helen's 'Good Drug': Odyssey IV 1-305," in S. Kresic (ed.). Contemporary
Literary Hermeneutics and Interpretation of Classical Texts (Ottawa 1981) 201-14, and
particularly 208-09.
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into her power. Thus, although we may doubt that Helen's story makes her
appear to be quite the pro-Achaean she wants to be in her explanation of her
behavior, it does show that she is a powerful person, one so powerful as to
be able to do something which no one else at Troy (or in the Odyssey, for
that matter) can manage to do: make Odysseus, against his will, admit to his
real identity, and thus put himself in her power.
Helen's method of persuading Odysseus bears a close resemblance to
the xenia offered to Odysseus at the court of Alcinous, king of the
Phaeacians, in Odyssey 8. 454-56.^ As in Troy, a battered Odysseus arrives
in others' clothes, with nothing about him to indicate his true identity. After
initial rounds of hospitality, the maids of Queen Arete bathe Odysseus,
anoint him, and dress him, just as Helen says that she does. Odysseus is
never at risk, of course, in the land of the Phaeacians, as he is at Troy
—
Phaeacian kindness finally prompts him to reveal his identity (9. 19-20),
and so no one ever swears a great oath, as Helen does. Such a need for
oath-swearing leads us, instead, to another and more dubious display of
xenia in the Odyssey, at the house of Circe.
Whereas, among the Phaeacians, Odysseus has nothing to fear from
xenia, he has been warned twice about the quality of Circe's hospitality,
first, by his lieutenant, Eurylochus, and then by Hermes. Eurylochus, who
remained outside, has seen half of Odysseus' crew enter Circe's house and
not return and thus can only convey a sense of mistrust (10. 251-69).
Hermes, however, knows very well the fate of Odysseus' men, as well as
the fate of Odysseus, if he should fall under Circe's spell (10. 281-85). To
prevent this fate, Hermes gives Odysseus the plant \i5Av, tells him how to
react to Circe's sexual advances, and then says (10. 299-301):
aXka KeXeoGai |iiv liampuv neyav opicov onooaai,
Hn Ti Toi aiJTCp nr\\ia kokov PouXEuaeiiev aXko,
\xr\ o' otTtoY-unvcoSevxa kokov koi dvT|vopa 9titi.
But call her to swear the great oath of the blessed ones,
lest she plan some other evil mischief for you,
lest she put evil on you when you're naked and vulnerable.
Odysseus follows Hermes' advice and, after he has confronted Circe
and overcome her, he allows himself to be bathed, oiled, and dressed, the
pattern echoing that at Troy and Phaeacia (10. 357-65). And, as at Troy
with Helen, Odysseus is protected by an oath (10. 345-46).*
' Or in his own home, in the treatment Odysseus receives from Eumaeus, Penelope, and
Eurycleia. It is interesting to note that only Eurycleia, who bathes his feet, recognizes
Odysseus.
* Helen's oath in 4. 253-54 is only "a strong oath" (Kparepov opKov) that she would not
betray to the Trojans that he was Odysseus. Since, presumably, Circe is accorded near-god
status (her father being Helios), Hermes insists on the oath sworn by the gods themselves,
probably the one which uses the Styx as its focus. See //. 14. 271-74, for example, when Sleep
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Not content with keeping himself free of Circe's spells, Odysseus then
pressures the sorceress into freeing his crew members. Upon their arrival,
Circe has given them a drink which, if we may use the Iliad as a source for
our conclusion, looks like a standard recipe for a kind of tonic. When
Nestor, in Iliad 11, withdraws from the fighting, his slave, Hecamede,
makes him a drink of Pramnian wine, cheese, and barley, which is clearly
refreshing (11. 637^2). Circe provides for Odysseus' men a drink of
Pramnian wine, cheese, barley, and honey (10. 233-35), but this drink is not
meant to refresh (10. 235-36):
dvEiiiavE 5£ aftcp
(pdpHttKa A,ijvp', iva ndyx^ X,a9oiaxo itaipiSo? ai'rii;.
... but she mixed with the drink
mischievous drugs, so that they might forget completely their homeland.
Helen, too, as we will remember from Odyssey 4. 220-32, mixes a drug
of forgetfulness with wine just before she tells the story of her encounter
with Odysseus inside Troy. Circe, however, does not stop with
forgetfulness (10. 237-40):
aijidp ETcel 5coKev xe Kai eKTiiov, aiJxiK' ETtcixa
pdp5cp itE7i^r|Y\)ia Koxd aucpEOiaiv iipyvv.
o'l 6£ cuuv |iEV e'xov KE(paA,d(; cpcovriv xe xpixon; xe
Kal 5iyLaq, aijxctp vovq r\v e[iK£?)oq mq x6 napoq ixEp.
And so, when she had given and they had drunk it, right away then
she struck them with a staff and drove them down to the pig sties.
And they had the heads and squeal and bristles and
look of pigs, but the consciousness was as before.
When Circe attempts to work the same magic upon Odysseus, her
method is slightly more elaborate (10. 316-19):
xt\)xt Se jioi KUKEU zpDOEtp Sehoi, 6(ppa Tcioim,
Ev 5e xe (pdpiiaKov tike, koko cppovEouo' EVl Guiiw.
aijxdp ETtei 5a)icEv xe koi ekkiov ovbi n' eBeX^e,
pdp5q) 7t£7:X,riY\)ia ETtoc; x' Ecpax' ek x' ovona^ev •
She made for me the brew^ in a golden cup so that I would drink it,
and in it she put the drug, evilly disposed in her heart.
And so, when she had given and I had drunk it, it did not enchant me.
makes Hera swear an elaborate form of that oath. Curiously, when Odysseus actually forces
Circe to swear, however (10. 342^6), it is only a "great oath" and not the greatest oath of all.
^ The word used here is kukeo), which is glossed as a mixture of wine and other ingredients.
Thus, although Circe is not actually described as making up the "tonic" used on Odysseus'
men, she appears to be offering him the same drink. The same word is also applied to the brew
created by Metaneira for Demeter, when she declines the wine offered to her (Hymn to
Demeler 206-10), although there the ingredients are simply barley, water, and pennyroyal. By
its use in the Odyssey, are we to imagine that its effects, combined with the appropriate magic,
go beyond the restorative to the transformative?
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She struck me with a staff^ and spoke a spell and summoned me.
When the spell does not have the desired effect, Circe is more than a
little puzzled (10. 326-29):
9au|id n' EXEi (oq ov xi rciuv Td5E (pdpnaK' iQiXxQ^<i'
oi)5e ydp oij5e Tiq ixXkoq dvf|p lade cpapiiUK' dvExXr),
oq K£ Ttiri Ktti rtpwTov diiEiyETai EpKO(; 656vtmv.
aol 6e Tii; ev oxTiGEaaiv dicf|A.TiTO(; voce; eotw.
Wonder holds me that, drinking these drugs, you were not enchanted.
For never ever has any other man withstood these drugs,
who drank and it first entered the ring of teeth.
Yours in your breast is some uncallable spirit.
Odysseus' invulnerability to enchantment, in turn, provides Circe with
the clue to his identity (10. 330), an identity previously given by Hermes to
the sorceress when he prophesies Odysseus' eventual appearance on her
island (10. 330-32). Neither Circe nor Odysseus, however, provides an
explanation as to why Odysseus, of all men, should be invulnerable. We
might assume that it is the \x(hXv given by Hennes which does the trick, but,
if we do so, we must inquire how. Odysseus tells the Phaeacians (10. 302-
06):
ihc, dpa (pa)vr|aa(; jiopE <pdpnaKov dpYEi(p6vTT|(;
EKyaitiq Epuoa^, Ka{ \ioi cpuoiv aijTou e5ei^e.
pi^T| HEV liE^av EOKE, ydXaKti 5e eVkeX-ov avGoq-
|iai?l\) 5e mv Ko^EODOi 6eo{ xa^Eitov 5e x' opiiaaEiv 305
dv5pdai YE GvriToToi- Geoi §£ te navxa 5uvavTai.
And so, having spoken, Argeiphontes handed over the herb,
having plucked it from the ground, and explained the nature of it to me.
It was black at the root, but its flower was like milk.
The gods call it molu and it's difficult for mortal men
to grub up—but then the gods have power to do everything.
Unfortunately, although Hermes explains the nature of limXu to
Odysseus, neither Odysseus nor the poet explains that nature to us, and, as
Odysseus never seems to make use of it, it disappears from the story right
here, almost at the point where it enters. Why are we not told more?
Clearly, [lihXv was meant to be understood as a counter-charm to
Circe's magic. Because we are not told that it is consumed or smeared on
his skin by Odysseus, we might imagine it to be something like an amulet,
to be carried or worn on the body, and an audience which may have worn
^ A staff appears to be a common tool in Homeric shape-changing. See Poseidon's
employment of it to put new courage into the two Ajaxes (in effect, "making new men of
them" [//. 13. 59-60]), as well as Athena's, when she changes Odysseus into an old man (Od.
13.429-33).
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such charms itself would have been expected to take its use (and its powers)
as a given without further mention.'
It is also possible, as Rhys Carpenter once suggested, that the story as
we now have it in our Odyssey is a blurry version of a much older folktale,
half-forgotten—or misunderstood—by a Homer "who displays the classic
Greek's characteristic failure to comprehend faerie."'° Although I believe
that Carpenter is substantially correct in positing that another tale, although
not necessarily an older one, underlies our text, I would suggest that there is
a stronger reason than later Greek forgetfulness which allows the ^wXv to
fade out of our narrative. To understand this reason, we must now return to
Menelaus' anecdote about Helen's behavior as she stands outside the
wooden horse (4. 277-89). As Menelaus tells Telemachus:
Tpii; 5e jtEpiaiei^ai; koi^ov Xoxov dnipacpocoaa,
EK S' 6vonaK^r|5nv Aavawv ovona^eq dpioToui;,
TtdvTwv 'Apyeicov (puvfiv i'oKoua' dA.6xoioiv.
auxdp £yd) Kal TdSeiStii; kui 5ioq '05-uoo£\)(; 280
iiliEvoi Ev liEoooioiv dKouooiiEv ox; £p6r|oa(;.
vcoi nev ducpoTEpw HEVETiva|iEV 6pnr|6£vtE
T\ E^£A.6£(i£vai, 11 evSoGev aiv)/' {jTiaKoiJaai-
d^A,' 'OSuOEUi; KOTEpUKE Kai EOXeOeV IeHEVCO TCEp.
£v6' aXkoi n£v TcdvtEq dicfiv Eoav v'leq 'Axaiwv, 285
"AvxikA-oi; Se oe y" oioc, d|i£i\)/aa9ai ekeeooiv
tiGeAev • aXk' 'OSuoEuq em ndaxaKa XEpcj'i rci£^£
vto^EliEco; KpatEpfiai, odcooE 5£ jidvTa<; 'Axaiovx;,
Toippa 6' ex' ocppa oe vooipiv dreriyaYE riaXXaq 'A9rivr|.
And three times you paced around, having stroked the hollow ambush,
and by name you summoned the best of the Danaans,
having mimicked the voices of the wives of all the Argives.
And both I and the son of Tydeus and godlike Odysseus
sitting in the midst, heard you as you cried.
Stirred up, we both were eager
either to go out or at once to answer from within.
But Odysseus stopped us and held us, though we two wanted to.
Then all the other sons of the Achaeans were in silence,
but Antikios alone wished to reply to you in speech,
but Odysseus relentlessly pressed shut his jaw
with powerful hands and saved all of the Achaeans
until Pallas Athena led you away from us.
' For more on amulets in the ancient world, see C. Bonner, Studies in Magical Amulets (Ann
Arbor 1969). On \imX\} and divine knowledge, see J. S. Clay, "The Planklai and Molu: Divine
Naming and Knowing in Homer." Hermes 100(1972) 127-31.
'" R. Carpenter, Folk Tale, Fiction, and Saga in the Homeric Epics (Berkeley 1946) 20. I do
not believe that Carpenter's statement about Homer's "failure to comprehend faerie" is strictly
accurate, but the important part of his statement for my purposes is the idea that another story
lies beneath that which survives in our text of the Odyssey.
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Even if we construe this as a story about Helen's treachery, it displays
strangely over-elaborate behavior on her part. If Helen suspects that the
Achaeans are in the horse, why not simply say so to the Trojans who
dragged it within the walls? The Troy tale tradition as a whole allows us to
believe that there was a good deal of initial doubt about the supposed gift.
In Proclus' summary of the Iliou Persis, we are told that some Trojans
believed that the horse should be burned or thrown down a cliff
(Chrestomathy 2) and, according to Apollodorus, Cassandra spoke up
against it, as did Laocoon, to his grief {Epitome 5. 15-19). But Helen
makes no open denunciation. Instead, Menelaus (addressing Helen) says,
xplq 5e Tiepiaiei^aq koiA.ov Xoxov d^i(pa(p6moa ("and three times you
paced around, having stroked the hollow ambush" [4. 277]).
In Aeneid 2. 50-53, Laocoon makes the rash gesture of throwing a
spear against the horse. In contrast, we might wonder whether Helen, more
cannily, is beginning her assault with a reconnaisance, until we notice that
she moves not once or twice, but three times around the horse. Three is a
potent number for the beginning of spells in classical texts of all periods."
Remembering this, might we imagine that Helen's next action, that of
stroking the horse, is not an idle caress, but suggests an anointing for
magical purposes?'^
Such an anointing will appear again later in the Odyssey, in the next
section of Odysseus' story of his struggle with Circe. Having bent her to his
terms as far as his own safety goes, he then insists that she disenchant his
men, which she does in the following lines (10. 391-96):
ol nev £7i£it' eoTTioav evavtioi, f| 6e 8r aijiuv
£PXO|iEvri npoad^eicpEV emota) (pdpiiOKOv ixXko.
TCOV 5' EK HEV HE^ECOV tpiXEt; EppEOV, UC, TlplV EcpUOE
(pdpiioicov oiJX6|i£vov, -co oipiv nope Jioivia KipKT| •
dv5pE5 5' dy EYEvovTo VEWXEpoi n ndpoc, -qaav 395
Kttl Kokv KaXA,iovE(; Kal nE{^ovEq EioopdaaGai.
Then they stood facing her and she, walking among them.
'
' Among a large number of examples of the power of Ihe number three, see, for example,
Medea's behavior when she sets out to destroy Talos, the guardian of Crete. While making an
incantation, she kneels and repeats her words three times in a chant, three times in a prayer
{Apollonius, Argonaulka 4. 1668-69). See also Cato, De Agri Cultura 70, where a preventive
for oxen taking sick requires a series of ingredients in threes, and Varro, Res Ruslicae 1. 2. 27,
for a cure for foot problems which includes a spell which must be chanted ter noviens. See, as
well, the anecdote of the old woman and Encolpius in Petronius' Salyricon 131. Encolpius is
suffering from temporary impotence and, among other things, the old woman tells him to spit
three times and to drop enchanted pebbles three times into his clothing.
'- Although the horse is not changed physically, the reaction of the warriors inside makes it
clear that they had been somehow cfianged, since they have become so vulnerable to the wiles
of Helen. For references to what is possibly a related tradition, that of anointing holy objects,
see C. A. Faraone, Talismans and Trojan Horses (New York 1992) 5-7.
Another perspective on this is the possible link between female speech and enchantment; see
A. L. T. Bergren, "Language and the Female in Early Greek Thought," /lr(?(/i«ra 16 (1993) 69-
95; I. E. Holmberg, "The Odyssey and Female Subjectivity," Helios 22 (1995) 103-22.
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rubbed another drug on each.
And the bristles streamed from their hmbs, which
the accursed drug which the lady Circe had handed them had caused to
grow there before.
And, going baclc, they became younger men than they were before
and very much more handsome and better to be looked at.
If our literary evidence is to be credited, the use of anointing was
customarily believed to be an important element in certain spells designed
to change the body in some way. Pythian 4. 221-22 and 233, as well as
Argonautica 3. 1042^3, 1049-51, for example, refer to the ointment which
Jason rubs on himself to become invulnerable for a day. In Apuleius'
Metamorphosis 3. 21, the lady Pamphile strips and anoints herself with an
ointment which, along with a whispered spell, turns her into an owl.'^ In
Menelaus' story, Helen's stroking is not the prelude to a change in the shape
of her—or the horse's
—
body, but it seems to be the prelude to a change in
her voice, as well as to a change in the behavior of the Achaeans within the
horse (4. 278-79):
ZK 5' ovotiaK^TiSriv Aavawv ovonai^ei; dpiaTouq,
TcdvTCOV 'Apyeicov cpuvriv 'I'oKoua' d^oxoiaiv.
And by name you summoned the best of the Danaans,
having mimicked the voices of the wives of all the Argives.
No surviving tradition tells us that the wives of the Achaeans were
anywhere except at home on the other side of the Aegean at this time. Thus,
it would seem doubly odd that, even being at Troy, they would be inside a
city which their warrior-husbands had been unable to enter for ten years.
Helen's behavior, too, seems very strange—Why should the Achaeans
believe her trick?—until Menelaus describes their reaction (4. 280-83):
autdp eyd) koI T\j5Ei5rii; Kal 5To<; 'OSuooetj!;
iinevoi £v neoooiaiv oKouaanEv wq tPoriaaq.
VUl HEV d|I(pOT£pC0 (iEVEr|Va|i£V opun^EVTE
f\ £^EA.9enEvai, f\ ev6o0£v aiy' ijnaKoijoai-
And both I and the son of Tydeus and godlike Odysseus
sitting in the midst, heard you as you cried.
Stirred up, we both were eager
either to go out or at once to answer from within.
That the Achaeans would fall for this is astonishing, but only if we ignore
Helen's triple circumambulation and rubbing of the horse. Like Odysseus'
men in the clutches of Circe, the men in the horse are falling under a spell.
And, just as Odysseus can resist Circe, so he can resist Helen—this time.
• The recited spell is also clearly a crucial part of the magic here. When Lucius, the hero,
allempts the same shape-changing, he employs the ointment—but without the spell—and is
turned, not into an owl, but into an ass (3. 24).
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A spell, however, is not always cast just by movement and anointing.
There may also be another element, that of summoning the one to be
charmed by name, as we can see in texts like Theocritus' second Idyl and its
descendant, Vergil's eighth Eclogue.^'* We see as well, I believe, an earlier
use of this practice in Circe's attempt to enchant Odysseus (10. 316-19),
where Odysseus tells his audience that not only did she use a drug, but "she
struck me with a staff and spoke a spell and summoned me" (pdpScp
TienXr\yv\.a enoq x' ecpotT' ek x' ovonai^ev, 10. 319).
Here, Circe goes beyond the potion and the staff which she used on
Odysseus' men, saying a charm of some sort (e7tO(;) and then attempting to
call Odysseus by name (ek t' 6v6|iai^Ev).'^ In the story as we have it in our
Odyssey, Odysseus has not yet given Circe a name, but, considering the
seeming muddle in the story here (as Carpenter has pointed out), and
considering Odysseus' encounters elsewhere, I would posit that an alternate
version of this story, no longer available, included a scene in which
Odysseus does what he does so often when he is entertained in the Odyssey,
introducing himself under a false name and autobiography. A clue in our
surviving text may lie in line 316: XEiJxe Se |ioi k-ukeco xP^c^e^P SETtai, ocppa
7iioi|ii, "she made for me the brew in a golden cup so that I would drink it."
When Circe had enchanted Odysseus' men, she presumably made them
the same brew she now tries to administer to Odysseus, but the poet at that
point in the story says nothing of any cup at all. Now Odysseus tells the
Phaeacians that the brew was not only given to him in a cup, but in a golden
cup. Without stepping any farther into the dubious realm of reconstruction,
one might at least theorize the following:
1. that there were once at least two versions of the story of
Circe's attempted enchantment;
2. that, in one, the divine \iGiX\) somehow protected Odysseus,
3. but that, in another, Odysseus tells Circe one of his lies,
providing a false name,
4. which Circe then uses—to no effect;
5. that there may be some evidence of this second story in two
details in our current text:
a. Circe serves Odysseus the brew in an upper-class cup of gold
rather than in a common clay or wooden one, implying that she
believes him to deserve such tableware (and why should she think
this unless Odysseus himself has suggested it?);'^
''' The title of Theocritus' poem. Pharmaceiilriae, "The Users of Charms/Drugs," and the
subtitle of Vergil's poem, Pharmaceiilria, glossed as "Sorceress," but more specifically "She
Who Employs Drugs," clearly underline only one part of spell-casting.
'^ For a view of ovoijd^Eiv in formulae which suggests a link to physical contact
(specifically touch), see R. P. Martin, The Language of Heroes (Ithaca 1989) 19-20.
'* When Telemachus serves his father before the suitors in their house on Ithaca, he pours
wine for his father in a golden cup {Od. 20. 257-61). Of all the people there, only Telemachus
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b. that, seemingly without the |icoXu, Circe's spell has no
effect—which leads Circe to exclaim (10. 329): "Yours in your
breast is some uncallable spirit" (ooi 6£ x\.q ev oxriGeoaiv
aKr\Xr\xoq vooq eaxiv).
"Uncallable," as I have translated the word dKTiA.riToq, offers one literal
reason for Odysseus' ability to withstand charms.''' Throughout the
Odyssey, Odysseus is constantly vigilant against revealing his true identity.
This would be natural for him to do on Ithaca, where the many suitors could
easily overwhelm him until he had made his plans and recruited allies, but
what are we to make of those other times when, pressed for the truth or no,
Odysseus presents an alternate personality?
It is a concept well known from folklore and anthropology that, in
certain cultures, one's name has such power that it is to be kept concealed at
all costs, for fear that, in the hands of another, it may be used as a weapon. '^
This is certainly true of later Greek belief One has only to examine curses,
both those with the name of the target already filled in and those which are
the magical equivalents of bureaucratic forms, with blanks carefully saved
for entering the name of the victim, to understand this. '^ In the case of such
belief in the earlier heroic world, Calvin Brown points to another of
Odysseus' adventures, that of the escape from Polyphemus, as a clear
illustration both of Odysseus' usual cautious practice and of the
consequences of dropping that practice. 2°
When first asked about his identity by the Cyclops, Odysseus is very
vague. He says that he and his men are followers of Agamemnon, and
leaves it at that—as does Polyphemus (9. 259-64). When Polyphemus asks
again, and promises a guest-gift, Odysseus gives his famous "Nobody"
reply (9. 364-67). It is only when he and his surviving crewmen are aboard
ship once more that Odysseus finally reveals his true identity, an action
which Aristotle believed Odysseus had taken to vent his anger (Rhetoric B
3. 16). Carolyn Higbie, in her 1995 book. Heroes' Names, Homeric
Identities, amplifies this quite correctly, I believe, in adding:
knows who the old beggar to whom he is attending really is. Does this suggest that he is giving
the suitors a mocking hint? If so. they fail to recognize it.
"
'AicfiXriToi; is formed on kti^eco ("to enchant"), which may well be related to KaXiw ("to
call, summon"), though the connection between the two forms is not evident on the
morphological level. See Chantraine, s.v. toiWo) and KaWm. On the semantic level, as I argue
through my interpretation of the archaic contexts of this word, a connection is indeed evident.
I am grateful to Gregory Nagy for assisting me in understanding the etymological difficulties of
this word.
'* The fairy tale, "Rumpelstiltskin," easily illustrates this belief.
" For the use in later Greco-Egyptian practice of specific names as the focus of spells, see
the many examples in H. D. Betz (ed.). The Greek Magical Papvri in Translation (Chicago
1986).
^^ C. S. Brown, "Odysseus and Polyphemus: The Name and the Curse," Comparative
Literature 18 (1966) 193-202.
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Many commentators have speculated over the wisdom of Odysseus'
self-identification, especially because of his previous craftiness and the use
to which the Cyclops puts the information, but it is explicable in heroic
terms. Warriors identify themselves to opponents, either as they begin
combat or as one is about to die; this enables the proper use of the
encounter to be made. For one who is successful, the naming allows the
deed to be remembered and sung to his credit.^'
Thus, as Aristotle says, Odysseus may name himself as part of his
revenge upon Polyphemus, but he is also claiming credit for his deed in the
manner of a warrior on an Homeric battlefield. He is also, as his crewmen
fear (9. 491-99), making a great mistake. By revealing himself, he becomes
the target of Polyphemus' curse. It is important to note here that, just as
Odysseus has been very specific in naming himself, saying not only that he
is Odysseus, son of Laertes, but that he lives on Ithaca (9. 502-05), so
Polyphemus is just as specific, praying that Odysseus, the son of Laertes,
who lives on Ithaca, might not return home (9. 530-31). When we
remember that Poseidon's anger keeps Odysseus from Ithaca until Zeus
finally intervenes, it is clear that directing anger through a name can have
powerful results.
If one is "uncallable," then, because his name is unknown, he has no
need for other magic and perhaps this is the reason why liSiXx) has
disappeared from our current Odyssey. As a strand of an alternate version
of Odysseus' resistance to Circe, the root has survived in our text, but,
because its use has been combined with another form of protection, it is
abandoned after its introduction. It would certainly appear that Circe has
not been able to complete her spell. That her failure is due at least in part to
the lack of Odysseus' true name may be underlined when she only realizes
the identity of the man when it is too late—she is in his power, and he
makes her swear the great oath that she will not try to enchant him again.
He has been advised to do this by Hermes (10. 299-301).
When with Circe, Odysseus, as Hermes describes it, will be naked
(dTioyunvcoGevTa, 10. 301). Nakedness here has a double meaning. It is the
literal physical condition for certain magical spells: Ointments are applied,
shapes are changed, when one is naked.-- Nakedness also implies the
exposure of one's self by revealing one's true name. This double-nakedness
takes us back to that moment in Helen's story where she says (4. 250-56):
iyu) 5e niv ol'ri dveyvcov xoiov Eovta 250
Kai (xiv avripcoTcov • 6 5e KEpSoouvti dA.££ivev.
aXX' oxe 5fi (iiv Eym Xoeov Ka'i xp^ov E^aicp,
^' C. Higbie, Heroes' Names, Homeric Identities (New York 1995) 164. See also N. Austin,
"Name Magic in the Odyssey," CSCA 5 (1972) 1-19.
^^ Jason, in the Argonautica. strips before anointing himself (3. 1042-43). See also
Petronius' Satyricon 62, in which a soldier strips, then turns into a werewolf, and the double
transformations of Pamphile and Lucius after stripping and rubbing themselves with ointment
in Apuleius' Metamorphosis 3. 21 and 3. 24.
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dtucpi 5e e{\iaxa eaoa Kai oSnoaa Kapxepov opKov
Hn (iEv Ttpiv 'OSuafia \ieia Tpcbeaa' dvacpfivai,
Ttpiv ye Tov iq vfjdi; xe 9odq KXxaiaq, x' dcpiKeaSai, 255
KOI TOTE 5ti hoi jtdvTa voov KOTeA-E^ev 'AxaiMV.
But I alone recognized him, even being in such form,
and questioned him. And he, in his cunning, was elusive.
But, when I was bathing him and anointed him with oil,
and I put clothes about him and swore a great oath
not to betray Odysseus among the Trojans afterwards,
before he returned to the swift ships and lean-tos,
then he explained to me all the thinking of the Achaeans.
It is evident from Iliad 3. 191-202, in which she identifies him even from a
distance, that Helen had long known Odysseus' face and name.-^ Thus, he
is already potentially naked in identity. He is obviously also physically
naked when she bathes him and anoints him.^'' As in his struggle with
Circe, however, Odysseus protects himself by forcing Helen to take an oath,
thus rendering himself, although here actually after the fact, aKr\Xr\xoq.^^
This condition might pertain when, later in Menelaus' story of Helen
and the wooden horse, Odysseus alone appears to be able to resist Helen's
attempt to lure the Achaeans in the horse into betraying themselves. Still
odcri^TiToq because of Helen's oath, he prevents the others from rash
behavior, even by force, when necessary. ^^
In describing Odysseus' behavior to Telemachus, Menelaus has spoken
admiringly of Odysseus' ability to resist this attempted seduction by Helen,
although he offers no explanation of Odysseus' strength more complicated
than that (4. 269-73):
aXk' OX) Jtco TOioijTov iyiav 'i5ov ocpSa^iioioiv
olov '05\jaofio(; xaXaoiippovoi; eoke (piXov icfip. 270
olov KOI t65' epE^E koi exXt] KopTEpoi; dvfip
iTtncp Evi ^EOTM, I'v' £VTi|iE0a KUvxEq dpiaioi
'ApyEiuv TpwEooi cpovov koi Kfipa cpEpovTEc;.
^' In the Troy tradition, Odysseus is even named as one of Helen's original suitors; see
Hesiod, Eoiae fr. 198 M-W, ApoUodorus 3. 10. 8, and Hyginus, Fabulae 81.
^'' Odysseus, according to Helen's account, has so distorted himself, even to the point of
self-mutilation, as to render himself unrecognizable. In short, he has performed a kind of
shape-changing. Can we see in this bathing and anointing an echo of Circe's anointing
Odysseus' men to reverse their shape-change from pigs back into humans?
^^ We might also see a miniature version of the bathing/identifying scene in Od. 19. 386-94,
467-502, where, by persuasion and threats, Odysseus preserves his "uncallable" status on
Ithaca when recognized by Eurycleia.
^*
I wonder whether we might link this scene with that in 12. 158-200, when the Sirens
summon Odysseus by name, tempting him to wreck his ship and destroy his companions on
their rocks, a temptation which he also resists. Mihoko Suzuki links the Sirens with Helen,
Circe, and Calypso: "for all these women tempt Odysseus to turn aside from the mindfulness
of the present to seek oblivion in the past or in timeless immortality" (Metamorphoses of
Helen: Authority, Difference, and the Epic [Ithaca 1989] 70).
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But never yet have I seen with my own eyes such a spirit
as that which was resolute Odysseus'.
Such did he do and endure, the powerful man,
in the wooden horse, where all the best of the Achaeans
sat, bringing killing and death to the Trojans!
When he resisted Circe, Odysseus had had the advantages of divine aid
from Hermes and perhaps an anonymity which had prevented him from
being "summoned." Facing Helen for the first time and being recognized,
Odysseus forced her to protect him with an oath. I have suggested that, the
second time, Odysseus may have been assumed to be under the protection
of Helen's earlier oath. In both stories, however, when it comes to power, it
is clear that Helen is the mightier of the two, even as Odysseus is praised for
his cunning and his spirit. In Helen's tale, after all, nothing Odysseus has
done to himself can blur her ability to identify him and it is only her oath
(and perhaps her change of heart towards the Achaeans) which keeps
Odysseus from the hands of vengeful Trojans. In Menelaus' story,
Odysseus may be able to keep the Achaeans from calling out, but it requires
the aid of Athena herself to save those beleaguered in the horse by removing
Helen. Why is Helen the more powerful and how might these two stories,
with their struggles between Odysseus and Helen, be about that power?
So far, we have seen Helen as a being like Circe, able to possess the
power to summon (in the magical sense of the word), as well as to use
drugs^^ and perhaps even to change shapes.^* Circe is perhaps a minor
deity. She comes from a powerful family, her father said to be Helios, her
mother Perse, daughter of Ocean. Her brother is Aietes, the father of
another sorceress, Medea (Od. 10. 135-39). Helen is probably to be
thought of as a demigoddess. Whether her mother is Leda or Nemesis,
Helen's father is Zeus,-^^ and post-heroic tradition appears to have elevated
Helen to the position of a deity in her own right, worshipped at Sparta and
^' L. L. Clader suggests that Helen's ability to use drugs hints at "witch-like powers," but
goes no farther with this suggestion (Helen: The Evolution from Divine lo Heroic in Greek Epic
Tradition [Leiden 1976] 32-33).
^* Does an ability to appear in different forms, along with her famous beauty, underlie a
number of stories about shape-changing which seem to surround Helen? See Apollodorus 3.
10. 7, in which one of her potential mothers. Nemesis, changes shape to avoid the attentions of
Zeus (she turns into a goose; in Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 8. 334, a (ish); Herodotus 6. 61
(also Pausanias 3. 7. 7) in which Helen changes the mother of Damaratus from a plain girl to a
beauty; and even Stesichorus fr. 192, in which it is an t'ihasXov of Helen which goes to Troy.
Even those who come to see her may come in other shapes—Odysseus, after all, arrives at her
house in Troy disguised as a beaten beggar, and, when Iris summons her to the wall of Troy to
see the combat of Menelaus and Paris in Iliad 3, Iris appears not as herself, but as Laodice,
Helen's sister-in-law, daughter of Priam (3. 121-24). Ironically, in Euripides' Helen, it is
Menelaus who has seemingly changed shape, as Helen does not recognize him at their first
meeting (541-66).
^' See Apollodorus 3. 10. 6-7 for both possibilities. Zeus, of course, was thought to change
shape often when courting mortals, but it is interesting to note that, according to Apollodorus
(3. 10. 7), Nemesis herself practiced shape-changing in order to attempt to avoid the attentions
of Zeus. For a variant, see Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 8. 334.
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at Rhodes.^'* Her power, however, would appear to come not from her
divine father, but from Aphrodite, as the goddess makes clear in Iliad 3.
414-17, when she threatens to withdraw her favor:
|iTi n' e'peGe, oxet^in. MTl xcoaanevr) oe lieGeiu),
xaiq 5e a' (X71ex9tipo) o)<; vuv EKTiayA-a (fiiXr\aa,
Heaacp 5' dnipoTEpcov urixiaonai 'ix^taX-oypa,
Tpwojv Kal AavaMV, av 5e kev kokov oitov 6>.riai.
Don't provoke me, you stubborn thing, lest, being angry, I abandon you,
and I hate you as much as now I have loved you,
and I will plan painful, hateful things in the midst of both
the Trojans and the Danaans, and you may suffer an evil fate.^'
If Helen's power derives from Aphrodite, her behavior, both with
Odysseus and at the horse, seems much more logical. First, there appears to
be a potential link between xenia and seduction, the tool of Aphrodite:
Odysseus must sleep with Circe in order to keep power over her {Od. 10.
297-98). Might there then be the hint of sex in Odysseus' confrontation
with Helen? Unlike Helen, Nausicaa does not bathe Odysseus, nor does
Circe (although one might expect her to) in other scenes of xenia in the
Odyssey. Both times, the act is performed by servants.^^ yet Helen tells us
that she herself not only bathed but anointed and dressed Odysseus—and
there is no mention of servants at all.^^ Our text does not tell us if Odysseus
"' For her worship at Sparta, see Pausanias 3. 15. 3. For her worship at Rhodes, see 3. 19.
10, where Helen appears to be linked to a sacrificial cult like that of Atys. For more on Helen's
divinity, see Clader (above, note 27) and J. Lindsay, Helen of Troy, Woman and Goddess
(London 1974). The idea of Helen as goddess must not have been current everywhere, or at
least not in 5th-century B.C. Athens. A number of red-figure pots from 480 to perhaps the end
of the century and beyond illustrating that moment at the fall of Troy when Menelaus comes to
claim Helen show a panicked Helen and, sometimes, a protective Aphrodite. Helen's behavior
there is hardly that of a goddess protected by her immortality from mortal harm. See, for
example, the illustrations by the Syriskos Painter (c. 480) and the Altamura Painter (c. 475-
450) in S. Woodford, The Trojan War in Ancient Art (Ithaca 1993) 112, nos. 106 and 107, and
a particularly elaborate depiction by a painter connected with the Heimarmene Painter (end of
the 5lh century?) in J. Boardman, Athenian Red Figure Vases: The Classical Period (London
1989) 162, no. 309. As well, in Aristophanes' Lysistrala (411 B.C.), Lampito jokes that Helen
saved herself by exposing her naked breasts to Menelaus (155-56).
" See also Penelope's explanation of Helen's troubles, that a god had driven her to behave
as she did (23. 217-24). Might the use of "god" by Penelope, and Menelaus' earlier "daimon,"
be euphemistic? If Aphrodite can cause such troubles, would anyone—especially a victim like
Menelaus—want to risk summoning her by using her name?
-" Among the Phaeacians 8. 449-57; with Circe 10. 357-67.
-" Is there a possibility of magic garments being mixed in with xenia here? Although the
pattern seems fairly standardized: After bathing, Odysseus is clothed by Helen (4. 252-53),
Phaeacian servants (8. 454-55), and Circe's servant (10. 364-65), yet, in two out of the three
cases, women with powers of enchantment are involved. If magic is a possibility, then I would
suggest a possible association of this act of clothing with the murder of Agamemnon by
Clytemnestra, Helen's half-sister, as described in Aeschylus' Agamemnon. Like Odysseus,
Agamemnon is given a bath, then clothed, the difference being that, at the end of his bath,
Agamemnon is wrapped in a garment which is used to kill him (1382-83), rather than prepared
for a sexual situation. With the magical in mind, one might then also see an incantational
significance in Clytemnestra's insistence that she killed her tangled husband with three blows
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then slept with Helen,^'' but she does seduce him at least into admitting his
identity and his plans, even while he protects himself as he did with Circe,
by making her swear the great oath.
Second, although Menelaus suggests that "a daimon was intending to
direct you, who wished to hold out honor for the Trojans," we know from
countless other incidents in the Troy tale that it is not unnamed daimones
who direct humans, but very specific gods with very specific ends.
Although no one earlier than the third- or fourth-century A.D. poet
Triphiodorus, in his Iliou Persis, appears specifically to identify Aphrodite
as the power prompting Helen to the Trojan horse, ^^ the fact that Helen
again is seen using seductive, sexual powers through the voices of the
Achaeans' wives would seem to confirm Aphrodite's role in her action.
From the moment in Iliad 4. 7-12, when Zeus taunts Hera and Athena
about Aphrodite's rescue of Paris from Menelaus, we see Athena and
Aphrodite at odds. In Iliad 5. 131-32, Athena prompts Diomedes to single
out Aphrodite for attack. And, in Iliad 5. 330^3, as Aphrodite attempts to
extricate her son, Aeneas, from death at his hands, Diomedes actually stabs
her. Such is Athena's obvious animosity that Dione, when her daughter
comes to her for comfort, knows immediately that Athena is behind
Diomedes' temerity (//. 5. 405-06). With this animosity understood
between the two goddesses, we have only to remember that Athena is
Odysseus' patron to imagine another reason why he might be immune to
Helen's power as he crouches inside Athena's own inspiration, the wooden
horse.
Although Apollodorus states that the Trojan horse was under the
protection of Apollo (Epitome 5. 18), there is much more evidence to
suggest that there was a stronger tradition in which Athena watched over
it.^^ From 4. 289 in particular ("until Pallas Athena led you away from us"),
we might conclude that, at least in our current text of the Odyssey, the latter
deity is watching over the Achaeans' strategy. ^^
(1384-86). See also perhaps the poisoned garments used by Medea to kill the princess of
Corinth in Euripides' Medea and the tradition of the poisoned tunic which the dying Nessus
tricks Deianira into putting on Heracles (Apollodorus 2. 7. 7).
^^ Considering that she is telling this tale in front of her husband, as well as Odysseus' son.
Telemachus, this would hardly seem likely behavior. See, however, Bergren (above, note 4)
208-09, for the idea that Helen may be demonstrating her seductive powers to gain KXioq.
^' Triphiodorus, Iliou Persis 454—56. It is curious here that Aphrodite appears as an old
woman, especially in the light of her line, "For I give you to Menelaus, who has endured
much" (462), which would seem to uncover her disguise immediately, anonymous old women
not being much given to control over kings. Is Triphiodorus simply repeating an older
tradition, one which has not come down to us?
^* See Vergil, Aeneid 2. 225-27, where the two serpents, having destroyed Laocoon and his
two sons, escape to hide at the base of the statue of Athena in the citadel of Troy.
^' As Proclus tells us in his summary of the Little Iliad that Athena had inspired Epeius to
construct the horse {Chrestomathy 2), her protection of the finished product would seem
natural.
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Seen this way, Helen's temptations and Odysseus' reactions might
appear, like so many other moments in the Troy tale, to be divine struggles
worked out through human agents. And, should they be so, they prove the
power of the deities behind the mortals, even while they allow those mortals
a certain almost-divine power. If we consider Helen's tale of her behavior
towards the disguised Odysseus in Odyssey 4 in this light, we see a mortal,
or semi-divine figure, triumphing, through the power of her patron goddess.
Aphrodite, over a mortal, Odysseus, with an underlying text in which
Aphrodite scores off Odysseus' patron, Athena, if only in that Helen teases
Odysseus' real identity out of him. The contrary would then be true in
Menelaus' tale in Odyssey 4, where Helen, for all the magical powers given
her by Aphrodite, can seduce the rest of those in the horse, but not
Odysseus, because he is under the protection of Athena. And, in this tale,
Athena is the winner.
Such stories match very nicely with the Iliad's picture of indirect
combat between Athena and Aphrodite and with the larger Homeric picture
of the gods constantly at war with each other through their human
surrogates. Helen and Odysseus, at this level, and in these two stories, may
resemble Diomedes, an agent of divine will. In Odysseus' case, this is
expressed as much by the appearance of the divinity who backs him as by
his personal abilities. In the case of Helen, we see only her own power,
which displays itself most clearly in her gift for persuasion and in her
perception, her ability to recognize what is truly there, even when cleverly
disguised. She knows the beggar-spy Odysseus when she sees him. She
perceives that the wooden horse is a ruse and recognizes those within so
well that she can choose which wives to imitate. ^^
When we consider the scene of the telling of stories about Odysseus to
Telemachus, then, we might begin with the levels already discussed in other
interpretations, but we might add to these levels that of indirect combat
between two rival goddesses, not only in terms of Odysseus and Helen, but
also in terms of Helen and Menelaus. When we think of Helen and
Odysseus as actors within those stories, we can add to our interpretation the
idea of Odysseus as "uncallable" and Helen as one who, time and again in
the story of Troy, practices arts shared with Circe and Medea, these arts
linking her with Circe to make a greater resonance in the narrative.
And Helen's powers certainly extend beyond her actions in Troy. By
his words, Menelaus is a great admirer and long-time friend of Odysseus,
and yet he has, at first, no idea that his friend's son is standing before him
{Od. 4. 60-64). Helen matches father and son at once (4. 138-^6). This
ability to perceive the hidden is displayed one final time at Telemachus'
departure, when an omen appears above Menelaus' courtyard. A wild eagle
seizes a domestic goose (15. 160-65). Menelaus, requested to interpret the
^* Perhaps even the teichoscopia, with its emphasis upon identification, is a echo of this
power.
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vision, stumbles—no more powerful than when he was trapped in the horse
by Helen's seductive voice. Helen then steps forward and, in her last
appearance in the Odyssey, correctly recognizes the sign sent by Zeus as a
warning that Odysseus will now appear and take revenge (15. 169-78).
Telemachus, impressed with her quick understanding, unconsciously
reminds us of Helen's earlier underlining of her power and her relationship
to the divine by saying (15. 180-81):
OUTQ) vuv Zeuq GeiTi, EpiY5o\)j:o(; nooii; "Hprii;-
TO) K£v Toi Kai KeiGi Geu co(; eijxexocpuriv.
Thus may Zeus, the thundering husband of Hera, make it happen.
Then, even at home, I would pray to you as I would to a god.
And, with these words, Telemachus drives off and Helen disappears
from the Odyssey, having sent the son homeward to join the father she had
tried to seduce and name within the walls of Troy.
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The perplexing "Deception Speech" in Sophocles' Ajax has been the subject
of much scholarship.' This is not surprising, since many believe that this
magnificent, mysterious, and complex speech (646-92) is the key to
understanding the entire play. It appears at the center of the play and acts as
the play's major turning point. Nearly all the action leads up to this speech,
and, as the play progresses, refers back to it.^
The events surrounding this speech are these: Dishonored by failing to
receive the arms of Achilles, Ajax attempts to kill the Greek commanders in
their sleep, but is deluded by Athena for his excessive pride. In his madness
he tortures and slaughters the Greeks' sheep and cattle. Ajax returns to his
senses, learns of his deeds, and determines to commit suicide, for his shame
I wish to thank the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions: Kirk
Ormand, Gregory Dobrov, Julie Belanger, the editor and referees for ICS, and especially Edwin
P. Menes.
' A complete list of works is too extensive to make enumeration practical. I single out the
three studies of B. M. W. Knox, "The /\;a«: of Sophocles," //5CP 55 (1961) 1-37; M. Sicherl,
"The Tragic Issue in Sophocles' Ajax," YCS 25 (1977) 67-97; and R. P. Winnington-Ingram,
Sophocles: An Interpretation (Cambridge 1980) 38-59, which together offer a very extensive
bibliography and detailed review of the controversy surrounding Ajax's speech, beginning
from Welcker's presentation of the problems in 1829. See also 1. M. Linforth, "Three Scenes
in Sophocles' Ajax," UCPCP 15 (1954) 10-20; H. Musurillo, The Light and the Darkness:
Studies in the Dramatic Poetry of Sophocles (Leiden 1967) 7-24; J. Moore. "The Dissembling-
Speech of Ajax," YCS 25 (1977) 48-54; O. Taplin, "Yielding to Forethought: Sophocles'
AjaM," in G. W. Bowersock (ed.), Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W.
Knox on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday (New York 1979) 122-29; and D. A. Hester, "The
Heroic Distemper: A Study in the Ajax of Sophocles," Prometheus 5 (1979) 247-52. For most
recent scholarship, see J. P. Poe, Genre and Meaning in Sophocles' /Ay'ax (Frankfurt 1986) 50-
71; M. W. Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek
Ethics (Cambridge 1989) 60-105, specifically 72-88; G. Crane, "Ajax, the Unexpected, and
the Deception Speech," CP 85 (1990) 89-101; J. R. March, "Sophocles' Ajax: The Death and
Burial of a Hero," BICS 38 (1993) 11-22; J. Gibert, Change of Mind in Greek Tragedy
(Gottingen 1995) 120-35; and C. Gill, Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy:
The Self in Dialogue (Oxford 1995) 204-16. I will be be referring to the following
commentaries: R. C. Jebb, Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments VII: The AjcLX (Cambridge
1896); J. C. Kamerbeek, The Plays ofSophocles. Commentaries I: The Ajax (Leiden 1953); W.
B. Stanford, Sophocles. Ajax (London 1963); and A. F. Garvie, Sophocles. Ajax (Warminster
1998).
^ Cf. Knox (previous note) I and Sicherl (previous note) 67.
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and disgrace are too much to bear. He considers various ways to end his
life because, he says, if he cannot live honorably, he will die honorably.
Tecmessa appeals to him, but despite her attempts, she does not soften his
resolve to die. She and the chorus fear the worst. Ajax bids farewell to his
son and orders everyone out of his tent, where Tecmessa and the chorus
expect him to kill himself. A melancholy choral ode follows. Shortly
thereafter, Ajax emerges from his tent with sword in hand, speaking words
which suggest a change of mind. He says in strained and ambiguous
language that he now feels pity for Tecmessa and his son, and that he will
go to the seashore to cleanse himself of his pollution and bury his sword.
Reconciliation with the Atreidae will follow. Tecmessa and the chorus
rejoice as they think that Ajax has decided to live. Then, alone near the
shore Ajax curses the Atreidae and commits suicide by throwing himself
onto his planted sword.
Tecmessa later concludes that she was deceived by Ajax and cast from
his favor (807-08). Did Ajax change his mind and decide to live, only to
change it back again? Did he intend to deceive Tecmessa and the chorus?
Winnington-Ingram nearly dismisses discussion on Ajax's intent: "The
point need not be labored, since most recent interpreters accept that Ajax all
along intends to die and many that he intends to deceive."^ More recently,
Stevens argues that nearly everything in Ajax's speech contributes in some
way to consciously deceiving Tecmessa and the chorus; from the time he
recovers his sanity until his death he remains "proud, uncompromising,
obstinate, implacable.'"* But is the intentional deception of Tecmessa an
adequate motive for this speech? Knox and Sicherl maintain that Ajax had
no intentions to deceive.^ Tecmessa and the chorus have simply
misunderstood his words and therefore have no one else to blame but
themselves. Furthermore, in regard to Ajax's state of mind, most scholars
view Ajax as reflective, contemplative, and psychologically detached from
his surroundings, and many, including Knox and Winnington-Ingram, go so
far as to call it some type of monologue or soliloquy.* Some, however,
remain unconvinced and require more proof. Taplin, for example, writes,
"But I cannot see how the speech is any more a soliloquy than many others
in Greek tragedy. . . I suspect that, as often, it is a mistake to ask too
precisely. Who is this addressed to?"'' Most recently. Gill attempts to
answer this question, suggesting that the dramatic form is something of a
deliberative "duologue" which responds to and answers Tecmessa's
previous appeals.^ Still more perplexing for scholars is the ambiguous
' Winnington-Ingram (above, note 1) 47.
* P. T. Stevens, "Ajax in the Trugrede." CQ 36 (1986) 334-35.
' Knox (above, note 1)14 and Sicherl (above, note 1) 89-90. Likewise Musurillo (above,
note 1) 14-16; Gibert (above, note 1) 120; and Gill (above, note 1) 205.
* Knox (above, note 1) 12-14 and Winnington-Ingram (above, note 1) 24.
^ Taplin (above, note 1) 123.
^ Gill (above, note 1)204-16.
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language that caused Tecmessa to feel that she was deceived and cast from
Ajax's good graces. This speech then is wanting an interpretation that can
somehow reconcile the above issues. In this paper 1 argue that these points
can be resolved by understanding that the dramatic form of this speech is
not only a soliloquy, but one which Sophocles modeled after the Homeric
deliberative soliloquy, specifically Hector's in Book 22 of the Iliad. Once
we understand the Iliadic model and Sophocles' rethinking and
transformation of it, the question of deception, Ajax's intent, the dramatic
form of the speech, and most importantly the ambiguous language become
less problematic.
I. Hector's Soliloquy
Near the beginning of Book 22 of the Iliad, Hector stands fast, determined
to fight Achilles under the walls of Troy. Priam beseeches his son to take
pity on him and to come inside the wall, so that he can rescue Troy, for
Hector's survival is linked with his own (38-78). Next, Hecuba also begs
him to pity her and Andromache, because if Achilles kills him, they will not
be able to mourn his body (79-89). Their tears, supplication, and demands
for pity do not openly move him. Instead, he leans his shield against the
wall and debates with himself (98-130).
Hector's internal debate falls into a natural group of four soliloquies in
the Iliad.^ They share the same typology: The fighter starts with a cry of
desperation, ponders the disagreeable choices, which are usually expressed
in dilemma form, and signals his decision with a formula of transition from
private reflection to narrated action:
aXka xiTi HOI xauTU <p{A,oi; 5i£A.E^aT0 Gunoq;
But why does my dear heart debate about these things?'"
'The remaining three soliloquies, of Odysseus (11. 401-10), Menelaus (17. 91-105), and
Agenor (21. 553-70), differ from Hector's in that unlike the others, who are virtually cut off
from safety. Hector can walk into the safe haven of Troy. Here 1 am following the typology
outlined and explained by B. Fenik, "Stylizalion and Variety: Four Monologues in the Iliad." in
B. Fenik (ed.), Homer: Tradition and Invention (Leiden 1978) 68-90. See again Fenik, Typical
Battle Scenes in the Iliad: Studies in the Narrative Techniques ofHomeric Battle Descriptions
(Wiesbaden 1968) 96-102. For further discussion on Hector's soliloquy and internal debate,
see D. Lohmann, Die Komposition der Reden in der Itias (Berlin 1970) 37-38; O. Taplin,
Homeric Soundings: The Shaping of the Iliad (Oxford 1992) 230-36; N. Richardson, The Iliad:
A Commentary VI: Books 21-24 (Cambridge 1993) 1 19; J. M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in
the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector (Chicago 1975) 157-59; and, for the longest sustained
discussion of this, see Gill (above, note 1) 81-93, who explores in detail Hector's
psychological motivation and deliberative process.
'" All references to the Iliad and Ajax are taken from the Oxford Classical texts of Monro-
AUen and Lloyd-Jones-Wilson respectively. The recent Teubner text of the Iliad (only vol. 1.
Books 1-12, is available) by M. L. West (Stuttgart 1998) and the Oxford edition agree in the
readings of those passages relevant to this paper. Translations are my own, and are literal,
without regard to literary merit (with the exception of //. 22. 123, where 1 have adapted A. T.
Murray's translation in the Loeb [Cambridge, MA 1925]).
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Each articulates his situation in his own terms. Hector's soliloquy
stands out as it is the culmination of the four; it is the longest, the most
complex, the most exciting and probably the most memorable. The prelude
of Priam and Hecuba hysterically pleading with Hector, moreover,
heightens the emotional effect. Furthermore, while the other warriors
escape. Hector is the only one to die in the confrontation. The basic
elements of Hector's soliloquy are these:
1. He is a single warrior facing unequal odds.
2. He ponders his various options, including retreat and
reconciliation.
3. He likens himself to a woman, if he were to decide to talk
instead of act.
4. He sees his entire plight in terms of honor and shame.
5. He decides to go with his original decision."
The soliloquy begins with Hector realizing that he should have
followed the advice of Polydamas, his friend and fellow warrior, to lead the
Trojans back into the city the day before (18. 243-313). Hector now feels
that his stubbornness has killed many of his people, for he boasted to his
friend that he would never run away from Achilles (306-08), who has just
slaughtered many Trojans. At this point, should he return to the city, he
would incur shameful reproach from Polydamas. A somber line (105)
follows, recalling his conversation with Andromache in Book 6:'^
ai5eo|iai Tpwa(; koi TpcpdSac; k.XKta\.ninXo\)C,
I feel shame before the Trojan men and women with trailing robes.
Thoughts of retreat and shame turn to resistance and honor as the poet
shows the binding effect of the heroic code. Although he knows that the
fate of Troy rests on his survival, Hector falteringly decides to face
Achilles. He is concerned above all with honor and shame; if he cannot live
honorably, he will die honorably (108-10):
e|iol 5't tot' av no^i) Kep5iov e'lri
avTTiv r\ 'AxiA-fja KaxoKTEivavTa veeoGai,
fie KEY aiJTU) o^eoGai ivKXemq npb n6XT\o<;.
At that time it would be better by far
" Fenik, "Stylization and Variety" (above, note 9) 69, lists four general ingredients of the
soliloquies. I have modified them, so that they are more specific to and, consequently, more
telling of Hector's soliloquy. Fenik's last element is escape, which, of course, does not apply
to Hector's situation.
'- This line appears only once more in the Iliad, in Hector's reply to Andromache, who
beseeches him to stay on the rampart with herself and their child (6. 442). Both Richardson
(above, note 9) ad loc. and Redfield (above, note 9) acknowledge a parallel between these two
scenes. See also note 15 below for further discussion.
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to face Achilles and kill him, and return,
or else be slain by him in glory before the city.
Only victory or death can restore his honor and erase his shame. '^ But
Hector begins to waver. No sooner does he make a decision than thoughts
of compensation and reconciliation dart through his mind. He entertains the
idea of going out, unarmed (yu|iv6v) to meet Achilles with a promise to
give back Helen and the booty which Paris stole. As Fenik writes, "What
was once a just recourse is now only a sorry contrivance, born of
desperation and weakness."''' Again, Hector rejects his own suggestions on
the basis of the heroic code. This course of action would bring him no
honor but the shame of being killed like a woman (123-25):
(iri [iiv iyu) \iev iKconai icbv, b bt |i' ouk E^erioei
ouSe t{ h' aiSeaexai, kteveei §£ \i£ yujivov eovto
auTwc; co; le jwaiKa, inti k' anb xtix^o. Siju.
Let it not be that I go up to him, but he will not pity me,
nor in any way respect me, but kill me naked,
just as a woman, once I stripped myself of my armor.
Hector's language shows the intensity of his rejection. He likens himself to
a woman in order to emphasize the shame with which he would die should
he adopt this measure. Reconciliation is impossible; friends they never
were, friends they will never be. But this reality does not prevent Hector
from wishing it so. Although knowing that Achilles will not listen to his
pleas (just as he himself did not yield to Priam and Hecuba), he nevertheless
conjures up, then dismisses, a scene far more pleasant than the terror which
actually awaits him (126-28):
o\) (lEv noic, v\jv Eonv anb Spvbc, ovb' anb nexpT\q
Tcp oapi^EfiEvai, a te napQevoc, liiGEOQ te,
napdtvoq ti'iBeoc; x' oapii^Etov a^>.T|Xouv.
There is now no way from a tree or a rock
to talk intimately with him, like a young man and a maiden,
in the way a young man and a maiden talk intimately with each other.
Hector wistfully thinks of Andromache as he realizes that he cannot talk to
Achilles as he would his wife, for the verb oapi^co repeated above appears
nowhere else in Homer except in the touching, memorable exchange
between Hector and Andromache at 6. 516.'^
'^ Cf. Taplin (above, note 9) 234.
''' Fenik, "Stylizalion and Variety" (above, note 9) 84.
" In a sense he is thinking of both Achilles and Andromache. This may be a poetic way of
saying, "This Achilles, he's no Andromache." I think it is no coincidence that both the earlier
line (aiStonai Tpcba; Km TpcpaSai; eXK£aininXo\)z,. see above, note 12) and the verboapil^co
occur only twice in the Iliad, in the same scenes in which Hector is a main character, and when
non-engagement with the enemy is an issue. Pathos is heightened as we are reminded of his
emotional encounter with Andromache in Book 6 and, consequently, of what he stands to lose
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This soliloquy reveals that Hector is in a turmoil of uncertainty. He
thinks of his wife and ponders the choices of retreat, resistance, restitution,
and compensation, then reconciliation. None stands up to the code by
which he has lived his life, for none increases his glory and fame. He will
live honorably, or he will die honorably. Hector decides on the only
available course and rejects any action producing shame, especially one by
which he is made womanly. It is a decision hesitantly made and, as
evidenced by his flight, immediately abandoned.'* He will fight Achilles,
but unlike the other warriors in this group of four soliloquies, he will not
escape.
II. Sophocles' Ajax and Homer's Hector
At first glance. Hector's soliloquy in the Iliad is far removed from Ajax's
speech in Sophocles' play. What reasons are there to suppose that in
creating Ajax's speech Sophocles was thinking of Homer, the Iliad, or even
a scene as remote as Hector's soliloquy in Book 22? As Kirkwood states, it
would be hard to name a prominent ancient Greek author who is not in
some way Homeric. ''' Yet Sophocles, more than most, writes with a certain
Homeric proclivity. The Life of Sophocles reports opinions attesting to
Sophocles' affinity to Homer, and Diogenes Laertius considered Homer to
be an epic Sophocles and Sophocles a tragic Homer. '^ Of the three major
tragedians Sophocles seems to be the most interested in Homeric character;
over one third of his more than one hundred and twenty plays were on
Homeric or Trojan War themes.'^ Modern scholars also have observed in
the works of Sophocles not only a generally diffused Homeric color, but
also Homeric passages.-'^ All of these critics, ancient and modern alike,
point to Ajax as their prime example.
should he face Achilles and die. Cf. C. Moulton, Similes in the Homeric Poems (Gottingen
1977) 82; Richardson (above, note 9) ad loc; and K. Crotty, The Poetics of Supplication:
Homer's Iliad and Odyssey {Ithaca 1994) 85-87.
" Cf. Fenik, "Stylization and Variety" {above, note 9) 85.
" G. M. Kirkwood, "Homer and Sophocles' Ajax," in M. J. Anderson {ed.), Classical
Drama and its Influences: Essays Presented to H. D. F. Kitio (London 1965) 53.
'* On the Life of Sophocles, see M. R. Lefkowitz, The Lives of the Greek Poets (Baltimore
1981) 75-87 and 160-63; Diogenes Laertius 4. 20.
" In the dated but still informative study of the fragments of Sophocles' plays {The
Fragments of Sophocles [Cambridge 1917]), A. C. Pearson numbers the plays at 123 (p. xv)
and counts 43 of them as belonging to the 'Trojan Cycle (p. xxxi): "If the limits were enlarged
so as to include the plays whose subjects lie on the borders of the Homeric domain, the result
would be even more striking" (pp. xxxi-xxxii). Stefan Radt, "Sophokles in seinen
Fragmenten," in Entretiens Hardi 29 (Geneva 1983) 185-231, also calculates the percentage at
over one third (p. 196), but numbers the plays at only 122 (p. 194).
^^ See Kirkwood (above, note 17) 54. Although Kirkwood was not the first to write about
the Homeric influence on Sophocles, his work is the most wide-ranging study concerning
Homer and Sophocles' Ajax. For more on Sophocles' use of Homer, see R. Garner, From
Homer to Tragedy: The Art ofAllusion in Greek Poetry (London 1990) 46-64. For scholarship
dealing with Homer and particular scenes in Ajax, see C. M. Bowra, Sophoclean Tragedy
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But neither Trojan War themes nor the use of Iliadic characters
necessarily implies Homeric imitation or reminiscence; Sophocles'
depiction of Menelaus and Agamemnon in Ajax proves this.-' Still, most
scholars agree that the character of Ajax has deep Homeric roots, and that
there is no way in which Sophocles' portrayal of him is other than a true
development from Homer's Ajax.^^ Sophocles, like Homer, depicts him as
a stark contrast to Odysseus. He is unchanging, inflexible, intractable, and
straightforward. Thus arises the incompatibility of Ajax and deception; the
essential immutability of his character makes him unable to tell an overt lie
to Tecmessa and the chorus.
In addition to the Trojan War setting and the character of Ajax, there
are other areas or aspects of Ajax in which Homeric influence is evident.
Sophocles, for example, borrows general plot elements from the Iliad. First,
Athena is the common thread in the circumstance of the demise of Hector
and Ajax. She deludes both heroes; the former she tricks into facing
Achilles by creating the image of his brother Deiphobus, and the latter she
temporarily drives mad, which ultimately leads to his suicide.-^ Second,
both Homer's Hector and Sophocles' Ajax are prevented from returning
home because of a previous boast. Hector faces reproach from his brother
after he boasted that he would never run from Achilles, and Ajax faces
reproach from his father after he boasted that he needed no help from the
gods.-'' In other words, their feelings of shame stemming from their refusal
to listen to advice prevent them from returning home. Third, after both
heroes die, the subsequent plots revolve around the question of burial for
each man. Achilles attempts to mutilate the dead body of Hector until
Priam becomes the principal advocate for its burial. In Ajax, Menelaus and
Agamemnon are the real killers of Ajax (so Tecmessa states) and are
prepared to let Ajax's body lie unburied, until Teucer and Odysseus become
the principal advocates.
Sophocles does not restrict his use of the Iliad to the Trojan War setting
and mere general plot parallels. As the remainder of this section will show,
Sophocles rethinks and transforms scenes from the Iliad in which Hector
(Oxford 1965) 118-21; P. E. Easterling, "The Tragic Homer," B/CS 31 (1984) 1-8; and March
(above, note 1)9-17.
2' See Kirkwood (above, note 17) 55-56 and 63-70.
^^ As Winnington-Ingram notes ([above, note 1] 19), Ajax is more than a typical Homeric
hero, for he "carries the implications of the heroic code to the extreme possible point . . ." Cf.
also Kirkwood (above, note 17) 59-61, after numerous comparisons: "Sophocles has taken this
Homeric figure in its entirety for the depiction of his tragic Ajax. He has imported nothing
whatsoever thai is not in accord with it." See also March (above, note 1) 9-24, especially 1 1-
14.
-' Cf. K. Reinhardt, Sophocles, transl. by H. and D. Harvey (New York 1979) 10: "In the
Iliad Athena deceives Hector in his flight, in order to deliver him into Achilles' hands. But
Sophocles' Athena goes much further than Homer's. She continues to play tricks on the man
after he has been betrayed."
-'' For the hubris theme in Ajajc, see Crane (above, note 1) 99-101. Conversely, M.
Simpson, "Sophocles' Ajax: His Madness and Transformation," Arelhusa 2 (1969) 88-103,
argues that Ajax is not hubristic, though, of course, mad.
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appears, and he continually alludes to Homer's Hector through scenes,
themes, symbolism, and diction. ^^ For example, the farewell scene at Iliad
6. 390-502, in which Hector and Andromache appear on the rampart, is a
conspicuous model for the long Sophoclean scene in which Ajax and
Tecmessa converse (430-595).^^ In these scenes both Tecmessa and
Andromache beg their men for pity and ask not to be abandoned, for if their
men die, each woman would become a widow and her son an orphan. Each
points out that she is solely dependent on her man, since both of their
parents were killed, Tecmessa's by Ajax, Andromache's by Achilles. Both
Ajax and Hector reach for their sons and pray, and both reject the pleas of
their women on the basis of the heroic values of honor and shame. At the
conclusion of each scene, the men dismiss their women. Hector tells
Andromache to get back to her work, while Ajax bids Tecmessa to take
herself and their son out of the tent.
This allusion to the Homeric scene, particularly to Hector, becomes
more pronounced as Sophocles borrows precise details and locutions. Both
passages refer to inescapable necessity, dvaYKri (//. 6. 458, Aj. 485), and
both speak of the slavery of woman and child with the same word, 5ou>.iov
(//. 6. 463, Aj. 499). Next, each woman predicts that if her man dies, her
son will become an orphan. Andromache uses opcpaviKov (//. 6. 432), while
Tecmessa speaks of orphan caretakers, opcpavioxcov (Aj. 512). The
allusions continue as Ajax tells Tecmessa that their son Eurysaces will not
fear him, TapPfjoei yap ov (545), still blood-soaked from the fresh
slaughter, an obvious reference to Astyanax's fear of Hector's plumed
helmet, xapPfiaaq (6. 469).-^ Finally, in his reply to Andromache, Hector
imagines what someone would say after he himself is dead and Andromache
is taken captive (6. 459-62). Hector begins with Kai Koxe xiq e'lJirioiv and
concludes with c6q jioxe xiq epeei. In Ajax, in the final scene between
Tecmessa and Ajax, Sophocles transforms his Homeric model so that the
female character imagines what the enemy would say. Tecmessa begins
with Kav Tiq ... epei and concludes with xomut' epei xiq (500-04).
Sophocles not only imitates Homeric ring composition, but also employs a
^' This connection between Homer's Hector and Sophocles' Ajax has not gone unnoticed.
See W, E. Brown, "Sophocles' Ajax and Homer's Hector," CJ 61 (1966) 118-21, and most
recently March (above, note 1) 15-18. In this section I will make extensive use of Easterling's
important and penetrating study of Sophocles' use of Homer to create his own scenes (above,
note 20). Parallels have also been drawn between Achilles and Ajax; see Knox (above, note 1)
22-23; Hester (above, note 1) 25; Winnington-Ingram (above, note 1) 17-20; and March
(above, note 1) 14-15.
*^ This scene is so closely modeled after the Homeric scene that the scholia of Ajax (499-
574) refer six times to this model scene in the Iliad and to nothing else, and the scholiast twice
uses Hector for clarification. There is far too much scholarship comparing these two scenes to
list here, but I offer the following most relevant works: Easterling (above, note 20) 1-8 gives
the most detailed and insightful analysis of this scene, comparing and contrasting it with the
Homeric model. See also Reinhardt (above, note 23) 17-22; Garner (above, note 20) 51-58;
and particularly Stanford (above, note 1 ) ad loc. for useful divisions of this extended scene.
" Cf. Gamer (above, note 20) 52.
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literary device, the xiq-speech, so recognizably Homeric and closely linked
to the Homeric values of honor and shame. ^^ All of these references and
allusions put it beyond a doubt that Sophocles had in mind the Homeric
scene of Hector and Andromache as a model for his own.
If we continue to have the Iliadic analogy in mind, some interesting
results appear. Comparing the same two scenes, we find that both Ajax and
Hector consider their situations from the viewpoint solely based on heroic
values. In the beginning of the exchange with Tecmessa, Ajax articulates
his plight in terms of honor and shame, and he continually returns to his
father as the focus of his shame and parental approval. He says (434-40):
OTOU naxT]p (lev xr\a?)' an 'I6a{aq x^ovoq
TO Hpcoxa KaXXicTtV apxaitvaaq oxpaTou 435
Ttpoq oiKov fiA.6e naaa\r EUK^eiav ipepcov
Eyo) 5' 6 KEivou Tioii;, xov aijiov ei; xokov
Tpoiaq intXQuiv ouk iXdaaovi oGevei
oiJ5' epya liEico x^ipo? apKiaaq i\if\q,
cxTiiioi; 'Apyeioiciv 0)5' anoXXxniai. 440
My father by his valor won
the supreme prize of the troops and
came home from this land of Ida bearing every honor;
But I his son, who came to the same Trojan land
with no less might and successfully
proved my hand with no inferior deeds,
dishonored by the Greeks I perish here.
Ajax laments his dishonor and shame and explicitly compares himself
with his father, Telamon. He realizes the disparity in honor between son
and father, who accompanied Heracles to Troy only one generation earlier
and came back with every honor, including Hesione, the most beautiful
princess of Troy, a reward for his supreme valor.^' Shortly thereafter,
Sophocles stresses this disparity between father and son as Ajax mentions
his father for a second time (462-65):
^* Although Kirkwood mentions this ([above, note 17] 56-57), complete discussions of the
significance of this iiq-speech in Homer and as a Homeric literary device in Greek literature
can be found in I. J. de Jong, 'The Voice of Anonymity: tis-Speeches in the Iliad," Eranos 85
(1987) 69-84, and J. R. Wilson, "KAl KE Til HA' EPEEl: An Homeric Device in Greek
Literature," ICS 4 (1979) 1-15, respectively. The latter writes (1), "the device ... is of ethical
as well as stylistic interest. In each case, llie approach to an Homeric pattern, or the deviation
from it, to some extent defines the moral attitude of the speaker as well as the stylistic affinity
of the writer." Thus, Sophocles here is showing his hand in regard to his stylistic affinity.
Most recently, V. Bers, Speech in Speech: Studies in Incorporated Oratio Recta in Attic Drama
and Oratory (Lanham 1997) 51, compares in some detail Tecmessa's and Hector's xii;-
speeches and concludes that Tecmessa leaves less to the imagination as she plays on both
Ajax's feelings for her (even stressing the possibility of ending up in the service of another
man), and his aversion to any action producing shame.
^' Cf. Stanford (above, note 1 ) ad loc.
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KOI EOlov 6|i|ia naipl Sn^uoco cpaveit;
TeXa|i(Jjvi; nSiq \i£ iX^aexai nox' eiai6eiv
yv\ivbv (pavevxa tuv dpiaTelcov atep,
(bv avxbq eoxe OTE(pavov foKXtiaq \iiyav;
And what face shall I show, appearing before my father
Telamon? How will he ever venture to look at me
appearing naked without the highest prize of valor,
whose great crown of glory he himself had.
Ajax cannot go home and face Telamon, appearing without the highest prize
of valor. As Stanford and Kamerbeek note, this prize is Achilles' armor. ^°
In Sophocles' extant tragedies the adjective yufxvov appears only here.
When we have the Iliadic analogy in mind, specifically the context and the
allusions to Hector, we may think of Hector and his soliloquy, in which he
contemplates talking to Achilles, without his armor (KxeveEi 8e p.z y^nvov
eovxa, 22. 124).^' This armor links Hector and Ajax, for in each case it
once belonged to Achilles. In his deliberation Hector contemplates
removing this armor, which he stripped from the body of Patroclus the day
before; and Achilles' armor was awarded to Odysseus instead of Ajax, a
slight which sets the stage for the entire play. Thus Ajax sees his
shortcomings (464) in light of his father's glory (465).
Then, for the third time in only thirty-nine lines, Ajax again uses
Telamon as the focus of his shame (470-72). Since the alternatives of
remaining at Troy and returning home involve much shame and disgrace,
Ajax decides to die in a way, he says, that will prove to his aged father that
he is not gutless, in a way consistent with the heroic code. He makes this
abundantly clear with one of the most striking statements (473-80) of the
heroic creed in extant Greek tragedy (or epic). He says that in the eyes of
his father he must appear neither shameful (473) nor base (474). He
concludes his lament with the thought that a well-born man must either live
honorably or die honorably; there is nothing else (479-80).
Ajax's thoughts illustrate the concepts of honor and shame and their
connection to the relationship of father and son. Any honor and shame Ajax
wins or receives directly reflects on his father. Ajax perceives that in a
certain sense he carries on his shoulders his family's reputation, future,
present, and past. These sentiments of Ajax resonate in the very scene
which Sophocles uses as model for his own. After Andromache begs
Hector to pity both her and their child and to remain on the wall. Hector
replies (6. 441-46):
fi Ktti e|ioi T(i5e ndvca ne^ei, yvivai • aXka ndX,' aivwi;
•^'' Stanford and Kamerbeek (above, note 1) ad loc.
^' The closest Sophocles gets to using the adjective yunvov is in Antigone, in which the
guards tell Creon that they uncovered (Yuiivmcavtei; 410) the dead body of Polynices and
waited down wind of it. The adjective also appears once in the fragments (4). A priestess,
perhaps Medea, performs some ritual act while nude.
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ai5eonai TpS>ac, koi Tpa)d6ai; iXKeainEnXovq,
a\ KE KOKOi; (oq voacpiv aXvoKal^u) no^Enoio-
o\)5e HE 0\))i6(; dvcoyEv, e^ei \iaQov £'nn£vai eoQXbq
aiEl Kai Ttpcbxoioi hetu Tpcoeaai ndx£a9ai 445
dpvijHEvoc; naxpoi; te \iiya kA,£0(; ti6' ehov autou.
All these things are a concern to me too, woman; yet I will feel
deep shame before the Trojan men and our women with trailing robes,
if like a coward I dodge the fighting;
nor does my heart bid me, since I have learned to be valiant
and to fight always in the first ranks of the Trojans,
winning for my father great glory and for myself too.
Sophocles is alluding to this well-known passage in theme and diction.
Ajax must win for himself great glory, which, as he himself perceives,
Telamon already possesses, just as Hector must win it for both himself and
his father.-^- In addition, both heroes make very striking statements
concerning the heroic creed by which they must live their lives, which
includes avoiding shame and winning glory for their fathers.
In Tecmessa's reply to Ajax (485-524), Sophocles points to more than
just the Iliadic scene of Hector and Andromache on the rampart in Book 6;
he also draws from and alludes to another celebrated Iliadic scene in which
Hector is the central character. Tecmessa beseeches Ajax with appeals and
words similar to those with which Priam and particularly Hecuba beg
Hector in Book 22 (31-92).^^ In each scene the dependents of Hector and
Ajax try desperately to dissuade each man from his resolve, for the fate of
each hero determines the safety of his dependents. Priam states that if
Hector dies, B6.vr\q (22. 55), his people would suffer; he must come inside
the walls to save them, ocppa oacooT^q / Tpuaq Kai Tpwctq (56-57).
Likewise, Tecmessa twice says that if Ajax dies, Qa\ir\q (496 and 513), she
'^ There are several good discussions on shame and honor and their connection to the
relationship of father and son. See G. Zanker, "Sophocles' Ajax and the Heroic Values of the
Iliad," CQ 42 (1990) 21; D. L. Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and
Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford 1993) 228; and particularly K. Crotty (above, note
15) 24-41, with special emphasis on 30-35: The father seems to be instrumental in linking the
values of the warrior society to shame (30). At Iliad 6. 207-10, for example, Glaucus' father
commanded him not to bring shame on his family:
He sent me to Troy, and enjoined many things on me,
always to be the best and to surpass others,
and not to shame the race of our fathers, who were the best
in Ephyra and in broad Lycia.
See also Iliad 6. 479, at which Hector says that his son will be belter than himself. A "better"
son will confer honor and glory on his father, and conversely, a "worse" son will acquire
shame for his father also.
According to Garner (above, note 20) 8-12, this scene is drawn on more frequently than
any other by Greek poets: "Its popularity helped ensure its effectiveness as a source for
allusive effect." Garner cites Tyrtaeus (fr. 10 W), indeed one of the least disputed instances of
Homeric allusion in Greek poetry, and Aeschylus (Cho. 896-98). See also S. Murnaghan,
"Maternity and Mortality in Homeric Poetry," ClAnt 1 1 (1992) 250, who detects a close echo
of this scene in a fragment of the Geryon by Stesichorus.
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would be taken away by his enemies, for all of her safety depends on Ajax,
ev ool naa' eywYe cswt,o\ia\ (519).^'' The parallel scenes and sequence of
words underscore the modeling here: Priam and Tecmessa understand that
they are utterly dependent on another, and they give bleak accounts of what
would happen to them should their protectors die. Tecmessa will be
dragged away, while Priam graphically describes how, after his death, his
body will be rent by his own dogs.
Both Tecmessa and Hector's parents base these appeals on pity,
respect, and the position each holds in the man's life. After her xiq-speech,
Tecmessa continues to appeal to Ajax (505-10):
aoi 5' aioxpoc xcxjtri Ta^Jxa koi xu aui yivex. 505
aXk' a'ibeaai (iev naxepa xov oov ev A.'uypw
yripa npo^eiTccov, a'i5eaai 5£ urixepa
noXkiav Exuv K^ripovxov, t\ ae 7toX,X,dKi(;
Seoii; ctpaxai (^S>vxa jtpoc; 66|io\)(; noA.eiv
o'lKxipe 5', cbva^, nai5a xov oov ... 510
But for you and your family these words will be shameful.
So have respect for your father, abandoning him
to sorry old age, and have respect for your mother
of many years, who prays and prays that you come home alive!
And pity, O king, your son . . .
The unusual repetition of the imperative of ai5eo|iai intensifies Tecmessa's
appeal to both Ajax's sense of duty to his aged parents and his stubborn
adherence to heroic ideals. With an argument that touches upon Ajax's own
concerns, she reminds him that dishonor will reflect not only on himself, but
also his family, particularly his father and mother. Tecmessa then paints a
pitiful picture of his parents: gray, weighed down, and abandoned to old age
by Ajax. To heighten this pitiful appeal, Ajax's old mother is portrayed as
pious, praying to the gods, asking only for Ajax's safe return.
With good reason Sophocles develops this theme of parental respect
and pity in the ensuing chorus (596-645). In his study of the chorus in
Sophocles, Burton^^ has noticed that the chorus takes Tecmessa's
description of Ajax's father, ev Xvypw ynpot, and mother, iiT\iipa noXXwv
ETWv K^TipoTJxov, and amplifies it into the longer phrase naXaia (lev
ouvTpocpoq anepa, / ^euKw 5e ynpa ndxrip (624-25). When Ajax's mother
hears of his death (at this point the chorus is sure Ajax will kill himselO, she
will beat her breasts and tear her snow-white hair (631-33). When these
successive scenes of the description of Ajax's parents are joined with
Sophocles' use of the Hector and Andromache scene as a foil for Ajax and
''' The verbal form 6dvri(; appears only twice in Iliad and five times in Sophocles' extant
works, including twice in Ajax. It is significant that //. 22. 55 and A;. 496 and 513 are the only
occurences of Bdvri; followed by the speaker's belief that the safety of others is tied to the fate
of the beseeched.
" R. W. B. Burton, The Chorus in Sophocles' Tragedies (Oxford 1980) 24-25.
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Tecmessa, they point to the Iliadic scene of Priam and especially Hecuba
beseeching their son in Book 22. When Priam begs Hector to come inside
the walls and demands pity from him (22. 56-59), he appeals to him both as
the king of Troy to his best warrior, and more importantly as an old father to
his beloved son. He tears his hair from his head (77-78), just as the chorus
describes Ajax's mother. Next, Hecuba in tearful mourning lays bare her
breasts and says (82-83):
"Ektop xekvov enov tdSe x' ai5eo Kai n' iXii]aov
aiJTTlV, £1 KOXZ TOl ^a9lKTl5EO [la^OV E7CEOX0V
Hector, my child, have respect for these and pity me,
if ever I gave you my soothing breast.
The two scenes of Priam and Hecuba begging Hector and of Tecmessa
beseeching Ajax are linked by the theme of parental respect and pity, and by
the imperative of ai5eo|iai.
The respect and pity that both Tecmessa and Hecuba demand implies a
memory of the past and the expectation of reciprocity. Both base their
demands on the foundation of an intimate relationship, Tecmessa as
bedmate of Ajax and mother of their son, and Hecuba as mother of
Hector.-'* An exasperated Tecmessa finishes her appeal with these words
(520-24):
aXX' laxe k6.\iox> nvfjaxw • dv6pi xoi xpewv 520
(ivTinriv ;tpooeTvai, xepnvov e'l x{ nov TtdBoi.
Xctpiq xdpiv ydp Eoxiv Ti xikxouo' dei-
oxoD 5' (xHoppEi nvf)axi(; eij jiE7tov96xoi;,
oijK dv YEvoix' eS' oijxoi; £ijy£vt)(; dvrip.
So remember me also! It is necessary for a man
to remember, if he ever experiences pleasure.
For kindness begets kindness—always;
but if the memory of one who has been well-treated slips away,
he can no longer be regarded as noble.
Just as Hecuba demands that Hector recall the comforting pleasure of her
soothing breasts, so too does Tecmessa demand that Ajax recall the pleasure
she has given him as both his bedmate and mother of Eurysaces. Hecuba's
appeal requires little explanation, for her bare breasts are a visual reminder
and striking symbol of their relationship and the obligatory reciprocity it
should involve.^'' Tecmessa's appeal, however, is more detailed. She
reminds Ajax of the pleasure she has given him, which, as Blundell
remarks, "puts him under an obligation," then "she appeals to the principle
^^ K. Ormand's study, "Silent by Convention? Sophocles' Tekmessa," AJP 117 (1996) 37-
64, sheds light on the status and role of Tecmessa as Ajax's bedmate, not wife.
'' For a more complete discussion of Hecuba's gesture as a claim to authority, see
Murnaghan (above, note 33) 249-50, especially n. 20.
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of reciprocal favor, which she expresses as a universal truth. "^^ Each
woman then tries to capitalize on her special position in the man's life;
Hecuba wants Hector to change his mind about facing Achilles, and
Tecmessa wants Ajax to abandon his thoughts of death. In other words,
Hecuba and Tecmessa are saying, respectively, "Since I nursed and cared
for you, you owe this to me," and "Since I shared your bed and reared your
son, you owe this to me." The similarities in diction, furthermore, are as
striking as those in themes. Three times in the above four lines Tecmessa
demands that Ajax remember her past service or duty to him. This
extraordinarily strong appeal, three times with a word for memory
(HvfioTiv, liVTinriv, and |ivfloTi<;), again recalls the Homeric scene and
Hecuba's words to Hector, for after Hecuba bares her breasts and demands
pity and respect, her next words to Hector are xcov livfjoai, "Remember
them!" (22. 84).39
Regarding these scenes and allusions to Hector two points must be
added. First, the pleas of Hecuba and Priam to their son come immediately
before Hector's soliloquy and his death, just as the pleas of Tecmessa and
the chorus precede Ajax's great speech and his suicide. Second, Sophocles
has rethought and presented these Iliadic scenes—all without mentioning
Hector's name.
These allusions to Hector and to the Iliadic scenes in which he appears
accumulate until a climax is reached at the very first mention of his name in
the play. During Ajax's speech, Sophocles brings his sword to the special
notice of the audience after many previous passing references. Although
the Iliadic Ajax is characterized by his shield and is portrayed as a massive
wall of defense, the weapon or symbol of the Sophoclean hero is his sword,
the significance of which many scholars have noted.'"' Kirkwood, for
example, notes how it "comes gradually and ominously into greater and
greater prominence.'"" Stanford calls Sophocles' emphasis on the sword
motif "remarkable and hardly paralleled in any other Greek tragedy," and
gives no apparent explanation for the emphasis."*^ Indeed, every character
^* Blundell (above, note 1) 75. For the x^P^i theme, see C. Segal, "Visual Symbolism and
Visual Effects in Sophocles," CW 74 (1981) 136-38, and Cairns (above, note 32) 233. For its
connection to a well-born or noble man, see Zanker (above, note 32) 23-24.
'' Of the three times that Sophocles uses nvfjaxK; in his extant works and fragments, all
three are in this play and two appear here in this scene. For memory and its relation to
supplication in Homer, see Crotty (above, note 15) 70-88, especially 74.
'^° Ajax's sword has generated much interest. D. Cohen's study, "The Imagery of
Sophocles: A Study of Ajax's Suicide," G&R 25 (1978) 26-34, is most illuminating
concerning Ajax, his sword, and the link to Homer's Hector. See also R. Hirzel, "Die Talion,"
Philologus Suppl. 1 1 (1910) 415-17; Bowra (above, note 20) 44-45; Knox (above, note 1) 15
and 20; O. Taplin, Greek Tragedy in Action (Berkeley 1978) 85-86; Segal (above, note 38)
127-29; March (above, note 1) 16; and R. L. Kane, "Ajax and the Sword of Hector:
Sophocles' Ajax 815-822." Hermes 124 (1996) 18-22, who summarizes much of the above
literature.
"' G. M. Kirkwood, A Sludy ofSophoclean Drama (Ithaca 1958) 222-23.
•^ Stanford (above, note 1) 278 and Cohen (above, note 40) 26.
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on stage before Ajax's speech mentions it, including the chorus. '•^
Sophocles obviously focuses intensely on Ajax's sword, continually
bringing it to the notice of the audience, and he postpones until the critical
time the naming of its former owner. In his speech Ajax says what by this
time the audience must have known, that the sword in his hand once
belonged to Hector (662). At the very first mention of Hector, the audience
would make the connection to previous references and recall that famous
Iliadic gift exchange in which after Ajax and Hector fought to a stalemate
they exchanged gifts (//. 7. 206-312). Ajax presented Hector his belt while
Hector reciprocated with his sword, the same one that every character in the
play before Ajax's speech has mentioned, and the very one he is now
handling. Sophocles therefore makes references to Ajax's sword to recall
not just Hector, but the connection of Hector and Ajax.
When we consider the previous material, it is difficult to dismiss as
chance and irrelevant the persistent allusions to and finally the naming of
Hector at such critical points during the play. Each successive reference
further connects Ajax with him. In order to prepare the way for Ajax's
speech, Sophocles focuses his attention very carefully not only on Hector,
but also on the well-known Iliadic scenes in which he appears. First, it was
the farewell scene of Hector and Andromache on the wall in Book 6. Next,
Hector is beseeched by his dependents in Book 22, immediately before his
famous soliloquy, and shortly before his own death.
III. Ajax's Soliloquy
Thus far this study indicates that in his composition of Ajax Sophocles was
deeply influenced by Homer's Iliad. Indeed, Sophocles has rethought and
transformed Iliadic situations; specifically, he has conflated two scenes
" In the prologue, Athena calls Ajax's hands ^kpoktovoui; (10), referring to the bloody
mess. Soon after, Odysseus says that a scout told him that he saw Ajax bounding over the
plain with his freshly dipped sword, nriScbvta ntbia aw veoppdvicp ^iipei (30). Athena again
calls attention to it with more than a passing reference (94-95). She asks Ajax, "that sword
(ekeivo .
. . EYXoi;), tell me, did you dip it well into the Argive army?" As Segal ([above, note
38] 127) observes, the sword has an unambiguously prominent place on the stage, for ekewo
. . . e'yxoi; "could imply a gesture toward the sword, reddened with the blood of the slaughtered
cattle." Next, the chorus twice speaks of Ajax's sword as the instrument that did so much
killing, kxeivovt' a'lGtovi ai5r|p(p (147) and K£>.aivoii; ^{(psaiv (231). Finally, Tecmessa
makes the last explicit reference to it when she calls it the ancpriKE; . . . eyxo? (286-87) and she
describes the animals that Ajax slaughtered as oi5TipoK|jfiaiv (325).
When we are told that Ajax goes bounding over the plain with his freshly dipped sword,
Sophocles may be alluding to Hector in yet another way. Later in the play (1279) Teucer
reminds Agamemnon that Ajax alone saved the Greeks when Hector penned them in and
threatened the ships with fire, as he bounded high over the ditch: nri8(Ji)VT0(; ap5r|v "EKXopoq
idippcov iJTCEp. Both Hector and Ajax are described as bounding over the plain in the midst of
their slaughter. Cf. Segal, Sophocles' Tragic WorW (Cambridge, MA 1995) 17-18.
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which contain Hector, one in Book 6, the other in Book 22.'''' If we
continue to keep the Iliadic analogies before us, specifically the scenes in
which Hector appears, to which Sophocles alludes, and which he rethinks
and transforms, then the dramatic form of Ajax's speech, Ajax's complex
emotional condition, and especially his ambiguous language become less
problematic.''^
Many have suggested that Ajax's troubling speech is some sort of
monologue, but its character as such (up to line 683) was not convincingly
argued until Knox.''^ I will summarize his argument since his is the clearest,
most developed, and most convincing. Ajax comes out of his tent and
begins a philosophical reflection (646). He does not address anyone on
stage, neither the chorus nor Tecmessa. He begins with none of the verbal
cues which indicate a recipient of his words: The vocative or a verb in the
second person is missing. The only reference Ajax makes to anyone on
stage is to Tecmessa, but he mentions her in the third person, as if only in
passing reference. He says, "My edge has been softened by this woman
here," npbc, xr\(j8t xt\<; Yt)vaiK6(;, and, "I pity her," oiKtipco 5e viv (652).
After thirty-nine lines of meditation spoken in ambiguous language, Ajax
comes to some sort of conclusion, and breaks off his reflection with words
which, as Knox states, "sound like a formula of transition from private
reflection to direct communication": aXX' a\np\ \ikv totjioioiv eu cxr\<je\,
"well, concerning these matters it will turn out well" (684).'''' A direct
address to Tecmessa immediately follows, ov Se."^ In the lines following
his address to Tecmessa, there is no ambiguity: "You must go in and ask
the blessed gods to grant me all my heart's desire. You, my friends, honor
these things with her. Ask Teucer to see to things as I would wish . . ."
(684-91). The clarity with which Ajax speaks rules out deception. Ajax
intends to kill himself."'
See Easterling (above, note 20) 1-8 for a sustained analysis on the transformation of some
of these previous models.
^ So too Jebb (above, note 1) xxxiii, paragraph 12: "The meaning attached to parts of it
[Ajax's speech] must depend on our conception of the mood in which Sophocles meant Ajax to
quit life."
''' Knox (above, note 1) 12-18. For a comprehensive list of scholars before Knox who have
characterized this speech as some sort of monologue or soliloquy, see Sicherl (above, note 1)
89 n. 92. See also Winnington-Ingram (above, note 1) 24: "It is not for nothing that writer
after writer has described the four long speeches of Ajax as monologues or soliloquies."
"' Knox (above, note I) 13.
^^ The only other parallel in Greek tragedy is in the same play. "It is the last speech Ajax
makes. And here of course the absence of verbal rapport with the others is easy to understand;
there are no others, not even the chorus. Ajax is alone on stage" (Knox [above, note 1] 13).
" Not everyone, however, is convinced by Knox's argument. Perhaps the most vehement
critic of this view is Poe ([above, note 1] 59), who demands more proof: "A simple vocative
use of his name would have been a clear signal that Ajax was talking to himself." Poe does not
consider the remaining options. Whom, then, is Ajax talking to? Ajax's language makes it
clear that Tecmessa and the chorus are not the intended recipients of his words. If not
Tecmessa and the chorus, then who? Ajax himself and the audience watching the play remain.
Although Ajax may have been facing the audience while speaking his lines, he was certainly
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But Ajax's speech is no ordinary soliloquy. Other characters are
present on stage, and the speech itself contains ambiguous language, double
entendres, bitter sarcasm, and abundant allusions and references to Iliadic
scenes and characters, particularly Hector. The combination of cryptic
language and the obscure form of Ajax's speech, moreover, has no clear
antecedent in extant Greek literature, nor do subsequent (extant) authors
imitate it.^^ This enigmatic speech, therefore, may require an explanation as
unusual as itself. In light of Sophocles' use and transformation of Iliadic
models, specifically the well-known scenes in which Hector appears, I
suggest that Sophocles uses Hector's deliberative soliloquy in Book 22 as a
model for Ajax's soliloquy. Sophocles rethinks and reworks his model,
particularly the Iliadic deliberative process, to produce a unique and
different sort of deliberative soliloquy.
The peculiarity of this speech is apparent in the first sentence. After the
melancholy ode in which the chorus is convinced that Ajax will kill himself,
Ajax comes out of his tent holding his sword and begins speaking with
words that suggest a change of mind (646^9):
oirtavG' 6 p-OKpoq Kdvapi9|iriT0(; xpovoq
(pijEi t' aSri^a koI (povevxa KpunxEiai-
KOTJK eat' cxeA-TtTov ouSev, aXX' a^^ioKETai
XO) 5eiv6q ijpKoq xoi itEpiaKEA.£i(; ippivtc,.
All things long and countless time
produces from obscurity and hides once they are clear.
Nothing is beyond expectation, but the dreadful oath
and the inflexible heart are overcome.
Something has happened to Ajax; he was going to kill himself in his tent,
but he has not done it.^' Has Ajax begun to retreat from his once immutable
decision to kill himself? Has he finally been softened by Tecmessa's
forceful appeal? It appears so. His words cc^ioKexai . . . jiepiOKeXeiq
(ppeveq respond to the very last words which Tecmessa spoke to him, npoq
Gecov, \iakao<5Q\), "By the gods, soften up!" (594).^- With his following
not addressing them (for audience address in Greel< tragedy, see D. Bain, "Audience Address in
Greek Tragedy," CQ 25 [1975] 13-25). The only person remaining on stage is Ajax. Also, we
must remember this play was performed. The flashing light that Poe is seeking lies beyond the
text, for Ajax's body language, his posture, the direction in which he is facing, and very telling
hand gestures all undoubtedly play important roles in this speech.
'" In regard to the earlier scene of Ajax and Tecmessa as modeled after Iliadic scenes,
Easterling ([above, note 20] 6) notes that this technique is so subtle, indeed so original, that the
closest parallel might be Virgil's reworking of Homer. In extant Greek tragedy the closest
parallel to Ajax's deception speech is Medea's speech (1019-80) in Euripides' Medea,
especially her internal debate (1041-55). But, as Gill ([above, note 1) 218) observes, Medea
openly expresses her conflict and deliberation (5pdo(o xaS', 1019, and aim- ti Spdoco; 1041)
"in the different voices, and to some extent, the different 'selves,' which speak in the different
parts of the speech." Medea's deliberation is explicitly expressed, unlike Ajax's deliberation.
5' Cf. H. D. F. Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama (London I960) 188.
'^ With Ajax's apparent "softening," Sophocles again may be alluding to Ajax's sword (now
in his hand), and therefore to Hector. FlepioKE^eiq, first occurring here where it is used to
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words Ajax cites reasons for his apparent change and recently formulated
insights (650-53):
Kayiii ydp, oq ta 5e(v' eKapxepow tote,
pacpfi oiStipoq (oc; eOriWv&riv axo^ia
npoq TTJaSe ^^[q yuvaiKoc;- oiKTipo) §£ viv
Xt|pav nap' exQpoiq nai5d t' opcpavov A.i7teTv.
For not long ago I was terribly tempered,
like dipped iron, but now my hard edge has been softened^^
by this woman here; I feel pity to leave her a widow
and my child an orphan among my enemies.
Ajax says he has been softened by Tecmessa's appeals. Here we must
accept as true his claim of new feelings of pity, for only a softening would
prevent him from postponing or even changing his mind about killing
himself.^" This expression of pity, moreover (oiKtipco . . . XitteTv, 652-53),
is important in several ways. It recalls both Tecmessa's words to Ajax
when she demanded that he pity his son (oiKTipe . . . 7cai8a), and the Iliadic
scene in Book 6 in which Andromache beseeches Hector to take pity on her
and their son. At the climax of this latter scene, Andromache says (6. 431-
32):
aXX' dye vvv iXiaipz Kai aiixov ni^v" etci nvpyui,
UTi 7taT6' opipaviKov GriTiq zripriv te ywaiKa-
But come now, pity me, and stay here on the rampart,
lest you leave your son an orphan and your wife a widow!
The similarity in thought and especially the repetition of the words xhp^'^
and opcpaviKov indicate that in Ajax's soliloquy Sophocles was still
thinking about this Iliadic scene, for x^lP^v is rare in the Iliad and appears
with opcpaviKov only here.'^ Consequently, we can infer that in Ajax's
speech Sophocles is continuing to transform his Homeric model, for in the
suggest iron (as Stanford observes labove, note 1] ad loc), adds significance to Kpiirtxeiai, the
meaning of which Jebb (above, note 1) ad loc. suggests as "hides in its own bosom." This
same word, Kpuyo), although future and active, appears just eleven lines later (658) when Ajax
says he will "hide" his sword—later we discover in his own bosom. Also, for possible
allusions in this passage to Archilochus, the unexpected (cxEXTtTov) and the (Heracleitean)
mysteries (everything eventually transformed into its opposite), see Crane (above, note 1)
passim and R. A. S. Seaford, "Sophokles and the Mysteries," Hermes 122 (1994) 283-88.
^^ My translation of this line reflects the ambiguity of the phrase tSriWvSriv OTOtia, which
is discussed in note 56 below, and in the text to which note 56 refers.
'"'
It is nearly universally agreed that Ajax's pity is genuine. For compelling arguments see,
for example, Easterling (above, note 20) 108; Gibert (above, note 1) 129-32; and Gill (above,
note 1) 204-16. Those who disagree usually cite hne 651 in which Ajax says he has been
made womanly: If this very literal expression cannot be believed, then his expression of pity
also must be false. See. for example, Cairns (above, note 32) 234 n. 63.
'^ For another possible allusion, see //. 24. 725-26, where Andromache tells the dead Hector
Kot5 8e he x^IPIv / XeinEii; ev |iEYOipoioi.
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original, the woman (Andromache) spoke these words, not the man
(Hector).
The ambiguous meaning of this same phrase (oiKxIpco . . . Xmeiv) has
bothered commentators for some time. As Jebb and others have observed, it
could mean, "I feel pity to leave them (sc. but I still must do it)," or "I feel
pity to leave them (sc. so I shall not leave them after all)." The uncertainty
of either staying or leaving (i.e. to live or to die), is closely connected to and
can best be explained by Ajax's previous words. Ajax began his
explanation of change and pity with sword imagery (Pacpfi oiSripoi; cot;) that
Sophocles has been using throughout the first half of the play to allude to
Hector.56 Sophocles then weaves the sword imagery into a remarkable and
enigmatic phrase in which e0Ti>.\)v9r|v ax6|ia illustrates Ajax's softening.
He admits he has actually been womanized, which goes even further than
Hector's likening himself to a woman, if he were to decide to talk instead
of act.
The difficult and all-important phrase here is eGri^-uvSriv OTOna. When
az6[ia is taken with a{5r|poq it suggests the sharp edge of a sword. But
literally it means "mouth" (or "language" by metonymy) and recalls the
chorus' recent description of Ajax's language as y^waod oou Te0r|Y|ievT|,
sharp, biting or harsh, by which he announced his suicide (584). ''^ Ajax is
saying that he has lost his edge, but does his pity affect his words, or his
resolve? If his pity affects just his words, there are several possible
interpretations. First, one may say that in this speech Ajax is only
reformulating his previous "get out of my tent so I can kill myself
harshness into a softer description of his eventual suicide. Yet Ajax said
that his heart had been softened, not hardened. This interpretation involves
only a cruel offer of false hope.^^ Second, Ajax's actual words have
softened. This may be closer to the mark, since his elevated language and
insightful thoughts comprise some of the loftiest and most beautiful verses
'' This simile goes well with what preceeds as an amplification of ta Seiv' eKapxepouv ("I
was terribly tempered"), since it refers to the process of dipping hot iron in cold water to
harden it; cf. Jebb, Stanford, and Garvie (above, note 1) ad loc. But it also goes well with what
follows: oiSripoi;. which Sophocles has twice used by metonymy for Ajax's sword (the chorus
calls his sword ciSfipm in line 147, and Athena describes the slaughtered animals as
oiSripoKuficiv in line 325), looks forward to ciona, which can mean the edge or point of a
sword, which Ajax is now handling in full view of the audience. As Jebb, Kamerbeek,
Stanford, and Garvie observe (above, note 1) ad loc, oiopa is ambiguous and cannot be
completely translated. Stanford's remarks are indicative of most commentators: ".
. . primarily
it means 'mouth, speech,' but also, in light of the preceeding simile (paipfi oiSripoi; iic), it
suggests 'edge' or 'point' as of a weapon . . ." So too Kamerbeek: "It is the liiouth of Ajax (cf.
312, but also 584 yXmaaa T£9riY|Jevr|) but at the same lime the sharp edge of the sword to
which he compares himself." Also, little significance should be attached to the anachronism
surrounding the material of this sword. In the Iliad Hector's sword is, of course, bronze. In
AjcLX the sword which was given to Ajax by Hector is iron.
'' See the previous note for discussion of oioiia.
'^ Cf. Linforth (above, note 1) 19: "He deceives them, but he does so rather with the
negative purpose of avoiding unfeeling outspokenness and argument than with a positive
purpose of preventing their interference."
38 Illinois Classical Studies 23 ( 1 998)
Sophocles has written. This softening, however, does not stop at his words.
If Ajax did not kill himself in his tent, his new feelings of pity have affected
his actions—why else did he come out of his tent? Yet most scholars agree
that Ajax never abandoned or even thought about abandoning his intention
of killing himself.5^
I suggest we not close this door too quickly. If Ajax's pity for
Tecmessa and their son is genuine, then we must leave open the possibility
of Ajax acting on these feelings, for if we do not doubt his feelings of pity,
then we must not doubt the exploration of an alternative course of action
springing from them. This exploration of a new course of action has its
source in Tecmessa' s previous appeal. She perceives that if Ajax dies, she
and their son will be enslaved by the very men whom Ajax tried to kill.
Since all her safety is tied up in Ajax alone, Tecmessa wants him to reverse
his decision to die. Opposing the view of most critics, I believe Ajax is
seriously considering just this. As we have seen in the ambiguous
expression of staying or leaving, Ajax is thinking about living and dying.
He will either act on his pity and decide to live, thereby saving Tecmessa
and their child, or he will die, sticking to his original resolve. Since this
ambiguous language is specific to Ajax's description of his subsequent
course of action, let us then examine those passages in which he describes
what he intends to do. His next words are these (654-56);
aXX' ei|ii npoi; te ^ouxpa Kal rcapaKxioix;
A,eitia)va(;, dx; av Wna6' cxyviaaq ena
Hfiviv Papeiav E^aX,ij^Q)|iai Geai;-
But I will go to the bathing-place and the meadows
by the sea-shore, so that in washing off my defilement
I may escape the heavy wrath of the goddess.
Ajax's language here is too obscure to suggest that he is trying to
convey a single-minded purpose. In fact, the words express a meticulous
ambiguity.^'' The word ^o'UTpd, for example, is a bathing place, which
suggests a ritual sea-bathing for purification. If Ajax intends to live, he
must cleanse himself of his stains. But Sophocles often uses this word to
describe the washing of a corpse before burial, and he so uses it at the end
of the play when Teucer and the chorus prepare to bury the body of Ajax.^'
Furthermore, the A,-unaTa, the pollution from which he wants to cleanse
himself, indicates both the blood of the slaughtered animals and the
dishonor and humiliation Athena inflicted on him (from which he will later
purge himself by death). Finally, when Ajax says he will cleanse or purify
'' See, for example, Linforth (above, note 1)11; Simpson (above, note 24) 97; and Taplin
(above, note 1) 124.
^ Sicherl (above, note 1) 78-81 thoroughly flushes out the double enteiidres. See also Knox
(above, note 1) 14-17 and Moore (above, note 1) 50-66.
^' Paraphrase of Knox (above, note 1)11. Cf. Sicherl (above, note 1) 78.
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himself, he uses the word dyvioaq, which more often refers to the dead than
the living. Ajax continues (657-60):
HoX,a)v xe xwpov ev9' av dotipfi kixco
Kpij\|/co t65' eyxoi; toiJiiov, e'xOioTov PeXcov,
Yttiaq opu^ai; evGa ht) xiq o^eTai •
aXX' amb vi)^ "AiSriq xe ow^ovxmv mxa).
And going wherever I shall find an untrodden spot,
I shall hide this sword of mine, the most hateful of weapons,
after I dig out the earth where no one will see it;
let night and Hades keep it safe below!
These lines articulate simultaneously Ajax's thoughts of living and
dying. ^2 Furthermore, the sword motif recalling Hector nears its climax as
Ajax for the first time refers to his sword and tries to decide what to do with
it. He will indeed hide it, but how? We can interpret Ajax's digging out of
the earth in two ways. If he has decided to live, he will dig a hole in which
he will bury his sword, thereby continuing the process of ridding himself of
his pollution.*^ Since his sword will be underground, it will be out of sight,
in the realm of night and Hades. Conversely, if Ajax intends to kill himself,
he will dig out and fix in the ground the hilt of the sword, which will
become buried or hidden when he throws his body upon it. The sword will
end up in his grave, as he explicitly prescribed to Tecmessa in his earlier
speech (577). Ajax's choice of words here is foreboding. The expression
ocp^ovTcov mxco is likewise used by Electra when referring to grave
offerings {Electra 438) and, as Knox observes, Sophocles uses Kcixa) in the
locative sense only to refer to the dead and to the underworld.^
With Ajax's very next words, the allusions and references to his sword
come to a climax (661-65):
£70) yap E^ 01) XEipi xoux' E5E^dnriv
jcap' "EKxopo(; 5a)pri|ia duonEVEOxaxov,
oi}7tco XI keSvov eoxov 'ApYEicov ndpa.
aXX' Eox* d^Ti9Tii;Ti Ppoxuv itapoinia,
ExOpwv dScopa 5a)pa koijk 6vTiai|ia. 665
For since I received in my hand this gift
from Hector, my bitterest enemy,
I have had nothing good from the Greeks.
Yes, the proverb of men is true,
the gifts of enemies are not gifts, and they are no good.
*- The double eniendres continue: doiipfi can mean pathless or deserted, as if Ajax intends
to remove the pollution from the community, as was customary (see Sicherl [above, note 1]
79). But elsewhere Sophocles uses this adjective to mean not to be trodden, as in forbidden
and holy (e.g. OC 126), even taboo. Ajax may be saying, in effect, "1 shall go to a place where
I should not go: suicide."
•"^ Cf. Reinhardt (above, note 23) 248.
^ Knox (above, note 1) 55. See also Sicherl (above, note 1) 79-80.
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Ajax finally names Hector, thus solidifying and affirming the many previous
passing references to the sword in Ajax's hand (stressed by xeipO- Also,
Sophocles emphasizes the sword as a gift: 5a)pri|ia, dScopa, and 5copa. But
why is the gift not a gift and Hector, once a guest friend, now most hostile?
The sword in fact is the instrument with which Ajax in his madness cut
down the animals, thereby bringing shame upon himself, and with which the
dead Hector will eventually kill Ajax. The naming of Hector in the context
of the famous Iliadic gift exchange between Ajax and Hector, combined
with the renunciation of this same gift, alludes to the common and
inextricable fates of Hector and Ajax. Apparently Sophocles' audience
knew another version concerning Hector's death, which Teucer explicitly
recounts when he finds Ajax impaled on his sword (1027-39). He says that
the belt which Ajax gave to Hector became the rope with which Achilles
tied him to his chariot, and Hector's gift of the sword has killed Ajax.^^
Sophocles again specifically links these two heroes, this time by their
deaths.
From the beginning of Ajax's speech Sophocles has been making the
connection between Ajax and Hector. When Ajax said earlier that he felt
pity at leaving Tecmessa and his son, his thoughts of staying and leaving
—
living and dying—were intertwined with an echo of Hector and
Andromache. Add to this the persistent allusions to the sword (and
therefore Hector) and the eventual naming of Hector, all in the context of
Ajax's own soliloquy. These connections cannot be coincidental. What we
have, I suggest, is the product of Sophocles' transformation of Hector's
deliberative soliloquy. Hector waits to fight the charging Achilles and is
beseeched by Priam and Hecuba. Apparently unmoved by their pleas, he
deliberates, wavers from his original resolve, and recalls an earlier
conversation with Andromache. He considers his options, even the absurd,
reaching into the world of fantasy, then returns to both his senses and his
resolve (reconciliation with Achilles—impossible). He rejects any option
that produces shame, especially one by which he is made womanly.
So too with Ajax. Having decided to die, Ajax is beseeched by his
dependents immediately before his soliloquy. He then comes out of his tent
and strongly hints at a change of mind. He thinks of Tecmessa with words
recalling the same Iliadic scene to which Hector alludes in his own
soliloquy. Ajax now says he feels pity and he has lost his edge (been made
womanly). As a result of his new feelings, he seriously considers yielding
to Tecmessa's earlier pleas to reverse his decision to kill himself. Ajax then
describes his subsequent action in strained and ambiguous language; his
words are certainly not those of someone with a fixed and single-minded
purpose. The ambiguous language and double entendres outline two
alternatives before him. One course of action describes what he must do if
" Cf. Jebb (above, note 1) ad loc; Kamerbeek (above, note 1) ad loc; Cohen (above, note
40) 32; and Kane (above, note 40) 21-22.
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he decides to live, the other if he decides to die. Simply put, Ajax is
weighing the alternatives of life and death. He expresses each alternative
with the same words, as if he is leaving his options open or trying each one
on for size. Like Hector in his soliloquy, Ajax is uncertain and undecided
as he explores, contemplates, and maps out his next step.^^ The ambiguities
are indeed perplexing, but when we consider the Iliadic model and the
dramatic form of Hector's deliberative soliloquy, they become less
problematic. They illustrate both Ajax's uncertainty and his deliberation
about the two alternatives before him—to live or to die.
But this is a strange way for Ajax or anyone to explore options. At this
point we must recall Sophocles' use of other Iliadic scenes. Sophocles does
not simply copy Homer. Just as he rethinks and transforms his models to
produce something new, different, and original,^'' so too does he rethink
Hector's deliberative soliloquy. What makes this speech so peculiar is the
manner in which Ajax expresses his dilemma. Many critics interpret the
ambiguous language and double entendres as Ajax's attempt to intentionally
deceive Tecmessa and the chorus. Others take these words as proof of his
insincerity and therefore describe nearly the entire speech as deeply
sarcastic. On the contrary, he is sincerely exploring the options before him.
Sophocles has twisted the Homeric deliberative process into a new and
different kind of deliberation, into some sort of deliberative ambiguity in
which Ajax's words reflect his state of mind.*^ Both of these deliberative
soliloquies represent (different) ways of articulating psychological
motivation. While Hector explores his various options in open deliberation,
Ajax considers simultaneously just two alternatives with the same words.
He explores both courses of action, and leaves his options open as one who
is undecided and uncommitted.
If Ajax is seriously considering staying alive because of his pity for
Tecmessa and their son, when and how did he make the decision to kill
himself? The following words begin to clarify this (666-68):
Toiyotp TO XoiTiov Eia6|iEa6a |iev Geoii;
e'lKEiv, naGrjoonEaGa 5' 'AxpEiSaq oePeiv.
apxovxe(; eiaiv, c6a6' urteiKxeov. xi nn;
Therefore in the future I shall know how to give in
to the gods, and will learn to revere the Atreidae.
'^ On (his point I disagree wilh Knox, who sees Ajax's conscious reflection thwarted by
irrational drives, as if Ajax does not know what he is talking about, a sort of self-deception.
*^ He emphasizes, for example, Tecmessa's precarious position as concubine of Ajax, as
opposed to Andromache as wife of Hector. In addition, we notice Ajax's harshness towards
Tecmessa in light of Hector's open affection for Andromache, and Tecmessa appeals to Ajax
far more forcefully than Andromache beseeches Hector. Furthermore, it is Hector's father who
pulls and rends his hair in the Iliad, but in Ajax the chorus describes Ajax's mother in
mourning. Also, Hector's mother appeals to memory and reciprocity, whereas in Sophocles it
is Ajax's bedmate. See also Easterling (above, note 20) passim.
'''' Cf. Musurillo (above, note 1)17.
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They are the rulers, so one must give in. Why not?
These three lines have presented commentators with several problems. If
Toiydp prefaces an announcement of purpose, and to Xoinov means
"henceforth," or "from now on," we would infer that Ajax had renounced
his purpose of suicide.^' But if Ajax intends to live, he must reconsider how
he must live. As the scholiast and modern scholars have pointed out, he
should have said, "give in to the Atreidae and show reverence for the gods."
He seems to have mixed up his verbs. We may look to Hector's soliloquy
for help, for he too considered reconciliation with the Greeks. Hector
begins a conditional clause which he sustains for over eleven lines, but he
breaks off before he reaches the apodosis, for his offer of restitution grows
so extravagant and absurd that he himself realizes that reconciliation is
impossible. Like Hector, Ajax too considers reconciliation impossible; if he
submits and yields, he will have to renounce all pride, humble himself, and
beg for mercy.''" Ajax understands his limitations and is coming to realize
the absurdity of reconciliation as he expresses this impossibility with the
sarcastic xi lif). We can almost hear the bitter sarcasm in his words: Give in
to the gods? I'm hated by all of them. And revere the Atreidae—who do
they think they are, gods? One must yield, sure!
In the lines which follow (669-77) Ajax comes full circle as he
considers for the last time the possibility of change. In a beautiful
exposition of the doctrine of succession, mutability, and transience in
nature, Ajax asks himself why he must yield. The mightiest natural
elements are subject to change, why not himself? He begins with words
which recall his softening to Tecmessa's appeals: xa Seiva Kal xa
Kapxepcoxaxa (669) hearken back to oq xa 5eiv' EKapxepouv xoxe (650).
Ajax has now talked about yielding to Tecmessa and most recently to the
gods and the Atreidae—why not? Nature offers a perfect model, for it
seems to sum up the choices before him; like the elements themselves he
must change, retreat, and concede. But these are precisely all the things he
cannot do. Change his nature? Impossible. Retreat before and concede to
the Atreidae? No, not even the gods. Admit defeat and suffer even more
humiliation? Ajax would rather die. Indeed, this is his final decision.^'
Immediately following his thoughts on nature Ajax comes to some sort
of recognition in a passage (677-81) appropriately marked with verbs of
'''*
J. D. Denniston. The Greek Particles. 2nd ed. (Oxford 1954) 566. Cf. Jebb (above, note
1) ad loc.
™ Cf. Knox (above, note 1) 16.
" 1 agree with Knox (above, note 1) 12-20, in that Ajax's decision to die is not fully formed
until near the end of his speech. See also Sicherl (above, note 1) 89-92. Also, as observed by
one of the anonymous readers, it should be noted that the theme of the mutability of nature and
human existence is wholly absent from Hector's speech.
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thinking and learning (e.g. e7:ioxa|iai yap dpximq oxi . . . 678).^- Ajax's
speech is coming to an end, and he no longer wavers or is indecisive about
his next step. Once he has made up his mind, he (like Hector) ends his
deliberation with words signaling a transition from private reflection to
direct communication; aXX' (i|i(pi |iev toijtoioiv e\) axAoei- au 8e . . .
(684). Ajax then looks to the gods for a favorable outcome as he bids
Tecmessa and the chorus to pray to them for the fulfillment of his wishes
(685-88). Hector likewise concludes his soliloquy by deferring to the gods
the outcome of his impending duel with Achilles: "We shall see to which
man Olympian Zeus will grant his prayer" (22. 130).
Ajax makes this decision, as did Hector, in light of the heroic values of
honor and shame.^^ He has previously ruled out all other courses of action.
He cannot go home empty-handed, since he has no prize to match that of his
father Telamon. To die while storming the walls of Troy would be too kind
to the Atreidae—there is no honor in a lone, insane attack. Also, he has
nowhere else to go; Ajax perceives himself to be completely alone and
hated by all the Trojans, the Greeks, the gods, and even the plain of Troy. If
Ajax does live, however, his decision, like Hector's possible choices, invites
unbearable shame. The decision entails: a retreat from his former position
(like Hector's boast not to retreat from Achilles), the restitution and
compensation for the slaughtered animals (like Hector's restitution of Helen
and the booty), and reconciliation with the Greek commanders (like Hector
with Achilles). Conversely, a decision to die would mean none of the
above, and most importantly, as evidenced by the last four hundred lines of
the play, an eventual rehabilitation of his honor, beginning with his burial
(like Hector's when he falteringly decides to fight Achilles). In keeping
with the heroic code, therefore, Ajax, like Hector, rejects any alternative
which produces shame. He makes this abundantly clear when he speaks to
Tecmessa earlier in the play (479-80):
dXk' r\ KaXax; ^fjv f\ Ka^coq xeSvriKEvai
Tov E-uyevfi XPA- ndvx' dicriKoai; W70V.
Look, a nobleman must either live honorably
or die honorably. You've heard it all.
Yet due to the newfound pity which he feels for Tecmessa and their son,
Ajax contemplates the abandonment of the code by which he has lived his
entire life. Pity alone, however, cannot alter his resolve any more than it
altered Hector's. Although, of course, Ajax does not change his mind and
'^ rv(oa6tiEc9a (677), enioTOHai (678), PouXrioonai (681). Cf. Stanford (above, note 1)
148: "Note the various words.
.
.
They emphasize the completeness of Ajax's intellectual
conversion."
'^ Many of the considerations and observations in this paragraph are inferred not from
anything specific in Ajax's deception speech, but from the similarities in their situations.
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stay, nevertheless he does yield to Tecmessa's pleas. He finds a way to
accommodate the needs of both Tecmessa and himself.
Ajax's last words to Tecmessa and the chorus are, "Perhaps you may
learn that although I suffer now, I have been saved" (691-92). These
words, more than any others, seemingly substantiate Tecmessa's claims of
deception and of being cast from Ajax's favor, as she erroneously thinks
Ajax has decided to live. But if Ajax were to live, no one, not even
Tecmessa and Eurysaces would benefit. Gone was respect for Ajax.
Forgotten were the heroic deeds of dueling Hector to a stalemate and
fending off the Trojan prince from burning their ships. Further, if Ajax
were to live, a myriad of consequences would surely befall him and his
dependents.^"* Specifically, Ajax himself would have been killed by the
sword (408-10), or stoned to death, as the messenger explicitly states the
soldiers wanted to do (728-29). Tecmessa and Eurysaces would be
enslaved or worse (496-504), unprotected even by Teucer, whom the
Greeks would exile (1006-27) or even kill (721-32). Finally, the chorus of
Ajax's troops would at best sail home in shame (245-56). Ajax now
understands these consequences and he realizes that his fate, and that of his
dependents, rests with the rehabilitation of his reputation and honor.
Therefore, Ajax must die.''^ But his death is not sufficient in itself to effect
this rehabilitation. Ajax must also ensure for himself a proper burial. To
this end Ajax has a plan which involves his brother Teucer. First, he bids
the chorus and Tecmessa to tell Teucer to see to things as he would wish.
Then, on the sea shore in his final speech, Ajax prays to Zeus. He asks that
Teucer be the first of the Greeks to find his dead body, for Ajax knows that
Teucer, whose fate is closely linked with his own, would be one of the
strongest advocates for his burial. Although Odysseus' influence helped
ensure Ajax's burial, Teucer in fact was Ajax's most staunch and steadfast
advocate. As the end of the play shows, Ajax's plan is successful. The
burial in which Tecmessa will take part begins the eventual rehabilitation of
Ajax's reputation, which, in turn, saves his dependents. Ajax does not
intentionally deceive Tecmessa, nor does he cast her from his favor. Rather,
he fulfills Tecmessa's request to be protected, but not in a way she could
foresee.
In sum, Sophocles has rethought and transformed Iliadic situations,
specifically one from Book 6 and another from Book 22, to produce the
scene of Ajax and Tecmessa. But he does not limit his use of Homer to
^'' See Taplin (above, note 1) 125-26 for an extensive list of these consequences and
discussion of relevant passages.
^' Ajax's safety—salvation in death—has rightly been connected to the warning and
subsequent prophecy of Calchas (756-79) as reported by the messenger. An adequate
discussion of this connection, however, is outside the scope of this paper, but for those
interested in the connection of Ajax's salvation in death, Calchas' prophecy, and their effect on
the outcome of the play, see Linforth (above, note 1) 20-27; Sicherl (above, note 1) 84-88;
Taplin (above, note 1) 126-28; E. P. Garrison, Groaning Tears (Leiden 1995) 49-51; and
especially M. M. Wigodski, "The Salvation of Ajax," Hermes 90 (1962) 149-58.
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these scenes. He also rethinks Hector's deliberative soliloquy in Book 22
and uses it as a mode! for Ajax's soliloquy. Furthermore, Sophocles
transforms the Homeric deliberative process into a new and different kind of
deliberation—a deliberative ambiguity that reflects Ajax's uncertainty.
Because of his new feelings of pity for Tecmessa and their son, Ajax
seriously considers changing his mind about killing himself. The two
alternatives now before him are life and death, but he cannot decide. A
decision to live invites a multitude of shame but carries with it a provision
for Tecmessa and their son. A decision to die, however, is the lesser of two
evils, but it in no way ensures honor for himself and a safe haven for his
dependents. Ajax, like Hector, is in a turmoil of uncertainty, but unlike
Hector, he leaves his options open as he describes his subsequent action in
ambiguous language and double entendres. In the end, Ajax realizes that
the fate of his dependents rests with the rehabilitation of his honor and
reputation, and the only way for this to come about is not by his living, but
by his dying. Ajax, therefore, does not intentionally deceive Tecmessa; she
does not understand his plans and new insights.
Finally, to stress the connection between Sophocles' product and his
Homeric model, I again offer the basic elements of Hector's soliloquy for
comparison:
1. He is a single warrior facing unequal odds.
2. He ponders his various options, including retreat and
reconciliation.
3. He likens himself to a woman, if he were to decide to talk
instead of act.
4. He sees his entire plight in terms of honor and shame.
5. He decides to go with his original decision.
These elements clearly describe Ajax's soliloquy as well. The only possible
deviations from the list involves the first and third entries, and these are
only matters of interpretation. Concerning the first entry, Ajax perceived
that he was facing unequal odds, since he was convinced that he was
completely alone and was hated by all of the Greeks, all of the Trojans, and
even all of the gods. Concerning the third entry, Ajax goes further than
Hector when he says not that he would be like a woman, but that he actually
has been made womanly when he did not kill himself in the tent, but instead
came outside to talk.
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Words into Verse:
The Localization of Some Metrical Word-Types
in the Iambic Trimeter of Sophocles*
HELMA DIK
This paper proposes to lay some necessary groundwork for the study of
word order in the tragic trimeter. When at OT 122-23 we hear or read
Creon's lines,
^poTaq ecpaoKE ouviuxovtaq ou ma
pcburi Kxaveiv viv, dX?ia aw nA.ri0Ei xepuv,
we may well come to the conclusion—in fact we should—that JirioTotq and
|iia are highly salient words here, reinforced in the next line by ouv nki\Qt\
Xepcov. Nothing controversial so far. But are we also entitled to associate
the salience of these two words with their position at the extremes of the
trimeter line? In this paper I will propose that, in fact, there is little
evidence to support such an association. I will argue elsewhere that there
are other good reasons to consider "Kv^oxaq and |iia formally marked as
salient,' but here I will begin to investigate whether a position at the
beginning or the very end of a line constitutes such formal marking. It is
inevitable that the discussion of this issue involves a certain amount of
number crunching. But this foundation will, I hope, allow us to come to a
better understanding of the spoken verse of classical tragedy.
As a first step in the analysis of word placement in the trimeter, I want
to establish here which are the preferred positions of some of the most
common words, or rather, word shapes, in Sophocles. Whereas Homeric
scholarship (ever since especially O'Neill 1942, from whom, in homage, I
1 wish to thank Nancy Laan, Kees Ruijgh, David Sansone. and the ICS referees for their
helpful comments on form and content of an earlier version of this paper. I am grateful to the
audiences of papers I presented in the spring of 1999 at Berkeley, Amsterdam, and Chicago,
and one unwitting presenter at the conference on the Theban plays of Sophocles held in April
1999 in Chicago for making me realize that this article needed writing in the first place.
' This article is part of a larger project on word order in the spoken trimeters of classical
tragedy. As to OT 122. 1 will here only point out that, on a description of Greek word order as
following a basic pattern of Topic-Focus-Verb-remaining elements (see Dik 1995), XT|CTTd(;is
in the preverbal Focus position. As to |iia, it precedes its noun (the marked position in a noun
phrase; see Dik 1997), with the entire noun phrase preceding the infinitive kioveiv.
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borrow the title of this essay) has long studied word shapes and their
position in the hexameter, only vague indications exist of how words are
placed in the iambic trimeter of the tragedians. A study of "localization," as
this question is called in Homeric studies, is a necessary preamble to an
investigation of word order in poetry. Before one can claim that word .v
"has been postponed in order to allow greater emphasis to" word y, one had
better make sure that word x is of a shape that often, and preferably more
often than not, occurs at an earlier position in the line. If this is not the case,
one has to concede that its position is at best a fortuitous combination of
rhetorical effect and metrical necessity.-
Some of the most precise indications for localization can be found in
Seth Schein's The Iambic Trimeter in Aeschylus and Sophocles (1919)?
The present paper differs from the approach taken by Schein in some
important respects, and this difference in approach brings about some
different conclusions as to localization as well. The same holds for another
eariier description, that of Joseph Descroix in Le trimelre iambique (1931).
In what follows I shall start with some general remarks on the method I
followed in gathering the data presented here, and then proceed with a
discussion organized by word shape. The paper will be restricted to words
of two and three syllables.'' These are some of the most commonly used
words in tragedy,^ and generally have more freedom of placement in the
verse than longer words. As for monosyllables, since my ultimate interest
lies in accounting for the order of lexical constituents (nouns and verbs
rather than pronouns and particles), only few monosyllables are in fact
^ The quotation is from Davies' commentary on Track. 1 (Xoyoq iiev eot' dpxaioi;
dvGpcoTitov ipavEi;). The shape of dvGpconcov, a molossus, virtually decides its position in the
line, since 96 percent of all molossi in Am. and Track, are in position 8. While one could
conceivably move dvGptortmv to position 4 and put dpxocioi; in position 8 (which would entail
replacing ten.' with a different monosyllable in position 7), this transposition would result in
two molossi in a single line, a pattern I have not found elsewhere in Track, or Ant.
* Schein discusses localization only in his chapter on the Aeschylean trimeter, and does not
claim that his findings are applicable to the other tragedians. In the conclusion of this paper I
will briefly compare my findings for Track, and Ant. with those for Aesch. Ag. and Septem;
Eur. Bacch.; Sind PV.
* More precisely but more technically, words that take up two or three positions in the line:
I have not looked at two-syllable words of the shape u \j.
' A rough calculation (adding up the totals for the word shapes discussed in this paper,
multiplying them by the number of syllables, dividing by the number of lines and by 12 for the
number of positions in the line) puts the contribution of these words at 65 percent of the total
number of syllables. This means that the average verse has two thirds of the line filled with
two- or three-syllable words. But of course average lines are hard to find. In my sample there
are lines with exclusively two- and three-syllable words, such as Am. 163 itoXXo) cdXco
OEiaavtEi; uipGcooav itdXiv, or just one, such as Ant. 1 72 Ti^nYEVTEQ aijtoxeipi ouv nidonaxi.
Lines with no two- or three-syllable words at all are rare. In Marcovich 1984 we find Aesch.
Sept. 541, Siippl. 286, Choe. 706, 1049, and no examples in Euripides or Sophocles except for
Soph. fr. 537. 2 Radt. Three-word trimeters alone, however, do not exhaust the possibilities for
lines without two- or three-syllable words, so that this list is not complete.
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relevant. An account of their position in the trimeter can be found in van
Raalte 216-25.6
First a few words about notation are in order here. With Maas the
elements of the trimeter are numbered from 1 to 12. In the abstract a
trimeter thus looks as follows:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12
For diagnostic purposes, I have counted words of two and three syllables in
the spoken trimeters of Sophocles' Tracliiniae and Antigone. In anceps
positions, syllables of questionable length were treated as short if they were
unambiguously short elsewhere (e.g., the first syllables of xoiatjxa and
xeKvov).^ Unlike Schein, where applicable I have differentiated iambic and
spondaic words (starting in positions 1, 5, or 9), spondaic and trochaic
words, etc. throughout. Also in contrast to Schein, who in his study treats
enclitics as part of their preceding words,^ I here count only individual
words as they appear in the text, not treating enclitics (or postpositives in
general) as part of the preceding word. It is my aim here, as it was that of
O'Neill for the hexameter, to explore the possible positions of individual
words, not of word-groups.
I categorize words by their form and the position of their ^r5f syllable,
an arbitrary decision that has to do with my interest in what happens at the
start of lines. A concrete example from the Trachiniae should give an idea
of how words are counted. Here are the first three lines of the play:
Aoyoc H£v eat' dpyaioc dvGpcbrecov (pavelc
iic, ouK otv giMv ' EKudBoic ppoTMv , Tipiv dv
9dvii tk;, out' ei yptioxoc o\5x' e'l xw kckoc .
They contain two iambic words in position 1 (Xoyoi;, Gdvri); two in position
1 1 (cpaveii;, KaKoq); and one in position 9 (ppoxaJv). There is one spondaic
word in position 4 (avcbv') and a trochee in position 6 (xpr\ax6q). The
words of three syllables are dpxavoq, a palimbacchius in position 5;
dvGpcbrtCDv, a molossus in position 8; and finally EKudGoiq, a cretic in
* I confess to a less than complete understanding of the data in her tables XXI and XXIA
(pp. 223-24). I doubt that a "monosyllable at verse-end often involves an effect of emphasis"
(218), but I will not address that question here.
' This was done so as not to oifrestimate the preponderance of verse-final position for
iambic words. If anything, the numbers for earlier positions, especially position 1, are now on
the high side.
* See Schein's preliminary notes (xi). Although it is certainly interesting to examine the
behavior of word-groups as well as of individual words (cf. O'Neill 106), this paper is
restricted to the latter. O'Neill (109) supports his decision with the observation that
combinations of a word + enclitic occur in positions where single words of the same metrical
shape do not (e.g., vtiuai te - u u does occur in position 5 of the hexameter, but single words
of the shape - w vj do not). I have not examined this question for the trimeter.
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position 6. It will be clear from this sample that, like O'Neill, I determine
word shapes ''functionally, i.e. by the quantitative space they fill in the
verses in which they stand, regardless of their 'natural' quantities" (O'Neill
1 11). As a consequence, a word's metrical shape is often really only one
possible realization: Had apxaToq been followed by another consonant it
would have been classified as a molossus. Given the variable quantity of
many final syllables and, for some words, even some internal variability (the
tragedians can scan the first syllable of tekvov or 7iaip{ as short or long, so
that these words fit virtually anywhere in the line), I have not made a point
of keeping count of the occurrence of brevis in longo either.
The rest of this paper presents the results of my counts for all two- and
three-syllable words in Sophocles' Antigone and Trachiniae. Part I treats
the two-syllable words, Part II the three-syllable words.
I Two-Syllable Words
1. Iambic Words
Descroix (83) writes:
U - (Gavcov): mot iambique par excellence, qui peut etre mis a tous les
pieds, a condition qu'en principe il soit menage une coupe penthemimere
ou hephthemimere (total: 6).
Descroix's statement implies that as long as there is a caesura in the line,
iambic words can indeed be placed in all the positions theoretically allowed
by the trimeter, making for six possible positions in total. And in fact
iambic words do occur in all these positions (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11). Their
distribution, however, is far from random.
Schein states (27; see also his note 33) that localization data can be
derived from his word-end tables, and says that iambic words are localized
in positions 1 and 1 1^ and, to a lesser degree, at 7 and 9. Tables 1 and 2
present the localization data as derived from Schein's word-end tables.'"
From Table 1 it is clear that position 11 is by far the most frequent location
of iambic words. When we add up the numbers, just about 41 percent of the
iambic words are in position 11. And Schein had also noted the frequency
of position 1, which accounts for 26 percent if we judge matters by the
numbers in Table 1."
I translate Schein's numbering into mine. Schein names by position of final syllable,
rather than first syllable.
'" The numbers can be found in odd-numbered tables VII through XXVII in Schein. Note
that for positions 1, 5, and 9 both spondaic words and iambic words are included in one
aggregate number for disyllabic words. This issue will be addressed below.
'
' I should hasten to say that Schein does not do so in so many words. I just want to make
clear here that word shape data cannot safely be derived from Table 1.
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whereas position 1 is outnumbered by positions 7 and 9 and has only 1
1
percent. But how secure is this recalculation? Are two-syllable words as
likely as all other kinds to have an anceps element realized as short?
Clearly, we cannot expect this to be the case, especially when it comes to
the anceps of position 9, where Porson's Law comes into play.'-'
I will now turn to the data I gathered myself as set out in the
introduction. It will become clear from Tables 3 and 4 that for iambic
words the approximations on the basis of Schein's data are fairly accurate.'''
Position
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understandable, since they obviate the most popular, penthemimeral,
caesura and necessitate a monosyllable in position 7 to obtain a
hephthemimeral caesura. Of the six instances in Trachiniae, most are the
first word" of a new sentence or clause, and seem accordingly important
within the clause or even with a resonance beyond that, such as Jiexoq,
surely a keyword for Deianeira:
Track. 27
xzkoc, 5' e'GriKe Ze\)(; 'Aywvioi; koA-cTx;,
El 6ti ko^ok;- XiyoQ yap 'HpaK^eT Kpiiov
^DOTOa' dE{ TIV' EK (p6PoU (pOpOV TpE<pCO,
KEivou TipoKTipaivouaa.
Trac/i. 493,'«495
AH. 'KkV (ohz Kal cppovounEv gSote -taij-ua 5pav,
KoijToi voaov y' EitaKxov E^apoiJHE9a
Geoioi SuanaxouvTEq. aXIC Eiaco OTEYni;
XcopunEV, (bq X6y(ov t' inxazoXaq cpEprn;,
a t' dvTi Scopcov 5(bpa xpTl npoaapiioaai,
KOI xavJi' dyjic;. kevov ydp oij 5iK:aid oe
XcopEiv npoaeA.66v0' mSe aw no^Xu otoA-m.
Trac/i. 743
AH. Ol'iioi, Tiv' E^fiVEYKai;, cb tekvov, ^oyov;
YA. "Ov oux oiov TE UTi TEX,Eo9fivai • TO ydp
(pav0£v i\c, dv 8v)vaiT ' <dv> dyEvrixov reoeiv;
Trac/i. 920
onwc, 5' £XEX,EaE tout', etcevGopouo' dvco
KaGE^ET* Ev liEooioiv E\)vaTr|p{oii;,
Kttl SoKpijcov pri^aaa 6£pnd vdnaxa
eA.£^£v • "'Q. >.Eyn te koi vumpei' £)id,
TO A,oiii6v fi5r| xaipEG' uq eh' ovjiote
5£^Ea6' ex' ev Kolxaioi Taio5' EiJvrixpiav."
Track. 1146
HP. loi) io\) Sijoxrivoq, o'ixo|iai xd^oq-
6^03^' oXuiXa, fiyyoq oijkex' eoxi |ioi.
o'lVoi, ippovd) 5fi ^umpopaq iv' EOxanEv.
I'G', (i) XEKVov • naxfip ydp oijkex' eoxi ooi.
" By first word, I understand first "Mobile" in terms of Dover (12). A noun that follows a
subordinating conjunction, as Xoymv does in 493, is "clause-initial." Track. 743 is borderline.
If one accepts colon-formation (in the sense of Fraenkel 1932) with the repeated av and a new
start with Suvaix', then it, too, is clause-initial.
'* Track. 493 Xoymv i' yields the caesura Descroix (255) calls "'hephth" ("hephthemimere
avant elision faite"), a species of hephthemimeral caesura rather than a true caesura media.
This restrictive definition of the caesura media is that proposed by Schmidt, followed by,
among others, Maas, Korzeniewski, Descroix, and West. For a different view, see Goodell and
Stephan.
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Of the iambic words in position 5 in Antigone some are keywords like
Xexoc, above, but it is intriguing that relatively fewer are clause-initial than
in Trachiniae: Ant. 281 avouq, 314 'i?)o\c, 408 ekeiv', 491 eoco, 502 kKzoc,,
513 jimt; are not clause-initial; 323 SokeT, 438 KaKov, 521 Kaxco, 997 eya),
and 1278 exwv are clause-initial.
I pick out these examples because the iambic words in position 5 are so
rare; when one percent or fewer of all iambic words end up in this position,
it is tempting to look for explanations. However, at this point we need more
corroboration than these ad hoc interpretations before we can claim that
X,exo(; or Kkioc, are indeed of special importance here, and that their position
in the line is in fact associated with this importance. To decide on the
importance of individual words, the context of the instances should be
carefully examined, and, in order to answer the question of whether there is
an association of important words with particular positions in the line, they
should be compared with the instances of the same words in other positions.
In order to start addressing this question of what it "means" for an
individual word to be placed in a less or more preferred slot for words of its
shape, I here look at the distribution of a number of more frequent lexemes
(kixoq and kKzoc, themselves are not frequent enough to yield meaningful
quantitative data). Table 5 presents data for iambic (mostly second aorist)
forms" of TtdoxM, OvfioKco, (lavGdvco, ^auPdvco, Kupco, and xvyxayat in
Sophocles, selected for their frequency and formal similarity. 2" First of all,
I should point out that, as a group, these verbs are more frequent at the end
of the verse than iambic words in general, but what is even more interesting
is that the virtual auxiliaries Kupco and x-uyx^vco are much more frequent at
the end of the line than ndoxco, GvfioKct), and navGdvco. The often bland
A.a|iPdvco^' falls in between. Admittedly, the numbers involved are small,
but the similarity between K\)pcb and Tuyxdvco on the one hand and Tcdoxto,
GvfioKO), and (iavGdvco does not seem mere chance. It is attractive to
conclude that verse-final position is a "default" position, which does not
lend prominence to the words that occupy it.^^
" Forms that are only iambic by elision (e.g., Bavovt") or prodelision (e.g., 'jta9ov) have
not been counted since they would not fit all possible positions for iambic words. Including
these elided words in the numbers for 6vf)OKcu (i.e., Gavovx' as well as xeGvtik' and teSvac')
gives the following totals: position 1: 14 ('l7%); 3; 10 (12%); 5; 1 (1%); 7: 5 (6%); 9: 9 (1 1%);
11: 44 (53%); total 83.
"" Formal similarity: same part of speech, same CVCVC forms (where C = consonant, V =
vowel).
'' By "bland," I here mean the instances of XanPdvco best translated with "get," where an
object noun carries the brunt of the information.
^^ Descroix only much later in his book (334 f.) discusses the preference for final position of
iambic-shaped words and has some less than charitable comments on the subject: "La
recherche systematique de la clausule u - a conduit a la fin du vers une floraison de dissyllabes
qui se repetent et dont on n'a pas assez souligne I'insupportable monotonie" (335). More
specifically, on participles (338): ". . . quelques-uns feraient chez nous figure de chevilles.
Mais la faiblesse de leur sens est masquee par le tintamarre bruyant de leur demiere syllabe.
N'empeche qu'une analyse ddcele ces lermes parasites; el Ton pourrait parfois retoumer centre
la clausule u - du trimetre la reproche qu'un critique prevenu et partial, Fenelon, adressait a la
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For the bigger picture of word order, this distribution would suggest
that it is unwise to attach much a priori credence to the idea that the verse-
final position carries "emphasis." The small number of instances of ndoxco
makes it risky to base any sweeping generalizations on its distribution over
the line, but it is interesting to note that it is not only the verb with the
lowest frequency at line-end, it is also the only one in the group to have an
instance at position 5 {Phil. 1359), which, as we tentatively concluded
earlier on the basis of the instances in Trachiniae and Antigone, appears to
be a marked position for iambic words. Both facts point in the same
direction: Uaoxm is more often given prominence than the other verbs
examined.
Lexeme
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— (eiTi, EoXXaJv): au 1^'' et au 5* pied; plus rarement au 3^ et sous reserve
que la cdsure hephthemimere soit respectee; 5 cheval sur le 2^ et le 3^ pied,
mais non sur le 4^ et le 5' a cause de la loi de Person (total: 4).
This translates to positions 1 and 9; more rarely position 5, necessitating a
hephthemimeral caesura; position 4; not in position 8, which would violate
Porson's Law.
Schein (28) says that spondaic words are usually at positions 1, 4, and
9. Like Descroix, he excludes spondaic words in position %?'^ His data,
once corrected for the realization of anceps syllables, appear in Table 6.
Position
Position
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Am. 77 and 80
EKEi yap aiEi KEiaonar aol 6', ei 6oicei,
xa Toiv Geuv Evtm ' dtiiiaoaa' ex£-
II. 'Eyunev oiJKCXTinaTtoiovnai, to5e
Pia noXuSiv 6pav Ecpw a\ir\xavo(;.
AN. I\) |i£v Td5' av npojjyor Eyo) 5£ 5ti tdcpov
Xcoaoua' dSE^ipq) (pi^Tdxcp 7topEiJoo|iai.
In 77 the two xiht| -derivatives are juxtaposed. This would seem to
strengthen Antigone's point that Ismene does the opposite of what a god-
fearing person should do. In line 80 Antigone dismisses Ismene's argument
as a mere pretext. In other, more technical words, I would analyze xd5e as
Topic (colon-initial, as evidenced by av), and Tipoijxoio as Focus. To go on
in the same vein, note that xd90v. Focus of the next (participial) clause, is
preverbal.
In the third example, line 732, I would again say the spondaic word in
position 5 carries a lot of weight: "Isn't such the disease she is afflicted
with?"
Ant. 732
KP. Oux ti5e ydp xoiaS' enEiXriKxai voaco;
Antigone 329 is a borderline case. In traditional terms, after all, oij is not a
postpositive. Fending further work on this, I will just point out that oij
follows the first "Mobile" of the clause and can be seen as just as
unemphatic in translation as |i£: "There's no way y'll see me coming here
again!"
Ant. 329
OY. 'AXk' EupEGfiiri |iEv iidX.iax' Eav 5£ xoi
XricpGfi x£ KOI nn, xouxo Yctp xijxr| KpivEi,
OTJK eoG' onioq oyEi ai) 5eup' iXQovia |i£.
The remaining examples are followed by postpositives, making for a
hephthemimeral caesura (or a 'hephth, as in Ant. 44). Most are the first
word in their clause:
Ant. 44 (Gdnxeiv ocpe is an embedded, infinitival clause)
IE. 'H ydp voEii; GdnxEiv acp', drtopprixov jioXei;
Ant. 689 (main clause)
OOTJ 6' ow i:E(pi)Ka Jtdvxa jtpoaKOJtEiv ooa
Xiyei IXC, r\ TipdooEi xic r\ ^EyEiv exei.
Ant. 745, 747 (xi[iaq opens the participial clause; unless one
analyzes r\aaw kzX. as an embedded clause, supplying ovxa, T\aaw
is not clause-initial)
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KP. 'Anapxdvco yap zaq eiiaq dpxai; aePcov;
Al. CK) ydp oe(3eic Tiudq ye xdc Betov Ttatrnv.
KP. 'n liiapov r|6oi; Kai fwaiKoc; iJoiEpov.
Al. Ou xav eXoic noaco yE tcov aioypMv eue.
Ant. 884 (repeated av, signalling that Tia-uoaix' is clause/colon-
initial)
KP. 'Ap* i0t', doi5d(; Kai yooui; npb tou Gaveiv
mc, oijS' av E\q muoau' dv, ei xpeiti A.eyeiv;
A/i/. 1054 (\(/Eu5fi clause-initial)
TE. Kai |ifiv Xeytiq, \|/E\)5fi he GEoni^Eiv ^Eyuv.
A/1/. 1084 (A.u;ieiq clause-initial)
xoiauTd aou, A.\jnEic ydp, uote To^6Tri<;
dipfiKa Guiiu, KapSiaq To^Eunaxa
PePaia, xcov av QaXnoq oiJx \)7tEK6pa|iET.
Ant. 1108 (oieixoin' follows parenthesis)
KP. "flS' (QC Eycd oTEiYoin ' dv • ix' it' 67idov£(;,
01 x' dvxEq 01 x' anovitq, d^waq XEpoTv
6p|ida9* eX-ovxec; Eiq etiovj/iov xoreov.
Table 9 shows the distribution of some frequent spondaic words over
the trimeter line (included are only the individual forms indicated, except
for Tto^^-, which includes all spondaic forms of noXvq). I will pick out a
few points at which the selected words deviate from the numbers for
spondaic words in general. In line-initial position, eivai and dvSpcbv are
clearly less frequent. This is not surprising; eivai does not normally occur
in clause-initial position and lines and clauses tend to coincide. The few
cases of line-initial eivai that we do find are not also clause-initial (07403,
550; OC 261, 935). 'Av5pct)v, although to a lesser degree, shows the same
tendency. This word can be so semantically empty that it can be likened to
Lexeme
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an indefinite article (as in dvfip 'AGrivaioq, "an Athenian," and the like),
and as such it is as unlikely as eivai to fill a prominent position in the
clause.-^ We find exactly this in OC 413, however, answering the question
K^Tjo-uoa xov in the preceding line;
01. "A 5' ivvintxq KXvovaa xov Xiytic,, tekvov;
II. 'AvSpcov GecopMv Ae^cpiiciiq dcp' eoiiac;.
OT 33 is the only other example of clause-initial ctv6pcov, where there is a
clear contrast with Geoioi two lines earlier:
6eoTai (lev vvv oiJK iao\)\i£\6q a' Eyu
o\)5' oi6e 7tai5E(; e^oheoG' sipEOTioi,
dv5pa)v 6e npwTov ev te ounipopaTc; piou
KpivovtEc; EV TE 5ai(i6vcov ^Dva^^aYaiq.
At the other end of the range, the spondaic words frequent in first position,
we find words with a high potential for salience: oiJSeiq, Tcdvxcov and noXk-.
When next we consider position 4, we see a higher concentration of eivai
and dv5pcov, suggesting that this is not a position where one would prefer to
place highly salient words. Position 9, finally, gives a mixed picture.
ndvTcov and noXX- are at opposite extremes of frequency; perhaps the
difference between how the two words are combined with other words
(jidvxcov frequently with superlatives; noXX- with nouns) goes some way
toward accounting for the higher frequency of noXX- in position 9.
3. Trochaic Words
Descroix puts it simply: "- u (ofina, KepSoq): pent chevaucher sur tous les
pieds." That is, trochaic words can occur in positions 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10.
Schein states that they are mostly found at 2, 4, and 6.
The numbers as collected by Schein (and corrected for anceps
realization in the case of position 4)-' work out to the approximations in
Table 10. It turns out that position 6 is by far the most prominent. My own
counts for Antigone and Trachiniae bear out these conclusions (Tables 1
1
and 12). It is clear that by far the preferred position for trochaic words is
position 6. The rarity of trochaic words in position 10 can largely be
attributed to the fact that a monosyllable has to follow these words—and
monosyllables are rare at line-end.
^* Indefinite constituents are unlikely to be the Topic of a clause, because Topics tend to be
established referents. In OC 413 dvSpcov Getopwv is Focus.
-' See above (note 25) on the numbers for spondaic words. The adjusted numbers given for
trochaic words in position 4 equal the total number given by Schein for disyllabics in position
4, multiplied by the percentage of anceps realization as short. For position 8, the unadjusted
number is given; see above (note 13) on Porson's Law.
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ceux de 2 ou de 4, plus rarement encore 4-6 a cause de la cesure (total:
4 [sic]30).
To paraphrase Descroix, he predicts the highest frequency at positions 2, 6,
and 8 (not differentiating among those three), a low frequency at 10, and the
lowest at 4.
Schein (27) actually starts his discussion of localization with the cretic:
"A good example of a localized word-shape is - u-. In the trimeter, this
sequence of syllables can occur as a word [beginning] at positions [2, 4, 6,
8, or 10]. A study of Tables X, XIV, XVIII, XXII, and XXVI reveals that
[4] is almost non-existent, [2] and [10] are rare (the former more so than the
latter), and [6] and [8] are comparatively common. The word-shape - u -
is, therefore, localized at positions [6] and [8]."-^'
Position
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approximations in Table 14 are correct, they contradict Descroix's claim
about the rarity of position 10, nor do Schein's conclusions for Aeschylus
appear to apply in the Sophoclean trimeter.-^"' Positions 6, 8, and 10 are of
equal frequency; position 2 is five times as rare, and position 4 is ten times
rarer again than 2.
But before coming to definite conclusions, I will give my own counts,
in Tables 15 and 16, for Antigone and Trachiniae. It should be borne in
mind that Schein's numbers for cretics include two-syllable words followed
by an enclitic, and that I have counted only individual words.
Position
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As was to be expected,^^ the actual numbers for position 8 turn out to
be much lower than the figures calculated from Schein's data. As for the
first half of the line, we see that position 2 in my actual count of Antigone
and Trachiniae is again rare, apparently more so than Descroix realized.
Position 4 is extremely rare, comparable to the numbers we have seen for
iambic and spondaic words in position 5, and for the same reason: When
there is no word-end in 5, one needs a monosyllable in 7 to achieve a
hephthemimeral caesura.
Here are the four instances of cretics in position 4 in the two plays:
Trachiniae 18 is the only instance in that play. 'Yotepcp is followed by a
postpositive. As Davies notes in his commentary, -uoTepcp and donevTi
("late but welcome") stand in contrast to each other:
XpOVCp 5' EV {jOTEpCp HEV, dojlEVJl 5e HOI,
6 kA-eivoc; r\kQt Zt\moc, 'A^Knr|vrii; xe jtoiq,
oq Eiq dycova tu5e a\JH7tEad)v HdxT;
EKX,lJ£Ta{ HE.
Of the three instances in Antigone, that in line 322 is also followed by a
postpositive. With the guard denying responsibility for x6 y' epyov xotiTo,
Creon replies that clearly the guard is guilty, because burial rites could only
have taken place if the guard had been bribed to turn a blind eye to the
proceedings, loosely, "Yes you did, and for money ."^"^
KP. O'i'h', u? Xd^TiHa bx\\o\ ekke(p\)k6i; ei.
OY. OijKoviv x6 7' epyov xouxo noiriaa^ tioxe.
KP. Kai xa\)x' etc' dpruptj ye xtiv vdxtiv RpoSoiji;.
The remaining two instances are not followed by a postpositive:
In Ant. 307, we again have Creon speaking. The verb eK(pav£ixe is the most
salient of the entire conditional clause. Note that the verb is the only really
necessary lexical item in the clause: The gist of the clause is ei \ir\
EKcpaven' auxov.
akX'
, EiTtEp lOXEi Zeui; ex' e^ i\i.o\> ai^aq.
El!) xoux' ETtioxaa', opKioi; 5£ ooi ^eyco.
El HTi xov aiJToxEipa xov)5e j.oxi xd(pOTj
Ei)p6vx£(; EK(pavElx ' zc, 6ip6a^|iouq ehoix;,
otjxuhIv "AiSrii; not)voq dpKEOEi . . .
In Antigone 399, Kd^EA-eyxe forms a clause by itself so there is nothing we
can say about its salience compared to other words in its clause. But clearly
'* See above (notes 13 and 32) for an explanation.
" Kai xauta elaborating on to y' Epyov toiito itoirioa; without oukouv. "(You did the
deed.l and (you did) that by giving away your life for money." I supplied the "Yes you did" in
the paraphrase above. Creon's is a variation on the "no such thing as an innocent bystander"
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it is forceful. The prominence of the two present imperatives is formally
marked with the two Kai-s that precede them. The guard saved his own
skin only moments ago, and now exhorts Creon to interrogate the suspect to
his heart's content:
Kai v\iv, ava^, Tfiv5' aijxoi; coq GeA-ek; X-aPwv
Kttl KpivE Kd^eA-EYY ' • eycb 6' zXtvQepoq
SiKttioq eim TuvS' 6t7iTiA.^dx9ai KaKcov.
Now that we have looked at the extremely rare cases of cretics in
position 4, I turn in Table 17 to the distribution of individual lexemes over
the line. It is hard to find words of this shape that are sufficiently frequent
for any kind of quantitative analysis, and the material presented here should
therefore be treated with caution.
Lexeme
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accounts for the high percentage of instances in position 8.''° The remaining
words in the "deviant" group are most frequent in position 6, so that if we
want to assume that there is a position of choice for "emphatic" cretics
(other than position 4, discussed above) it would be position 6.'"
2. Molossi
Descroix: " (aipeioSai): a la position 8-10 (rarement 4-6)." Schein
does not mention the molossus in his discussion of localization. The
molossus statistics (Table 18) as derived from Schein's data are, of course,
the mirror image of those for cretics in positions 4 and 8, and give numbers
that are too low for position S.**-
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ourselves how it came to be in that position.''^ It is difficult with the few
examples we have in Trachiniae and Antigone (Tables 19 and 20) to say
anything definite, beyond the observation that the molossus in position 4 is
likely to receive prominence not just because of its unexpected position but
also because it is likely to be immediately followed by a caesura (the rare
caesura media, at Am. 1021^''; Descroix's '"hephth" at Track. 667, 691), by
a postpositive (yielding a normal hephthemimeral caesura: Ant. 556, 1017,
1048, 1194; Track. 543, 731), or both (Track. 63: e'lpriKEv 5', another
'"hephth").
Position
together in the corpus taken as a whole. Tables 22 and 23 give my own
results for Antigone and Trachiniae.
Pes.
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Lexeme
phenomenon, showing only the blurred reflexes of other determinants of
order. ^'
Kal Kpive Kd^eA.£Yx' ' evw 8' iXeiiQepoq
5iKai6c eim 'tcov5' (xjir|A.A,dx9ai kukcov.
Ev Toi(;ydp oikeioioiv ooxk; eot' dvTip
XpTiOToq, (pavEixai kov tio^ei SiKaioc o)v .
OC 825
XO. Xupei, ^ev', e^coBaaoov. oijxE ydp td vuv
Siicaia npdooeic oij0' d itpoaGev Eipyaoai.
OC 831
01. 'ii yfiq dvaKTEi;. XO. ^fl £,ev'. o\J SiKaia 5pac .
4. Palimbacchii
Descroix: " - - u (om^o-uoi): aux places 1-3, 5-7, 9-1 1 (total: 3)." Again,
no clarification from Descroix on where this word shape actually ends up
most frequently. Schein had collapsed amphibrachs and palimbacchii under
X - u and stated that this form is most frequent in positions 1 and 5. His
statistics, with my adjustments, are found in Table 25. First of all, it is clear
Position
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that position 9 is very rare. In addition, Table 25 suggests a preference for
position 1 over position 5. My numbers confirm the rarity of position 9 but
do not bear out the preference for position 1 . Instead (Tables 26 and 27),
there is an equal distribution between positions 1 and 5.
Position
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Descroix: " u - - {aKzipjsw, OTi^Tiai): a I'unique place 3-5 dans la
tragedie, et aussi 7-9 dans la comedie ou I'application de la loi dite de
Person est facultative." Indeed, this, in O'Neill's terms, is the one
"perfectly localized" word shape in the set of two- and three-syllable words
we have examined here. The absence of choice in this matter leaves little to
discuss (see Table 29). My actual counts for Antigone and Trachiniae were
184 and 160, respectively.
Position
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on word order? Is the importance of verse-initial position as overrated as
that of verse-final position? Perhaps more annoyingly for readers of this
paper, I have skirted around some issues of definition and used notions of
"prominence," "salience," "importance" more or less interchangeably. I
will return to these questions elsewhere.
In the meantime, I have thought it useful to compare my results for two
of Sophocles' plays with four other plays. In an appendix, I give the results
of my counts for Aeschylus' Agamemnon and Septem; Euripides' Bacchae;
and Prometheus Bound. I offer the results to show, first of all, that the
technique of trimeter composition shows great resemblance among the
various authors. However, divergences can also be observed among authors
and between the individual plays of the same authors. A more sophisticated
approach than simple counting is needed to decide whether word shape
statistics can be useful in the debate about the authorship of PV, but I will
point to some apparent deviations of PV below.
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Appendix: A Comparison of Word Shapes in Aeschylus, Sophocles,
Euripides, and PV
In reading the tables below, note that in the three rows for each play, the
following numbers are given: In the first row, the total number of
occurrences for each position in the line is given. E.g., in Aeschylus'
Septem (Table 30), there are 103 iambic words in position 1, and there are
562 iambic-shaped words in the whole play. The second row indicates that
22 percent of all lines start with an iambic word, and the third row shows
that 18 percent of all iambic words in Septem can be found in the first
position in the line.'^ All tragedians share the predilection for final position
for iambic words that was observed for Sophocles, and, similarly, in all
plays position 5 is extremely rare for iambic words.
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Septem (total number)
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"True Justice" in the Republic^
GABRIEL DANZIG
Roughly speaking, there are two schools of thought concerning Socrates'^
defense of justice in the Republic: those who acknowledge, following David
Sachs' influential discussion of the question,^ that Socrates' arguments fail
successfully to defend the form of justice which he was asked to defend,
and those who claim that in some way they do defend it successfully. These
two groups share the conviction that Socrates intends to defend this
"vulgar" conception of justice, and that if he fails to do so successfully then
he has not done a good job.
In fact, as I will argue, Socrates constructs an argument which, despite
his occasional protests to the contrary, does not seriously aim to defend
"vulgar" justice, and he does so deliberately, out of conviction. Socrates'
own concept of justice emphasizes the overriding principle of improving the
soul, and does not demand obeying the social rules which underlie vulgar
justice. But this does not represent a "failure" on Socrates' part, for his goal
is not "to do a good job" in defending any notion at all—he was not a
Sophist—but rather to illuminate the truth as he saw it.
This study thus aims to suggest a new paradigm for understanding
Socratic arguments. The defense of justice is only one case in which
Socrates' apparent conclusions do not follow from his arguments. While it
is surely not reasonable to expect anyone, even a philosopher, to
consistently construct perfect arguments, Plato's arguments are frequently
so unconvincing that it is difficult to see how anyone who could set forth the
problems as clearly as he does could be satisfied with the solutions he
offers. But if Plato's arguments do not prove what they claim to prove,
' This research was supported by THE ISRAEL SCIENCE FOUNDATION founded by the
Israel Academy of Science and Humanities. Earlier versions of this paper were read at
Seminars of the Classics and Philosophy departments at Bar Ilan University. I wish to thank
John Glucker, Ranon Kalzoff, David Schaps and Ephraim Meir for their useful comments on
these occasions.
"
I have tried to be consistent in using the term "Socrates" to refer to the character in the
dialogue, and "Plato" to refer to the author. When I wish to refer to the historical Socrates I
make this explicit.
' D. Sachs, "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic" The Philosophical Review 72 (1963) 141-58,
reprinted in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays II (Garden City, NY 1971)
35-51.
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there might be some value in clarifying what, if anything, they do prove.
Such an investigation would provide a better guide to the thoughts of the
author than any attempts to correct, revise or improve upon his arguments
so that they fit better to their presumed object. My suspicion is that the
apparent defense of a thesis often serves in Plato's hands as a convenient
method of revising or clarifying the meaning of that thesis, and hence that
one cannot understand properly what Plato is claiming unless one follows
the arguments in detail.
This paper aims to contribute in another way as well. The field of
Platonic scholarship remains divided between those who, however
appreciative of Plato's artistry, view the dialogues as philosophic discourses
with artistic trappings, and those who view the dialogues as essentially
artistic, with the philosophic content taking a secondary role. Attempts to
see how literary analysis can help solve the philosophic problems are still
rare."* This paper attempts to show how attention to literary features can
help place the philosophic problems in a context in which they are no longer
so troublesome.
Finally, the paper aims to shed some light on the teachings of the
historical Socrates, with respect to justice. Despite the apologetic purposes
of both Plato and Xenophon, neither of them is so bold as to completely
whitewash Socrates' ambiguous attitude towards justice, and towards the
property rights of others in particular. It seems to me that their revealing
admissions about Socrates' attitude on these points would be
incomprehensible if they did not reflect the attitudes of the historical
Socrates.
I
A major crux in the argument of Plato's Republic occurs when, after having
described his "city in speech," Socrates returns to the original question or
challenge which had been posed and offers an answer. Socrates had been
asked to prove, against Thrasymachus, that "justice pays," that the just man
who suffers materially is nevertheless happier than the wicked man who
prospers materially. It has long been recognized that, in his answer,
Socrates relies on a different understanding of justice than that implied in
the question, and as a result, it has been claimed, he fails to answer the
question he was asked.
The original question concerned a popular notion of justice which is not
easily defined, and may be finally incoherent. The "Cephalean" formulation
was perhaps the most straightforward: Justice means not lying or stealing
"• Charles Kahn is a notable exception. See in particular his "Drama and Dialectic in Plato's
Gorgias," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983) 75-121.
Gabriel Danzig 87
(331c). ^ Longer lists of prohibited misdeeds are offered later (344b-c;
348d; 360a-c; 442e-43a). This concept of justice is more than merely
observing the law but it is tied up essentially with the observance of some
general rules of behavior, which Socrates describes later as the observance
of vulgar standards of justice {ta phortika 442el).* Still, the subject is
dikaiosune, and this means, as has been noticed, that we are concerned with
the character trait which leads to this observance.''
It is often said that this vulgar dikaiosune is "other-regarding," but there
is no indication of such concern in the discussions with Cephalus or his son
Polemarchus. The motives for observing vulgar justice are left vague, and
Adeimantus later argues that they may be purely selfish (362d ff.).
Although difficult to define, this form of justice is characterized by the
observance of general rules of behavior with respect to the outside world.
^
Socrates attacks this concept in the first book on the grounds that very
important goals, such as the preservation of life, surely take precedence over
the strict observance of rules (331c).^ His own concept of justice will
correct this weakness through emphasizing the goals of just action. To this
degree his conception of justice has close affinities with utilitarianism, with
all its problems.'"
'
I refer to this as the Cephalean formulation only for the sake of convenience. In fact,
Socrates extracts this formulation from Cephalus' speech while Cephalus himself makes no
attempt to say what justice is.
^ The translation "common standards" does not reflect the pejorative sense of la phortika,
and has contributed to the mistaken belief that Socrates seriously defends the observance of
these standards.
' R. H. Weingartner, "Vulgar Justice and Platonic Justice," Philosophical and
Phenomenological Research 25 (1964) 248-62, at p. 251. This is emphasized also in Book 2
when Adeimantus asks to see what justice does in the soul (366e).
* This is the Platonic distinction, as appears in his description of "true" justice: "not with
respect to the external minding of one's business, but with respect to the internal, since it truly
concerns him and his own" (443c). This and all other translations cited here are my own.
' Joseph has argued that one of the main purposes of the discussion in Book 1 is to show that
justice is not conforming to rules of behavior. See H. W. B. Joseph, Essays in Ancient and
Modern Philosophy (Oxford 1935) p. 2 and Chapter 2, cited by J. Schiller, "Just Men and Just
Acts in the Republic." Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1968) 1-14.
'"There has been in this century a persistent minority voice attributing some form of
utilitarianism to Plato. See H. Prichard's inaugural lecture of 1928, "Duty and Interest,"
reprinted in Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest: Lectures by H. A. Prichard (Oxford
1968) 203 ff.; J. D. Mabbott, "Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?" MiVirf 46 (1937) 386-93, revised
and reprinted in Vlaslos (above, note 3) 57-65; R. Barrow, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education
(London 1975); and J. L. Creed, "Is It Wrong to Call Plato a Utilitarian?" CQ 28 (1978) 349-
65. J. H. Muirhead, Rule and End in Morals (London 1932; repr. Freeport, NY 1969) 3,
classified Plato's as a teleological theory of obligation. J. Annas also notes the similarity; see
"Plato and Common Morality," CQ 27 (1978) 437-51. at p. 448.
Plato is obviously not a modern utilitarian, of either a Benthamite or a Millian persuasion,
but the term "utilitarian" is appropriate both as a reflection of Plato's own terms (ophelimon,
lusiteloun, kerdaleon, sumpheron, 336d; see also Cratylus 416e-I7a and Hippias Major 295b-
96e) and because it helps make the point that Plato is not concerned with universal rules of
behavior, but with actions that lead to good results. By using the term "utilitarian," I do not
mean to suggest that he held a worked-out theory of utilitarian ethics; nor is it my intention to
provide one for him. I merely mean that for Plato the justification of any action is its
contribution to spiritual health (and hence to happiness).
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Socrates defends justice on the grounds of self-interest. In Book 2 he is
asked to explain why it is against my interest to act unjustly, even supposing
that I should not get caught, and that through my success I gain many good
things, such as wealth, honors and even a reputation as a generous and just
man. Socrates must show that justice is beneficial in itself, even without the
success, good reputation and other "non-natural" effects it might produce,
but he is not committed to showing that it is worth while to be just and
miserable." He will not attempt to show that justice is better than
happiness, but that it produces more happiness despite material misfortune
than material fortune would produce in the absence of justice. '^ He will
argue that justice is more choiceworthy than anything one could acquire
through injustice precisely because it contributes more to happiness than
anything else possibly could, whereas injustice destroys all possibility of
happiness.'^
The terms of this defense already tell us something about Socrates'
conception of justice: He will defend it as something beneficial. Only if
Socrates can define benefit in such a way that it will never be dependent on
anything obtainable through vulgar injustice will he be able to offer a good
defense of vulgar justice. In fact, in the later part of the Republic Socrates
spends a good deal of effort in revising ordinary conceptions of benefit, and
he thereby reduces the possibility of conflict between vulgar justice and
benefit. But he does not eliminate it.
Moreover, Socrates spends at least as much effort revising ordinary
conceptions of justice. The fact that he begins his defense with a lengthy
investigation of the true nature of justice shows this clearly enough. After
constructing a "city in speech" in which justice can be seen more clearly
than in an individual, Socrates comes to a clear formulation of his new
conception of justice. According to Socrates, "true justice"'"* (443c) is a
kind of psychic harmony, in which the mind rules the thiimos or spirit,
which in turn aids it in ruling the passions. Once the question is framed in
this way, Glaucon readily agrees that the just man, the psychically healthy
man, is happier than the unjust or sick man, and that no amount of material
prosperity could compensate for a lack of psychic health. '^ Socrates has not
significantly revised ordinary conceptions of benefit at this point, as
Glaucon' s emphatic response clearly shows, but he has revised ordinary
" C. Kirwan, "Glaucon's Challenge," Phronesis 10 (1965) 162-73. See also Schiller
(above, note 9) 5.
'^The emphasis on a quantitative comparison is reflected later in the attempt to calculate
arithmetically the superiority of the philosopher over the tyrant in Book 9 (586b-88a).
" At AllA, Socrates restates the challenge in a simple form. They are seeking justice, which
he refers to as "what the man who's going to be happy must possess, whether it escapes the
notice of all gods and humans or not."
''' Or: "justice as it is in truth."
'5Book4, 445a-b.
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conceptions of justice.'* The justice which is beneficial is not ordinary
justice at all. How are we to judge this?'''
II
There have been a variety of responses. David Sachs argued that we have a
fallacy in Plato's argument:'^ "Attempts to show that Platonic justice (-
true justice) entails ordinary morality are strikingly absent from the
Republic. Plato merely assumes that having the one involves having the
other."" Although Socrates never argues that possessing vulgar justice is
better than not possessing it, Sachs, being charitable, considers the
possibility that the defense of Platonic justice is intended as a covert defense
of vulgar justice. In order for this to work, Socrates would have to show
mutual entailment: both (1) that those who possess Platonic justice
necessarily obey the rules of ordinary justice, and (2) that those who obey
those rules necessarily possess Platonic justice. Once we assume, with
Sachs, that Socrates' argument is designed to prove these implausible
theses, it will not be difficult to accept Sachs' conclusion that the argument
is fallacious or nonexistent.
Terence Irwin comes to similar conclusions. 2° In his view, Socrates
"wants to show that p-justice [psychic justice = Platonic justice] is justice,
that it is the virtue we normally refer to; that is why his argument is meant
to answer Thrasymachus."^' Yet he also argues that "Plato's argument for
the definition of p-justice does not try to show that p-justice is justice; he
'* See Vlastos' comment that the Socratic definition has "no discernible link with ordinary
usage"; "Justice and Happiness in Plato's Republic," in Vlastos (above, note 3) 66-95, at p. 70.
One may argue that in Plato's mind the original questions were poorly formulated, and as
a result cannot be properly answered. Plato's strategy, then, is to show the incoherence of
popular conceptions of justice, and then to move on to a more coherent conception in which the
question can be reformulated and answered. On this reading, there would be no point in any
attempt to extract from Plato an answer to the original question. (I am grateful to John Rist for
suggesting this line of interpretation.)
To this argument I would reply that it is Plato who formulated the original question, and that
he did not formulate it merely in order to demonstrate its incoherence. For after arguably doing
so in the first book, he reinstates the original question in Book 2 without making any essential
reformulation of the underlying conception of justice, and he refers back to the original vulgar
standards when, in Book 4, he gets around to answering the question. Plato thinks the original
question is important, and he is right to think so: The original question remains important for
all people who are incapable of becoming truly just, and even for those who are, as we shall see
below.
'*'The point was noticed earlier by G. Grote, Plalo and other Companions of Sokrates
(London 1888) 99-110 and A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek
Values (Oxford 1960) 289. See also N. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis
1979), who points out (131) that if Plato equivocates then he cannot be properly said to have
actually denied what Thrasymachus was asserting.
" Sachs in Vlastos (above, note 3) 47.
-°
I make use here of his earlier treatment of the problem in Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford
1977). His later treatment in Plato's Ethics (Oxford 1995) is also valuable for the i
analysis and solutions it proposes.
-' Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory {previous note) 205, italics added.
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assumes over-confidently that 'justice' must refer to exactly the same
condition of state and soul."-^ This last is an overstatement, but not a
serious one. Socrates does elicit from Glaucon the agreement that the man
of p-justice is least likely to perform the sort of action ordinarily called
unjust (442e^3a). But Irwin's conclusion still stands:
[H]e has not shown why a p-just man's rational plan of life would not
include some c-unjust actions needed to fulfil it. And if the p-Just man
avoids c-unjust actions only for his soul's good, his desire for moral
exercise will not obviously prescribe regular c-justice [common justice =
vulgar justice] in other people's interests. If Plato cannot defend a virtue
which benefits other people, he has not defended the virtue of justice
challenged by Thrasymachus and Glaucon. But so far he has offered no
good reason to a p-just man to benefit others; either we must agree that no
sound moral theory can offer a better reason, or we must find Plato's
theory altogether inadequate to explain a primary aspect of virtue.--'
Some have attempted to defend Socrates by arguing that there is no
fallacy but merely a lacuna. For Raphael Demos, the missing step is not too
far-fetched: He points out that being truly just means being ruled by reason,
and that reason aims at grasping and instantiating the forms of the good and
the just.-"* But the lacuna is still there, for Demos acknowledges that he has
not shown that the form of the just is instantiated by the observance of
vulgar standards of justice. This problem haunts most of the attempts to
"defend" Socrates.
Richard Kraut's attempts to fill in the missing link are illuminating but
no more successful. ^^ He argues that the harmonized individual, or
philosopher, will be just because he has no desire to be unjust. For the
philosopher, the desires of reason are far stronger than the desires of thumos
and appetite, and his life of reason cannot be improved by anything which
injustice can provide. This is certainly one of the main thrusts of Socrates'
argument: Socrates' just man will have very little interest in material
possessions. But will he have no material needs at all? And if he does have
some, how should he satisfy them?
Socrates has not really said anything against ordinary injustice, theft
and the like, and the arguments Kraut uses to shore up Socrates' failure to
do so are surely, as Julia Annas has pointed out,^* overly optimistic. They
rest explicitly on the improbable assumption that the philosopher will
^^ Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (above, note 20) 205-06, italics added.
^^ Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (above, note 20) 211-12.
^'' R. Demos, "A Fallacy in Plato's RepublicT The Philosophical Review 73 (1964) 395-98,
reprinted in Vlastos (above, note 3) 52-56.
^' R. Kraut, "Reason and Justice in Plato's Republic," in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos and
R. M. Rorty (eds.). Exegesis and Argument. Phronesis Suppl. 1 (Assen 1973) 207-24.
-^ As she points out, such a reading makes Socrates' arguments irrelevant: "By the time we
have stipulated that conditions are such that there is no competition in the way people obtain
their differing goals, we have got rid of what was worrying Thrasymachus even without any
doctrine of Platonic justice" (Annas [above, note 10] 441).
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already possess or have access to everything he needs for his life of
leisure:^'' And yet Socrates himself felt the need to ask for guaranteed
meals at the public expense. It is hard to resist pointing out that Kraut's
argument implies that if the philosopher did lack some of these things, he
would have no reason not to obtain them through acts of vulgar injustice.-^
All of these problems are the result of the misguided attempt to make
Socrates prove things he was never trying to prove. As both Vlastos and
Annas seem to recognize, Plato is concerned with developing his own rival
concept of justice, and has no real interest in defending the behavior of
ordinary "just" citizens.-' His referring to this form of justice as "vulgar" is
one hint that it is just not his main concern.
In Annas' reading, the Republic makes an attempt "to shift the centre of
gravity of Greek ethics from an act-centered to an agent-centered type of
theory. "''' But this can be understood in two ways. Annas appears to mean
that Plato is concerned with defending a character trait which directly
encourages the observance of vulgar standards of justice, something like the
dikaiosune which is discussed in Book 1. On this reading, while the
concern is with character, the character-trait in question is one recognizably
associated with the observance of vulgar justice. In fact, however, Socrates
is concerned with a different character-trait and a different conception of
justice. The shift which Plato envisions is more than a shift between an act-
centered and an agent-centered theory of ordinary or vulgar justice. It is a
shift from the observance of the proper rules of behavior to an imperative to
achieve personal psychic harmony, a shift from a "rules-centered" to a
(spiritual) "goals-oriented" conception of justice. But in any society where
ordinary rules of justice hold sway, a "goals-oriented" approach will
generate conflicts with the ordinary rules of behavior. Any new morality
which differs practically from the old morality will inevitably include some
elements of the old //^morality, and all the more so when the new morality
is not based on rules.-"
^' See also the pseudo-Platonic Eryxias, where this problem is raised explicitly (394a5-b5).
-* There have been other attempts as well. Schiller (above, note 9) 6 argues that "the value
of just action is that it alone can . . . guarantee the continuance of [a person's] balanced soul."
But for this argument to work. Plato would have to be thinking of vulgarly just action. On
Vlastos, see the extensive and perceptive critique by R. Sartorius, "Fallacy and Political
Radicalism in Plato's Republic" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1974) 349-63.
-' Vlastos (above, note 16) 95 comments that Plato "thinks the masses, if they lack the
requisite paideia, capable of nothing better than a degenerate morality . . ." Schiller (above,
note 9) raises the possibility that Plato does not intend to defend common morality (3) but later
dismisses it (4-5).
'" Annas (above, note 10) 444.
'' Vlastos (above, note 16) 78 argues that the new morality is more onerous, but
acknowledges that it is "more flexible in form."
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III
Socrates tries to minimize the conflict between the vulgar and Platonic
forms of justice, but he never argues or claims that the two are simply
compatible. When he compares true justice with the vulgar standards his
interlocutors have in mind (442d7^3b6), he only claims, at most, that a
truly just man will tend to conform to vulgar standards. But it is difficult to
extract his own, or Plato's, opinion with any certainty from the exchange
between Socrates and Glaucon.
After concluding his account of the truly just man, Socrates returns to
the question of vulgar standards of justice, and convinces Glaucon that a
truly just man would not violate such standards (442e^3a):
If it should be necessary for us to agree about that city, and about a
man bom and raised like it, whether it seems that such a one would steal a
deposit of gold or silver which he had accepted, do you think that anyone
would think he would do this rather than those who are not such?
No one, he replied.
Glaucon's admission here may well be a reflection of his own imperfect,
thumotic character. Glaucon protested earlier that Socrates' ideal city did
not contain enough relishes, and was willing to go to war for the sake of
superfluous material goods (372c). Theft for him is motivated solely by the
desire for excess wealth, and he cannot imagine why the truly just and
moderate man would have a motive to violate vulgar standards of justice.
Glaucon's admission here is as much a commentary on his own character as
a reflection of Socrates' or Plato's opinion.
But even if we take Glaucon's assent as a genuine expression of Plato's
opinion, it does not amount to a principled rejection of ordinary injustice.
Glaucon does not imagine that the character-trait of justice would eliminate
theft altogether: It would only make the just man less likely than anyone
else to steal, for it would drastically reduce the motive of theft. Here
Socrates draws a link between psychic and vulgar justice, but he does it in a
manner which is designed to show the link precisely as it is: The truly just
man tends, but only tends, to observe the laws of vulgar justice.
But there is a further difficulty with the argument. Although Glaucon
agrees that a Platonically just man, like a just city, would be unlikely to
commit acts of vulgar injustice, this does not amount to the claim that the
observance of Platonic justice entails the observance of vulgar justice as
well. Such a conclusion would be warranted only if we could assume that
the Platonically just man, who tends to observe vulgar justice, also observes
Platonic justice as well. In that case, his observance of both standards
would imply the compatibility of the two standards. But unlike Aristotle,
who defines just acts as the acts of a just man,^- Socrates does not argue that
" NE5.\.i,\ 129a6 ff. See also White (above, note 18) 135 note f.
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the acts of the Platonically just man are Platonically just acts, and the
Aristotelian model may have misled some commentators.-^-^
Socrates clearly distinguishes between justice, the harmony of the soul,
and just action. Just action is defined not as that which flows from a just
disposition, but as that which leads to or preierve^ justice in the soul (443e-
44a): 34
In all these actions he judges and names a just and fine action one that
preserves and helps to produce this condition, and wisdom the knowledge
that supervises this action, and injustice an action which would undo this
condition, and ignorance the opinion which supervises this action.
According to this definition, all acts which produce and preserve the
harmony of the soul are just.-^' It is a "utilitarian"^^ conception of justice,
defining justice by its consequences. Anyone can perform such acts,
whether already just (harmonized) or not.
It is easy to understand why it would be worth while to be just and to
act justly on Socrates' definition. But there is nothing in this definition
which implies either that the observance of Platonic justice would entail the
observance of vulgar justice as well, or that the Platonically just or
harmonized individual would necessarily observe Platonic justice. Being
already spiritually harmonized, the Platonically just man has no need to act
to instill a harmonized soul, but only to preserve it. Because he is not
pursuing Platonic justice, it may be easier for him to observe vulgar justice
than it would be for someone still on the upward path. Although Socrates
argues that the Platonically just man would tend to act in accordance with
I'M/gar justice, since he does not argue that he would act in accordance with
Platonic justice, he is not offering any argument for the compatibility of the
two standards of action.
It is notorious that Socrates never shows that Platonically unjust people,
those who still lack a harmonized soul, should conform to vulgar standards
of justice. But we may add that he does not even show that those among
them who pursue Platonic justice would conform to vulgar standards. As
" Annas (above, note 10) 447 assumes that for Plato as for Aristotle, "virtuous acts are
those that the good man would do in such circumstances."
^'* See also 444c-<l. Teaching is for Socrates the prime example of doing justice: Socrates
agrees to Glaucon's request to describe moderation "so as not to do an injustice" (430e; see
also 337d).
-" In Book 9, Socrates explains that the intelligent man will subordinate all of his activities
to the goal of acquiring and maintaining a healthy soul (591c-92a). See White (above, note
18) 135 note d. For Maimonides, this principle is so important that it justifies a transgression
of the Law. See Maimonides" Eight Chapters. Chapter 5 in R. L. Weiss and C. E. Butlerworlh
(eds.). Ethical Writings of Maimonides (New York 1975).
-'* See above, note 10. The "utilitarian" character of Socratic justice is indicated clearly in
the present context: Acts of justice are "supervised" by wisdom, and as we have learned only a
few lines earlier, wisdom in the city "possesses within it the knowledge of that which is
beneficial (sumpheron) for each part and for the whole composed of the community of these
three parts" (442c). By connecting justice with wisdom, Socrates is also connecting it with
utility.
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we have seen, Platonic justice permits, even obligates, all acts which lead to
the harmony of the soul, but Socrates does not even attempt to show that
such acts of Platonic justice would always conform with vulgar standards.
Socrates argues only that the Platonically just man tends to conform to
vulgar standards of justice, nothing more.^''
In another passage which might seem relevant, Socrates argues that the
performance of just acts engenders Platonic justice, while the performance
of unjust acts engenders injustice (444c-d). This passage could appear to
imply that the observance of vulgar justice leads to the harmonization of the
soul, and this in turn would imply that it is justified on Platonic grounds.
On such an interpretation, the argument would be highly implausible:
Socrates presents no argument to show that such observance is always the
best way to reach the desired results, and it is hard to imagine that either he
or anyone else could do so. In fact, he does not speak of vulgar justice at all
in the passage, and is presumably thinking of acts of Platonic justice which,
as he has said, are precisely those which lead to the harmonization of
the soul.
In a later passage (589d-90a), Socrates seems to say that acts of vulgar
justice lead to justice in the soul. But here the claim is hypothetical: It
would be worth abstaining from theft, Socrates argues, if such theft causes
harm to the soul. He does not present any argument that it does, far less that
it always does. There are, then, no arguments which make the implausible
assertion that vulgar justice and Platonic justice are mutually entailing or
even consistently compatible.
IV
The important point, however, is not simply that Socrates never successfully
defends vulgar justice, but rather that Plato himself is clearly aware of this
failure, and even presents Socrates as being aware of it. For this reason we
can draw the conclusion that the arguments in the Republic do not represent
a serious attempt to defend vulgar justice.
To my mind, it is inconceivable that Plato should not be aware of the
divergence between the vulgar and the "true" concept of justice: He after
all is the one who discusses them in detail and offers the terms by which we
distinguish them. As Rolf Sartorius has pointed out,^^ Plato's Callicles in
the Gorgias accuses Socrates of equivocating between natural and
conventional notions of justice (482e-83a), and it is hard to imagine that
" An individual performing only Platonically just acts would violate any ideal code of
behavior, unless one could be devised which systematically allows for every possible act which
aims at the harmony of the soul. This helps explain why Plato regards the rule of wisdom as in
principle superior to the rule of the law. See White (above, note 18) 132 and J. Macy, "The
Rule of Law and the Rule of Wisdom in Plato, al-Farabi, and Maimonides," in W. M. Brinner
and S. D. Ricks (eds.). Studies in Islamic and Judaic Traditions (Atlanta 1986) 205-32.
^* Sartorius (above, note 28) 351-52.
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Plato would unknowingly commit a mistake which he himself has pointed
out in a previous dialogue. In fact equivocation in the use of the term
"justice" is still very much on his mind in the Republic. At the end of the
discussion in Book 1, Socrates comments that he regrets not having defined
the term before they considered whether or not it is a vice, and whether or
not it is profitable (354b-c).
There are many indications that Plato is aware of the distinction, and
that he intends Socrates to defend only Platonic justice.^^ When
Adeimantus suggests that he will add something to Glaucon's speech
against vulgar justice, Socrates responds (362d), "So you too, if he leaves
out anything, come to his defense. And yet, what he said was already
enough to bring me to my knees and make it impossible to help out [vulgar]
justice." After hearing Adeimantus' speech he returns to the problem
(368b):
I'm at a loss what to do. On the one hand, I can't help out. For in my
opinion I'm not capable of it; my proof is that when I thought I showed in
what I said to Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice, you didn't
accept it from me. On the other hand, I can't not help out. For I'm afraid
it might be impious to be here when justice is being spoken badly of and
give up and not bring help while I am still breathing and able to make a
sound."*"
Socrates agrees to defend (vulgar) justice out of a sense of responsibility
rather than philosophic conviction. He does not state why he is unable to
persuade his friends of the value of justice
—
perhaps it is a result of his
personal state of ignorance, as Thrasymachus has previously charged
(337a-38b), and as he has himself acknowledged. But he is surely able to
mount an impressive defense of the Platonic conception of justice.
Socrates' hesitation is more likely attributable to his inability to defend the
vulgar conception of justice he was asked to defend, but which he never
does defend.'" It is not a coincidence, then, that a weak or nonexistent
defense follows this announcement; on the contrary the announcement
serves as a warning to look for problems in the argument. Not only is the
argument "weak" but Plato wishes us to notice its weakness. Only then will
we see the troublesome implications of the doctrine of Platonic justice.
As Socrates develops his argument he makes the contrast between the
two conceptions of justice perfectly clear. He has chosen to illuminate
'' Contrast Annas (above, note 10) 438, Sachs in Vlastos (above, note 3) 47.
'"' This is not the only passage in the Republic where Socrates indicates his inability or
unwillingness to refute Thrasymachus' argument. See also 357b2, 427c-d. In other places he
says that he does not know what justice is (337e-38b): Does he not mean vulgar justice?
"" We note that Socrates speaks here of offering a defense of justice, motivated by piety, and
not an impartial investigation. He uses military language (repeated use of boethein), and places
more emphasis on the use of his voice than his reason in making this defense. The later image
of the cave, and especially the inability of the philosopher to understand the dark images on the
wall of the cave, is surely intended in part to explain Socrates' inability to offer explanations
for common conceptions such as that underlying vulgar justice.
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justice by creating a city in speech in which justice will be more visible.
The just city as a whole is treated as parallel to the just individual. The
behavior of the just city should therefore tell us something about the
behavior of the just individual Socrates has in mind. Justice in the city
consists in everyone "doing his own business" {to heaulou prattein) and, in
particular, in each class sticking to its own task (433a ff.). This definition
parallels justice in the soul of the individual, which is said to be the
harmony of the three parts of the soul, resulting from each part of the soul
doing its own business. But the harmony between the parts of the soul does
not imply that the whole person would "do his own business," and nothing
implies that doing one's own business means observing vulgar standards of
justice.
The internal harmony of the city does not prevent it from making war
on other cities, and war is not a marginal activity in the ideal city. The
education of the guardian class, from whose ranks will come the
philosopher-kings, and which occupies no small part of the Republic, is in
the first place a training for war. War in this city is not merely defensive
war, but is rather offensive, aimed at enlarging the city's territory (373d-e).
War is motivated by the need for territory and not by justice: It is clear that
the city's internal justice does not conflict with its aggressive international
relations. If we take this analogy seriously, we will conclude that just as the
harmonious city is capable of making war against other cities, so too the
harmonious individual is capable of making "war" against other individuals.
Such war would be motivated by something analogous to the need to
increase territory. ''^
In accordance with this, Socrates offers an indication of the aggressive
nature of the just man after concluding the definition of justice and
examining the other virtues in the soul. Although the just man's reason
rules his thumos, it does not tell the thumos to avoid aggressive behavior.
On the contrary (442b),
these two do the finest job of guarding against enemies from without on
behalf of all of the soul and the body, the one deliberating, the other
making war, following the ruler, and with its courage fulfilling what has
been decided.
' One may object that it is improper to view the "inflamed" city as a model of health of the
soul. However:
1. Socrates never returns to the model of the so-called healthy city, but rather purges
the inflamed city without eliminating the need for war motivated by the need for land.
2. The relishes Glaucon desires, which lead to the construction of the "inflamed" city,
are later said to be among the necessary desires (559a-b).
3. Socrates does not indicate in any way that the inflamed city is an inappropriate
analogy to the just man; on the contrary, he finds justice in it and explicitly draws a
parallel to the just individual.
Gosling's suggestion that there is no room for justice in the first city, and that Socrates
deliberately provoked Glaucon into replacing it with the "inflamed" city, is also worth noting.
See J. C. B. Gosling, Plalo (London 1973) 18-19.
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Further, although the subject is a complex one, it is clear that Socrates
is willing to use lies for good purposes within the just city.''-'' This sort of
behavior is not justified only in an ideal city: Socrates himself is frequently
depicted telling helpful lies in the dialogues of Plato.'''' Since the avoidance
of lying and stealing were the two components of the Cephalean concept of
justice, it appears that Plato wishes to indicate to the reader that Socrates
condones precisely this vulgar injustice in at least some circumstances.
As Kraut and others have made clear, the Platonically just man is not
committed to justice, but merely uninterested in the goods which injustice
can obtain, and it is for this reason alone that he tends to abstain from
injustice. The author of the Republic is fully aware of this fact, and
indicates it by the curious literary relationship he establishes between
Platonic justice and moderation. After finishing his discussion of wisdom
and courage, Socrates suggests skipping moderation and going straight for
justice (430d). When Glaucon objects to this, Socrates describes
moderation as a kind of "harmonia" of the desires, in which the higher
elements of the soul dominate the lower (430e-31b; 43 le). After describing
moderation in this way, Socrates has difficulty finding anything left to call
justice (432b-e). Clearly he had intended to describe justice in the terms he
uses for moderation, and in the end he does call justice a kind of harmonia
(443d-e). In the meantime, he defines justice by a formula which was often
applied to moderation: "doing one's own business" (433b; compare
Charmides 161b). The interchangeability of justice and moderation is
particularly striking in a passage in which Socrates has chosen to bring
justice to light by a process of elimination (427e-28a)! This odd
argumentation draws our attention to the fact that Socrates is able to defend
justice only by reducing it to moderation. But, precisely for this reason, the
justice he is defending is not the justice he was asked to defend.
When Socrates finally comes to define justice for the individual, he
remembers the parallel to justice in the city quite clearly (443c-e):
And in truth justice was, it seems, something like this—but not with
respect to the external minding of one's business, but with respect to the
internal, since it truly concerns him and his own. He doesn't let each part
in him do foreign business or the three classes in the soul meddle in the
affairs of each other, but truly sets his own things in good order and he
himself rules over himself. He organizes himself, becomes a friend to
himself, and harmonizes the three parts, exactly like three notes in a
harmonic scale, lowest, highest and middle. And if there are some other
parts in between, he binds them together and becomes entirely one from
many, moderate and harmonized.
'-' Book 3, 389b-d; 414b-e. Allhough the guardians are also said to be truthful (485c-d)
Plato clearly means that they love to know the truth, which is quite different from speaking it.
See also Book 5, 459c-d; Laws 2, 663d ff.
^ An unambiguous example of helpful Socratic lying may be found al Charmides 155b.
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As justice in the city is an internal quality, not directly concerned with
international relations, so too justice in the human being is an internal
quality, not directly concerned with "external" affairs. Far from describing
an "other-directed" quality, Plato is at pains to point out that justice is
concerned only with the inner life of the individual. This is a natural result
of the way Plato has shaped the entire argument, defending justice by
showing how it contributes to one's own happiness.
Socrates does not claim that the just man leads a passive life. On the
contrary he is able to act, "either concerning the acquisition of money, or
the care of the body, or something political, or concerning private contracts"
(443e). His well-balanced soul may make him better equipped to act, all
other things being equal, than is the unjust man. This was Socrates' point in
Book 1, where he argued that justice makes a city or individual better able
to wage war (351a ff.). But there is nothing about his justice which induces
him to act for the sake of others, to restrain his actions out of consideration
for their good, or even to observe the ordinary conventions of justice.
There is no good reason to believe that acting purely for the sake of a
healthy soul would necessarily entail observing vulgar standards of justice.
Clearly there are cases where the two standards would conflict:
1. Taking money from—or not returning money to—a rich man whose
money leads him to ignore the development of his character and intellect, or
those of others, could be a just act by Socrates' definition, as it could lead
the rich man to re-evaluate his life, and it would, at least, prevent him from
harming himself and others by misusing his money. This is Socrates' point
in his discussion with Cephalus and Polemarchus in Book 1. Note how he
replaces the "weapon" which should not be returned to its raging owner
with a deposit of money, which also should not be returned so long as it
would cause damage (332a). But here there is no requirement that the
owner be in a rage; the potential for damage is enough."*^
2. Providing such money to a student or to oneself to enable that person
to be free from the lowly pursuit of income in order to spend more time
studying philosophy could be an act of true justice since it could lead to the
development or preservation of a harmonious soul.''*
The Republic is in part a reply to the various accusations leveled against
Socrates, before, during and apparently even after his trial and execution.''''
Although Socrates was not charged with theft in his trial, Aristophanes does
'*' See also Xenophon's Oikonomikos (1. 13), where Socrates argues that money, when used
to obtain a prostitute, is not a form of wealth, since it is not beneficial.
*^ See 591c. The pseudo-Platonic Eryxias raises the possibility that money obtained through
wicked practices could lead to the acquisition of virtue (404d2-e7).
*" On the question of anti-Socratic polemics after the trial, see A.-H. Chroust, Socrates, Man
and Myth: The Two Socratic Apologies ofXenophon (London 1957).
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make such a charge in the Clouds (177-79).''^ Xenophon indicates that
Socrates was blamed in part for the thievish behavior of his one-time
associate Critias (he was kleptistatos: Mem. 1. 2. 12). Xenophon himself
has nothing to respond to those who claim that Socrates should not have
taught his associates politics before teaching them moderation, and clearly
acknowledges that Socratic moderation was the basis of his just behavior
{Mem. 1.2. 17; 1.2. 1-2).
This agrees fully with what we have seen in the Republic. Socrates
obeys vulgar standards of justice, so far as he does, not on principled
grounds, but because he is moderate and needs little. Given his small needs,
Socrates would have had little incentive to seek the property of others, or
rather he would have had incentive to seek only a little of it. On the other
hand, Socrates defends the individual's right to take any action necessary
for the pursuit of the psychic harmony of his soul. The uncomfortable
parallel in Xenophon strongly suggests that the historical Socrates did teach
something along these lines.
I do not wish to suggest that the historical Socrates actually engaged in
theft, and I am not sure that Aristophanes meant his charge to be taken
altogether seriously. But it appears that his teaching made clear the
"justice" of some acts ordinarily considered unjust, and it is to Plato's credit
that he was able to defend Socrates' unique conception of justice without
giving it a complete whitewash.
In sum, Plato himself, as well as his character Socrates, is clearly aware
of the problematic character of the answer offered to Glaucon and
Adeimantus. This answer does not actually constitute a defense or an
attempted defense of the vulgar justice Socrates was asked to defend. Plato
does not regard vulgar justice as defensible or worthy of serious defense.
He seems fully aware that the observance of Platonic justice does not
necessarily entail the observance of vulgar standards of justice, but, unlike
all his recent commentators, he is not bothered by that fact, and he is right
not to be bothered by it. In his view, Platonic justice does not need to be
justified on vulgar standards; it is of inherent value in its own right, even if
it does conflict with vulgar justice at times. There is nothing deeply
problematic about this conflict. If Plato has no defense of vulgar justice, if
it is in fact indefensible in his view, then it is not obligating. And there is
certainly no reason to make a defense of Platonic justice dependent on its
conformity with its vulgar relation. Viewed from this perspective, Plato's
theory of justice and just action is consistent, plausible and contains no
obvious fallacies.
Bar Ilan University
'^^ Charges of Socratic thievery may be found also in Libanius, whose fourth-century A.D.
defense of Socrates may reflect earlier literature, contemporary with Socrates. For such
charges, see sections 13, 86, 103 and 112. On the possible influence of Polycrates' anti-
Socratic polemic on Libanius, see Chroust (previous note).

lambe/Iambos and the Rape of a Genre:
A Horatian Sidelight ^
J. KEVIN NEWMAN
Do nomen quodlibet illi.
Horace, Sfl/. 1. 2. 126
Quis devium scortum eliciet . . . ?
Odes 2. 11.21
Not the least task for the recent bimillennial commemorations of Horace's
death was to clarify his relations with half the human race.'^ Are they
typified by a certain crudity in understanding the iambic genre?
Archilochum propria rabies arnmvit iambo (Horace, A. P. 79). The
student of the iambos is confronted with a paradox. On the one side, the
exponent of the iambic style par excellence for Greeks and Romans alike is
certainly Archilochus, notorious for his aggressive ("rabid") attacks on the
daughters of Lycambes, which ultimately, as was said, drove them and their
father to suicide. On the other, the misty origins of the pre-literary iamb are
linked with Eleusis and the successful effort by lambe to reconcile Demeter
to the loss of her daughter, Persephone. It seems unlikely that lambe can
have prevailed on the grieving goddess by abusing in any Archilochian
sense the ways of women—or of anyone else, since that would have served
only to intensify an anger already intense enough. Yet the commentators
knew it was from her name that the iambos took its origin. ^ In its
' Aii; Ei; Tov auxov ouk av Ejipaiiii; poov. This article is an atlempt to refine certain ideas
already presented in my Roman Catullus (Hildesheim 1990) in the light of my Augustan
Propertius, Spudasmata 63 (Hildesheim 1997). In acknowledging how much I have learned in
the meantime from the work of Anastasia Summers (Philodemus flepl FIoirinaTcov and
Horace's Ars Poetica: Adapting Alexandrian Aesthetics to Epicurean and Roman Traditions
[diss. University of Illinois 1995]), as earlier from that of Olga Arans (lambe and Baubo: A
Study in Ritual Laughter [diss. University of Illinois 1988]), I apologize for the inevitable need
to summarize certain previous arguments here as a preliminary to their modification.
^ An intelligent (as always) modern scrutiny in R. O. A. M. Lyne, Horace: Behind the
Public Poetry (New Haven 1995).
' E.g. schol. B ad Hephaestionis Enchiridion, ed. M. Consbruch (Leipzig 1906) 299; N. J.
Richardson (ed.), The Homeric Hymn to Demeter (Oxford 1974) 213. Obviously in fact it is a
back-formation from a (non-Indo-European?) root found also in SiGiJpanpo; and BpianPo;.
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beginnings, therefore, the iambic was derived from the ritual, threshold
provocation of laughter in the face of mourning and death, intended in its
turn to precede resurrection from the lower world,'* and whether this is
historically true or not, what matters is that this was how the genre was
perceived. What happened then to the iamb as it passed from Attica to
Paros, from ritual to literature? What turned dialogue between women into
matter for male party pieces' threatening women's social acceptance and
therefore their very lives?
Paros, Archilochus' island home, is already mentioned as a shrine of
Demeter in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (491; cf. Pausanias 10. 28. 3).
The Hymn (96 ff.) describes her anguished wanderings in search of her
daughter. Eventually, she came to Eleusis, where Celeus' wife Metaneira
bade her welcome as she approached the threshold of the palace, and asked
her to be seated on her own couch. But Demeter would not accept, until
lambe finally set a "jointed" chair^ for her, covered by a silvery fleece. The
goddess was then willing to sit, but remained veiled, silent and motionless,
unsmiling and fasting from food and drink, "wasting away with longing for
her deep-girdled daughter." At last, wise lambe with "glees" and jokes
made her smile and laugh and filled her heart with graciousness (202-05):''
Ttpiv 7' OTE 6ti x^EijTiq^ liiv 'IdnPri keSv' ei5\)Ta
noXka jcapa OKtoTtioua' eTpe\)/aTO noTviav dyvriv
Hei5fiaai ^zkaoax xe koI 'iXaov axeiv 6vn6v •
"* Cf. the ritual HEyotpa (niuo, me'ara, "[burial] cave") from which the buried offerings were
resurrected on the third day (Kalhgeneia) of the Thesmophoria.
'
"In der Poesie und in der GeseUiglceit des Symposions," J. Burckhardt on Archilochus,
Griechische Kuhurgeschichie (Berlin-Stuttgart 1898-1902) IV 159.
' A version of the seat of authority known to the Romans as the sella curulisl On this
in general, O. Wanscher, Sella Curulis: The Folding Stool, An Ancient Symbol of Dignity
(Copenhagen 1980); T. Schafer, Imperii insignia: sella curulis und fasces, Romische
Mitteilungen Suppl. 29 (Mainz 1989).
' H. Usener notes this passage in his Kleine Schriften IV (Leipzig-Berlin 1913) 469-70,
"Klagen und Lachen." See the comments in Richardson (above, note 3) 213-17. The edition
by H. P. Foley, The Homeric Hymn to Demeter. Translation, Commentary and Interpretive
Essays (Princeton 1994), is important for its feminist perspective.
* Apparently the word is connected with the same root as the English "glee." The phrase
"unholy glee" attests its ambivalence. For its survival in the mysteries, cf. mnioKmnTtov Kai
nai^mv Kai x^EU<iC™v, Aristophanes, Frogs 375-76, a play also concerned with a resurrection
(and with the spoudogeloion, lines 391-92). It recurs in Apollonius' x^EiSri -yT|96o\)voi, Arg. 4.
1726 (below, 115-16). In NT Acts 17. 32 we read: (XKOijaavtec; Se dvdoTaoiv VEKpmv, o'l nev
E/XEiJa^ov KT^. If there was miming at Eleusis, Philo connects x^euti with the mime:
X^Eua^onEvoi . . . rai; £V BEaxpiKo'it; liinoi; {Leg. ad Caium 359). The mime actress Theodora
used to "mock" (Ex^EiJa^Ev) her lovers, according to Procopius [Anecd. 9. 13 ff.). The y}.zv-
root might well merit a separate monograph, but meanwhile it may be seen that there is a
certain persistence of vocabulary and ideas over the centuries.
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il 5ti ol Kai ETtEiia iieGijoTepov £va5ev opyaii;.' 205
Then she accepted a cup of mingled barley and water from Queen
Metaneira, and undertook to nurse the baby prince Demophon. That was
the beginning (although at first thwarted) of her recovery from Hades of the
lost Persephone, later remembered (mimetically?) in her rites.
The action takes place on the threshold (o\)66v, 188). The passage is
thought to describe an aetion of the Eleusinian mysteries, and to presuppose
more than it says. In particular, it offers no information about lambe who,
keSv' ei6\)ia,'° evidently is meant to remind the goddess (who has not been
called KeSvfi since her terrified daughter cried out to her at line 35) of her
own better wisdom. Later authors knew that lambe was the serving maid of
King Celeus, even that she was an old woman." Euripides, as we shall see,
substitutes for her Aphrodite. The primitive connection of thought is, when
forced into our clumsy, serial logic, that of "before" and "after." Before
gnef is dispelled, her would-be comforter, like the goddess herself, is
necessarily apprehended as an old woman. Afterwards, and even by means
of eros, new life is restored to the one and the other. But these concepts are
not successive or mutually exclusive within an eternally occurring and self-
duplicating cycle. '^
This account of its origins links the iambos then with lambe, the
mysterious figure who "afterwards pleased the goddess opyaif;" ("in her
temper," "in her rites"?). Can she have pleased by "rabidly" attacking
either the goddess herself, or her daughter, or any woman? This seems even
less likely given that Euripides replaces lambe by Aphrodite. The meters of
this passage are mainly iambic/choriambic {Helen 1338-52):
ereel 5' enaua' eiXarewai;
SeOiq PpOT£l(p TE yEVEl,
Zeui; HEiA,{aacov OTDvioui;
Matpoq opyac evekei- 1340
BaxE, OE|ival XdpixEi;,
Vie, TaTCEpirtap0Evcp
Atioi GuficooaiiEva
^ijTtav it,aXkat,ax' akaXa,
' Richardson tentatively suggests "was . . . pleasing to her spirit," but can opyai only mean
that in this context? Cf. 6pY(i(; below at Eur. Hel. 1340. And can we dissociate the term from
opYOcto, "swell with new life," 'OpyoK; (the rich land sacred to the goddesses of Eleusis; Call. fr.
495 Pf.), "orgasm"? The translation must accommodate Baubo's displays.
'° Hardly "knowing her duty" (P. Bing). The verb here describes a moral attitude, as in
Tinia tiSu); and other similar Homeric idioms. The semantic range of ii-f may be compared;
see the article by J. Bergman and G. J. Botterweck in G. J. Botterweck (ed.), Theologisches
Worterbuch zum Allen Teslameni III (Stuttgart 1982) 479 ff.
'
' Philicus, fr. 680. 54 (H. Lloyd-Jones and P. Parsons, Supplementum Hellenisticum
[Berlin-New York 1983] 323).
'^ This illustrates the concept of "vertical" rather than horizontal time: Roman Catullus
(above, note 1) Ati; Augustan Propertius (above, note 1) 184-85.
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Movaai G' vnvoiai xopuv. 1345
Xa^KOV) x' ai)5av xQoviav
Tijiiavd x' EA.aPe PupooxEvfi
KaXkiaxa tote npibxa naKa-
ptov KiLiTtpiq- Y£A,aa£v te Geo
Se^oto t ' iq xepc? 1350
Papijppo)iov avXw
TEpcpGEio' aXaXay\L(i).
But, since she had brought to an end the festivities of gods and mortals
ahke, Zeus, in his effort to soothe the hellish anger of the Mother, said,
"Go, holy Graces, go drive out the pain of Demeter's resentment over her
Maiden daughter with the shrill cry; and you. Muses, with song and
dance." Then the earth-sprung noise of the bronze and the skin-stretched
drums were taken up for the first time by her who is fairest of the
Blessed—Cyprian Aphrodite. And the goddess Demeter burst into
laughter and took into her hand the deep-echoing flute, delighting in its
keening.
No student of Mikhail Bakhtin'^ will wish to ignore the importance here of
the resurrecting yeXaazv (1349). Can we imagine that Aphrodite's no
doubt lascivious cavorting to the accompaniment of pipe and drum actually
mocked Demeter in any hurtful way? Did it not celebrate and advertise
sexuality? That is the kind of mockery surviving in the mysteries. Not only
is the Eleusinian yeffvpioyioq well known,''' but the scholia to Lucian's
Dialogues of the Courtesans preserve an account of the Eleusinian Haloa,
also sacred to Demeter, which perhaps gives a much better idea of the
repartee characteristic of these festivals. There, the women claimed a
liberty to utter "obscene and irreverent things":''
ev taijTri (sc. tti EopTTJ) Kal teA-ett) th; EioaYETai yuvaiKwv ev 'E^euoivi
Ktti naiSiai ieyovxai no^^ai koI OKWunaTa. povai 5e ywaiKEc;
eionopETjonEvai En' d5E{a<; e'xovioiv d PoijA-ovTai ^.E-yEiv khi 5ti xd
aiaxtoTa dX,^nXai(; ^eyouoi tote, ai Se lEpEiai ^dGpa jtpooioiJoai Taiq
Y^jvai^i KXE\\iiya\iiac, npbq to oiiq uiq dTtoppriTov ti oupPoij>.Eii)o\)aiv.
dva(pcovoiJ0i 5e itpoq dA,X,TiA,a(; naaai ai yuvaiKEi; aioxpd Kal doEuva
PaoTd^oviaai EiSri aa)|idTcov drepEnfi dvSpEid xe Kal ywaiKEia.
At this festival a rite is also introduced among the women at Eleusis,
accompanied by many jokes and jests. Only women are admitted, and
with no fear of retribution they may say whatever they wish, and indeed
" Nor indeed of Genesis: pnn'i, 17. 17.
'" E. de Martino, "I Gephyrismi," Sludi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni 10 (1934) 64-
79; K. Kerenyi, "Parva Realia: recpupionoi—zu Aristoph. Plul. 1013-16," 50 36 (1960) 11-
16; Richardson (above, note 3) 214; W. Burkert, Homo Necans, Eng. tr. (Berkeley 1983) 278.
" Schol. Lucian Dial. Merelr. 2. 1, p. 280 Rabe (Leipzig 1906); M. P. Nilsson, Geschichie
der griechischen Religion. 3rd ed. (Munich 1967) I 466-67; E. Fantham, Women in the
Classical World (Oxford 1994) 92-93. iKcbunaTa (oKmitiM) is noted again in the later
discussion, since the verb is applied by Demetrius to Sappho.
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they do say then the most shameful things to one another. The priestesses
approach the women stealthily and, as some mysterious secret, whisper in
their ears advice about marriage cheating. And all the women proclaim to
one another obscene and irreverent things. They also carry indecent
models of both men's and women's bodies.
KA.e\i/iYa|iia in some sense ("bride-stealing"?) is presumably what Hades
inflicted on Persephone.
But, at some stage, in a second "rape of Proserpina," as the private social
life of the Greeks came to be more and more embodied in the symposium,
dominated by men, the iambos was elevated to the status of literature, and in
the process changed from being a women's laughing celebration of
sexuality; and this is the rape of which my title speaks. Already for his
ideal bee-woman, iambic Semonides rejects the "themes of Aphrodite"
which archaizing Euripides still saw, in his account of its origins, as
essential (7. 90-91 West):
oiJ5' ev ywai^iv TiSetai KaBri^evri,
'6ko\> Xeyguoiv d(ppo5io{oi)(; Wyoui;.
She takes no pleasure in sitting among the women, where all they talk
about is sex.
The fact that "bees" were Demeter's priestesses can only add to the
injustice.
This usurpation persisted. From Archilochus of Paros the iambos
descended to Hipponax of Ephesus, who is often quite misunderstood as a
simple beggar (56i; x^otivav 'iTincovaKTi). In fact, he is a literary poseur
whose type recurs in the Byzantine Theodoros Prodromos.'^
Characteristically for what had become the iambic tradition, he exploits
sex—as predators perceive it. A large fragment recovered on papyrus
exhibits an eroticism that anticipates Petronius. We read (fr. 84 West)
EKSiJvxeq, e5dKV0|iev, Y'unvoijq, eyu 5' epiveuv, and some ambiguous
nautical imagery.'^ If he looks forward to the Romans here, in an attack on
"Sannus" (fr. 118 West) he uses the kind of epodic meter familiar from his
predecessor Archilochus.
'* There seems no good reason therefore to distinguish a Theodoros Ptochoprodromos from
Theodoros Prodomos, as already K. Krumbacher had recognised: Ceschichte der
byzanlinischen Litteratur. 2nd ed. (Munich 1897) 749; cf. A. Kazhdan in The Oxford
Diclionary of Byzantium III (1991) 1756.
'^ See W. de Sousa Medeiros, Hipponaclea (Coimbra 1969) 46-48.
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Hipponax is wrongly viewed however as a Greek Villon.'^ His native
city was famous for its devotion to Artemis, no doubt a variant of the Great
Goddess worshipped throughout Asia Minor. Tadeusz Sinko has urged that
his verses were guided by artistic (generic) requirements more than by the
demands of reportage. The poet's begging songs are to be associated with
old popular festivals and processions like that of the eiresione, the
chelidonisma, koronisma and so on, accompanied as they were by ribaldry
and insults. Certainly, Hipponax shows himself acquainted with the
Thargelia, with their ceremony of the (pap^aKoq." Always ready to dress
inherited elements of every type, whether vocabulary, beliefs, idioms or
superstitions, in literary guise, the poet did not allow this ritual fund of jest
and amusement to escape his notice.
Hermann Frankel also doubts the "plebeian" character of Hipponax:
"His poems constituted, as far as may be seen, an impudent and grotesque
entertainment literature."-" In modern terms, it seems, Hipponax was a
"carnival" poet. The conclusion is relevant to certain aspects of Catullus.
The relation of such a genre to what went on in historical times at
Eleusis is not easily traced. Did the Eleusinian ceremony itself once involve
the sacrifice of a virgin, as Burkert has argued?^' We find something of this
{le sacre dii printemps) at the start of Propertius 4. 8, often dismissed as
local color. Had that victim at one time been ritually cursed,-^ and is some
fossilized relic of this the origin of iambic hostility to women (Propertius 3.
24 and 25)-^? But, in that case, the ritual adumbrated in the Homeric Hymn
to Demeter would already evince the profoundly civilizing mentality of the
Greeks—and is it not this which should attract attention rather than the
sceleris vestigia"? It would be Archilochus, with his vicious attacks
precisely on unmarried maidens, preliminary to their expulsion from the
community, and therefore in that sense sacrifice (glossed as "suicide"), who
'^ E. Degani, Siudi su Ipponane (Bari 1984) 150-51, offers a stimulating reassessment,
including a report of Sinko's views.
" Nilsson (above, note 15) 107. Cf. the characteristic meters, including the hendecasyllable,
of Bacchylides 18, written perhaps for the Thargelia (so Jebb).
-° H. Frankel, Dichlung und Philosophic des friihen Griechenlums, 3rd ed. (Munich 1969)
245^9 (here, p. 249).
^' Burkert (above, note 14) 268. He seems to identify the ceremony in Aristophanes, Clouds
254 ff. as a parody of an originally human sacrifice at Eleusis, even though the poet, in
introducing this motif, alludes to the quite unrelated myth of Athamas (257). These are murky
waters, and with Burkert we must guard against dredging up from them one aspect, that of
sacrifice, as if it were necessarily weightier than and isolated from all others. Do not death and
laughter guarantee resurrection and, for the primitive mentality, is not this link the whole
point? So at least J. G. Frazer and others would argue. Si le grain ne meurt . . .
" Cf. Callimachus, Aet. IV, fr. 90, with Pfeiffer's notes on p. 97 of his edition. Servius (on
Aen. 3. 57) cites a fragment of Petronius describing a (Gaulish?) rite at Massilia in which a
human scapegoat was dressed in sacred garments and led around the city to the accompaniment
of curses before being driven off; Nilsson (above, note 15) 108.
-' The meter is elegiac, but iambic Archilochus had written elegiacs, and Lucilius is called
iambicus by Apuleius even when hexameters are in question (Apol. 10). The spirit matters
more than the letter.
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would be the more primitive, and perhaps in this respect closer to Hipponax
than has appeared. Possibly with the rites of Demeter had crossed other
archaic rituals much harsher to women.
Archaizing Euripides, who should be viewed as himself in many
important senses an "iambic" poet,-"* inevitably therefore also recovered,
though without necessarily approving, the anti-feminism which had come to
typify the literary genre. His chorus of women in the Medea laments (421-
30) that it has no power to answer a long tradition of such poetic assaults.
His efforts and explorations were perhaps sometimes ambiguous or
misunderstood, and it is at another festival of Demeter (on the Meor], or day
of fasting and mourning preceding the resurrection), that Aristophanes'
Thesmophoriazusae propose to punish their slanderer.
This was Attic humor. In Alexandria, another attempt was made to recover
a different version of the iambic. In the first place, this meant to defang it.
Theocritus, for example, normally regarded (on the basis of Idyll 1 . 45-48)
as a follower of Callimachus, unexpectedly praises Archilochus without
mentioning his venom. ^^ Callimachus himself perhaps thought that
Archilochus' fierce reputation was beyond rescue (Grapheion, fr. 380 Pf.):
Ei^Kuoe 5e Spiiiijv xe x6A,ov ktjv6(; 6£ij xe Kevxpov
acpriKoi;, an' diicpoxepcov 5' i6v^° £xei axonaxoq.
He bared the sharp anger of the dog and the piercing sting of the wasp, and
poured from his lips the poison of both.
Elsewhere, he alludes to |ie0-u7:>.fiYOi; (ppoiniov 'Apxv>,6xot) (fr. 544 Pf.).
His quarrel was apparently well known. Antipater of Thessalonica, active
under Augustus, can still declare (AP 11. 20):
OeijyeG' oooi XoicKai; ti Xoifv{?>ac, t\ Ka^aar[vac,
a5EXE, noirixuv (pu^ov otKavBoWYCOv,
01 x' ETiEwv Koonov XtXvy\ci\xevo\/ doicriaavxEi;,
Kprivriq e^ \£Pt\c, tiivexe A.ix6v \j5a)p.
orinEpov 'Apxi^oxoio Kai dpoEvoq r\\iap 'Onfipou
areEv5o)i£v 6 Kprixrip o\J 6exe0' ijSponoxaq.
*'' In view of the descent of tragedy from the dithyramb alleged by Aristotle (Poetics
1449al 1; cf. Archilochus, fr. 120 West).
^' Epigr. 21 Gow. Cf. Epigr. 19, in which Hipponax is made to explain that the virtuous
have nothing to fear from him. Pindar's criticism of Archilochus (P. 2. 54-56) had perhaps
challenged a re-evaluation. What Apollonius of Rhodes had to say in his flepi 'ApxiXoxou
(Athen. 10. 45 Id) we would dearly like to know, but evidently the question of the poet's place
in literature was important enough to be addressed by the Alexandrians.
''' The language indicates that Callimachus already knew the derivation of 'lanPoc; from iov
Pa^eiv also given, for example, by schol. B ad Hephaestionis Enchiridion, ed. Consbruch,
p. 300.
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Off with you and your songs about "loccae" and "iophnides" and
"camasenes," tribe of poetic thom-pluckers! You elaborate your complex
pattern of words and drink simple water from your sacred spring. Today
we pour libation to honor the feast of Archilochus and manly Homer. The
mixing bowl is not at home to water-drinkers.
This epigram, which Ka|iaofivaq at least suggests may be a covert swipe at
Callimachus' Galatea, is a tissue of Alexandrian key words: (peuyeG',
(fivXov, Kpf|VT|<;, enecov Koajiov,-'' reinforced by the characteristic
cy7iov5eid^a)v in line 3. The literary game consists, as elsewhere in the
Anthology, in using all the refinements of the Callimachean water-drinkers
in order, Tiapa TipooSoKiav, to assail their master.^^ But the contrast
between the two styles is clear.
At the start of the lamboi then the initial declaration must be read as
polemical (fr. 191. 1-4 Pf.):
'AKOijaaG' 'iTiTcuvaKTOq- [o]iJ yap aXk' tikco
EK Twv OKOV) Poviv koX-X-tjIPou n]iJtpTiaKouaiv,
(pepcov lanPov oij naxT^ [a£i5]ovTa
TTiv Bo]un[dX]Eiov . . .
Give ear to Hipponax. No, I come from where an ox is sold for a farthing,
bearing an iambos that does not sing of the battle with Bupalus.
Hipponax returns from the next world, to speak in the first person. In ov
yap oXk' he uses an idiom known to Aristophanes. But what kind of
Hipponax was this? With its own itapa TipoaSoKiav, Callimachus' iamb,
making the old poet reject his most characteristic theme, has latched directly
on to the Eleusinian topic of laughing {yzXa-zoq, la. 1. 94) resurrection
{divina commedia).
The real revolution however was reserved until the twelfth poem of the
collection, which perhaps has not yet been sufficiently evaluated from the
feminist perspective.^' It alludes to the Cretan festival of the
Amphidromia,^° which took place five days or so after the birth of a baby.
This was an occasion, sacred to Apollo, when by the parents' invitation
relatives, friends and neighbors, along with all those who had taken part in
any way, gathered to celebrate the happy event with gifts. During the
general rejoicing, the baby was carried at a run around the hearth—and
-'
"EXkt\z (= <(>eiJye6'), Aet.-pxet 17; ipu^ov, Acf.-pref. 7; KpTiVTi;. Epigr. 28. 3 (cf. TtiSaKo;
£^ iEpfi(;, Hy. 2. 112)—all from Callimachus; tnemv eiSuk; koohov, Philetas, fr. 10 Powell.
^^ Cleverness is piled on cleverness. Alan Cameron (Callimachus and his Critics [Princeton
1995]) does not sufficiently develop the dialogic moment of these exchanges, inherent in the
very nature of the Greek genius. The epigram, in spite of its anti-Alexandrian tone, is
Alexandrian, as a moment's comparison with pre-Alexandrian epigrams will show.
^'
It is not mentioned, for example, in E. Fantham's already noted Women in the Classical
World (above, note 15).
^°RE\.2 (1894) 1901-02, s.v. "Amphidromia" (P. Stengel).
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hence the title of the feast
—
possibly by naked bearers (so Hesychius s.v.
5po|iid^(piov finap), and perhaps at one time for inspection by the elders of
the family to determine whether it would be reared (Plato, Tht. 160e). Now
the ceremony had become a sign of acceptance.
This was the occasion selected by Caliimachus in Alexandria to honor
the birth of a baby daughter to his friend Leon, who obviously kept up in his
new home some old traditions. In his twelfth iambos, the poet described
how the gods had attended a similar celebration for the baby Hebe (later the
wife of the deified Heracles). Each one brought different presents, but
Apollo, in offering a poem, explained that his gift would outlast gold and all
the other trinkets of the hour, until an age of peace and reconciliation should
come, when ravening wolves should delight in kids. The language is
messianic,^' the topos seems naive. But if indeed in Caliimachus the self-
praise does look "obvious" (Trypanis), it is only to those who forget the
cliches often deployed to laud their poetic wares by writers anxious to
secure the patronage of the rich and powerful. Theocritus offers a notable
example (Aainovioi, xi 5e KepSoq 6 litipioq ev5o9i xp^oot; kt^.. Id. 16. 22,
addressed to Hiero II of Syracuse). But this little baby had done nothing
and, as a girl in so masculine a society, what could she be expected to do
that would merit the services of a eulogist? But now she receives free from
Caliimachus and Apollo the tribute normally reserved by other well-paid
poets for some mighty general (reges et proelia, Virgil, Eel. 6. 3; cf.
Horace, Odes 4. 15. 1-2), in the wake of Alexander the Great and his
Choerilus {regale nomisma, Philippos, Hor. Epist. 2. 1. 234). The lesson for
the value of this poet's gift to his friend Leon's new daughter, and for his
estimate of her social worth and potential, was obvious, as was its implied
critique of "cyclic" (Epigr. 28. 1), military/bombastic epic.-'^ HaiSiov
eaxriaev . . . ev lieow auxuv . . . With its concern for the child, how much
this poem had done to recover the iambic for the woman.
The Amphidromia was also the feast at which the newborn might
receive a name—and, as Cleomenes' precocious Gorgo reminds us
^' Isaiah 11.6: 'Then (= inn cvd, 10) the wolf shall live wilh the sheep, and the leopard lie
down with the kid; the calf and the young lion shall grow up together, and a little child shall
lead them . . ." (New English Bible). Cf. Nonnus, Dion. 41. 185 ff. Horace in his iambs can
only use this sort of language however in poems filled with irony (Epode 2. 61 , faenerator
Alfius, said to be modelled on an Archilochian original), even eventually despairing irony
(Epode 16.41 ff.).
^^ Cf. D. L. Page, Greek Literary Papyri (LCL), no. 142, p. 590, where Germanus is
compared to Achilles, "breaker of men." Caliimachus' eulogies of other royal ladies (e.g. the
EkGemoi; 'Apoiv6ri(;, the Coma Berenices) are perhaps also programmatic in this sense,
although no doubt helped by the fact that among the pharaohs the line of succession passed
through the female. Catullus translated the Coma Berenices but—tellingly—he had no Roman
lady to whom it could be offered in her own right. The hostility towards Cleopatra at Rome
(Epode 9. 12, feminae: she is never named in extant Augustan literature) is relevant to a
comparison of the two societies and the poets who lived in them. The extraordinary passage in
the ad Herenniiim (4. 23, maiores nosiri etc.) also gives pause for thought, since wilh this piece
of unpleasantness the author is seeking merely to illustrate the rhetorical device of raliocinalio.
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(Herodotus 5. 51), Greek girls did have their own names. Whether she
received her name in this now fragmentary poem or not, Leon's little
daughter was not only accepted by it into the family and community, but
through it told that she could have an identity just as theophoric as that
conferred on the warrior and king.
That was in Callimachus' Alexandria, where Theocritus' own Gorgo
—
and Praxinoa—continued the Doric, comic tradition (Id. 15. 91, Corinth). It
was after all the tradition of Spartan Helen (Theocr. Id. 18). But, even if
Etruria had shared a similar concept of women's value, Rome was different.
Cicero adored his daughter, but the name she had was a feminine version of
his gentile name, "Tullia," and if her father wanted to give her more,
"Tulliola" is as far as he could go. Wives such as Terentia might progress
to mea vita (Cic. Fani. 14. 4. 1; cf. 14. 2. 3)—which was to drop the effort
towards a "personal" name altogether. Dido (Elissa/Eliza) and Anna had
their own names in Virgil; but they were Carthaginians, the enemy. The
assumption that they could have any other than a public destiny was their
mistake.
Horace was aware of Callimachus' effort to recover a different version of
the iambos. In the last but one epistle of Book 1, he reviews his
achievement to date (Epist. I. 19. 23-33):"
Parios ego primus iambos
ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus
Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben. 25
ac ne me foliis ideo brevioribus omes
quod timui mutare modos et carminis artem,
temperat Archilochi Musam-''' pede mascula Sappho,
temperat Alcaeus, sed rebus et ordine dispar,
nee socerum quaerit quern versibus oblinat atris, 30
nee sponsae laqueum famoso carmine nectit.
hunc ego, non alio dictum prius ore, Latinus
volgavi fidicen.
I was the first to show Parian iambs to Latium, following the rhythms and
spirit of Archilochus, but not his topics and language that hunted down
Lycambes. I do not deserve a lesser crown for hesitating to change his
meters and poetic art: after all, Sappho, masculine enough in her handling
of meter, merely plays variations on Archilochus' music, and so does
Alcaeus, though his topics and arrangement are different. He does not
'^ This passage is also discussed in my Augustus and the New Poetry (Brussels 1967) 339 ff.
'" E. Fraenkel argues {Horace [Oxford 1957] 344) that Archilochi and Musam are likely to
go together. This leaves pede to qualify mascula. Horace is not prying into Sappho's
bedroom, merely noting that her poetic technique rivals that of any male.
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look for a father-in-law to smear with poisonous verses, or weave a noose
for his betrothed with a scandalous poem. It was Alcaeus, untranslated
before, whom I made available as lyric poet of Latium.
In this passage, Horace, modulating from Archilochus to Sappho and
Alcaeus, joins his Epodes and Odes as in some sense in the tradition of the
iambographer (and justifies Dante's Orazio satiro). The claim is however
quite false if Horace is made to say tout court that he was the first to show
Parian iambics to Latium. The grammatical tradition placed Lucilius and
Catullus ahead of him there. -^^ But he is not saying that. He is saying that
he showed Parian iambics which had received a Callimachean modification
of subject matter (non res et agentia verba Lycamben - ov ndxTiv dexSovxa
TTiv BouTtdXeiov). By contrast, in his final poem 116, a sort of prefatory
piece set at the wrong end,^^ Catullus had sharply separated the
Callimachean and Archilochian manners, and had opted in the last analysis
for the latter.
Although Callimachus had in fact referred to Hipponax, the two most
famous representatives of the iambic genre were easily assimilated. Horace
himself supplies the evidence (Epode 6. 13-14):
qualis Lycambae spretus infido gener,
aut acer hostis Bupalo.
Like the son-in-law scorned by treacherous Lycambes, or the enemy bitter
against Bupalus.
In his epistle, Horace claims to have spared Lycambes, and it is true
enough, as Leo pointed out many years ago,^^ that the iambi have had their
teeth drawn when it comes to most of their objects. But what about
Lycambes' daughters? What did the epodes have to say about women
which could have rivalled Callimachus' courtesies? The poet's admirers
forget just how unpleasant for women the iamb in his hands could still be. I
translate/paraphrase Rogare longo putidam te saeculo . . . (Epode 8):
Time has made you stink, yet you keep asking what saps my manhood,
though your tooth is black and old age furrows your brow with wrinkles,
and between your dry buttocks gapes what looks like the ugly orifice of a
coarse cow. But is it your breast which moves me and your withered dugs
like a mare's udders and your sagging belly and thin thigh—over your
swelling ankles? You may be rich, your ancestor's busts may lead off
your funeral procession, and no wife may strut along loaded with rounder
•" Diomedes, Ars Gramm. Ill in GL I 485.11-17 Keil; "Iambus est carmen maledicum
plerumque Irimeiro versu et epodo sequenle conposilum . . . appellatum est autem rtapa to
ianPi^Ew, quod est maledicere. cuius carminis praecipui scriptores apud Graecos Archilochus
et Hipponax, apud Romanes Lucilius et Catullus et Horatius et Bibaculus,"
-"'
C. Macleod, "Catullus 1 16," in Collected Essays (Oxford 1983) 181-86.
" F. Leo, De Horatio el Architocho (Gotlingen 1900).
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pearls [than yours]. Yes, you even like to leave Stoic treatises lying
among your silken pillows. But do the sinews of a poor uneducated man
<such as I am> freeze any less, or does his prick slacken any less? To
rouse that from its disdainful loin, you will need to work overtime with
your mouth.
Another effusion in this vein is Quid tibi vis, mulier, nigris dignissima
barris . . . {Epode 12):
What are you after, woman, fit "mate for grey elephants? Why keep
sending me presents or billets-doux? My youth may be immature, my
taste is still refined. No one smarter than me when it comes to sniffing out
whether some wen or the foul goat is lurking in an armpit—not even the
keen hound hunting for the boar. What a sweat in her aged limbs and how
unbearable at every point the smell when, limp though my member may
be, she is in such a rush to quell her uncontrolled frenzy! Her chalky
complexion, daubed on with the aid of a crocodile's droppings, is too
damp to stay put, her sow's heat bursts the taut coverlets and the very
roof! Or she hounds my disgust with her words of reproach: "That Inachia
gives you a livelier time than me. You can fix her up three times in one
night, while with me you go slack at a single go. A pox on Lesbia who,
when I was looking for a mate, pointed out to me a plodding ox like you,
though I could have had Coan Amyntas. His loin doesn't lose its zip, his
sinew is more steadfast than a young tree clinging to the hillside. For
whom were we in such a hurry with the twice-dipped purple stuffs? For
you of course, so that no one at the party among your friends would be
more loved by his woman than you. O poor me, you run away from me,
fearful as a lamb from the hungry wolves or the wild goats from the lions."
At line 7 here, the dialogue ends, and Horace speaks about the woman in the
third person. He does not bother to answer the protest she begins at line 14.
Augustus himself had indulged in some "iambic" humor.^^ That was
the amateur. In a major poet, what justification can there be for this sort of
thing, unless it is generically determined? But, in Horace's case, is it? And
to what extent? Was a literary iambic possible of a different sort from that
of Archilochus and Hipponax? Philodemus, Horace's contemporary,
remarks: Kai laTicpco xiva ianPiKotx; Tioiei Kai 'Apxi^oxoq ouk iaiipiKCoq (P.
Here. 460, fr. 8. lO-IS).^^ Was there then a "Sapphic" iambic? If there
was, did Horace know that, and did he deliberately turn his back on it?
To answer these questions, we need to ask again about the original nature of
the iambic. Both the Hymn to Demeter and Euripides indicated that
^* C. Buechner, Fragmenia Poelarum Lolinorum (Leipzig 1982) 134, from Martial 11. 20.
''
I owe this to Dr. Anastasia Summers. See in general D. Obbink (ed.), Philodemus and
Poelry: Poetic Theory and Practice in Lucretius, Philodemus and Horace (Oxford 1995).
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laughter was part of the world in which iambic was still a women's genre.
And, interestingly, Demetrius uses of Sappho the word the hymn uses of
lambe—OKCojiTei.'"' The whole context may be quoted (De £/oc. 166-67):
Aio Ktti fi laTicpw Ttepi nev KaXXovc, adovaa KaXXi£KT\q eati koi
TiSeia, Kai nepi epMiuv 6e koI aepoc, Kai reepi dA.icu6vo(;, Kal aTtav ko^ov
ovona Evijcpavxai autfjc; xf\ jioitioei, xa §£ khi auifi eipydaaTo.
"AX^cck; 5e aKMTnei xov dypoiKov vuncpiov, Kai xov Gupcapov xov ev
xoiq ydnoii; EviXE^EOxaxa Kal ev Tie^oiq ovonaoi naX^ov t\ ev TtoirixiKoiq,
oSaxE aijxfic; [laXXov eaxi xd reoirmaxa xa\jxa 6iaA.e-/ea0ai t^ a5eiv, oij5'
dv dpnoaai npbq xov xopov ti rtpoi; xtiv A-ijpav, ei \ir\ X15 e'lTi xopoq
5iaA.EKxiK6(;.
This is why Sappho, when her song is of beauty, is full of beautiful
and pleasing words, as she is when too she celebrates love and the air and
the halcyon. Every beautiful word is woven into the fabric of her poetry,
some owed to her own invention.
Her jests at the expense of the awkward bridegroom strike quite
another note, and at that of the doorkeeper at the wedding. Here she uses
very ordinary language, rather that of prose than poetry. These poems of
hers are more suited to dialogue than song. They could not be adapted for
dance or music, unless there were to be a sort of dancing dialogue.
Two well-known fragments of Sappho's epithalamia (frr. 110a, 111 L-P)
support these statements. The exaggerated (carnival) numbers in the first
example are noteworthy:
Gupcbpo) 7c65ei; enxopoYuioi,
xd 6e aom^aXa nenjtEPoria,
TtiouYYOi 5e 5eK' e^eTcovaiaav.
The doorkeeper's feet are seven fathoms long, and his sandals five oxskins
thick. It took ten cobblers to fashion them.
'lyoi 8ri x6 neXaGpov,
unrivaov,
deppexe xeKxovei; dvSpeq-
iJ|iTivaov.
yduppoi; teioepxexai'" 'iaoi;t "Apeui,
dv5pO(; neydXco noXv ne^cov.
'"' And we already saw that OK0)|x|iaxa was used of the repartee at the Haloa: above, note 15.
" The meter is obviously a hexameter divided by the refrain into a hemiepes and enoplion
(Bentley). Since it does not fit this dactylic pattern, eioEpxetai in the penultimate line here is
doubted by scholars but, whatever the merits of their more general objections, Epxo|iai is the
vox propria on these occasions, and the concept of "the one who is to come" is shared by both
Greek (6 epxotievoq) and Hebrew. Cf. oe 5' EpxonEvov ev 5(koi koX\i<; oXPo; antpwEnexai,
Pindar, P. 5. 14; EijloyniiEvoq 6 ipxonevoc,. 6 PaciXtu; ev ovonaxi Kupiou, LXX Ps. 1 18. 26
(= benediclus qui venit in nomine Domini in the Sanclus); ou ti b EpxonEvoi;, r\ ixXXov
itpooSoKUHEV, Luke 7. 19; so, n3 in Botterweck (above, note 10) I 536 ff. (H. D. PreuB), 808
ff. (J. Scharbert).
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Up with the roof tree, sing marriage song, up with it, carpenters! Sing
marriage song. Here comes the bridegroom like Ares himself, much
bigger than a man who is big.
An "iambic" parallel to eioepxexai here {si sana lectio) of a more univocal
sort is found in Aristophanes {Birds 1708-13):
5exeaGe xov lupavvov o^pioii; 56|ioi(;.
TipooEpyETai yap oioq o\jt£ itaiicpaTiq
doxfip i5eiv tka\iM/z xpuoauyei Sonq),
ovi9' r|X{o\j xri^auyec; oiktivcov aeA,aq
ToiouTov £^eX,a|j.v((ev, oiov Epyexai
ezMV ywaiKOi; KaKXoc, oij (paxov \iyz\v.
Welcome the lord in his prosperous house, for here he comes! Not such
the bright star shines in its palace of gold, nor the sun's far-travelling
beam, with such a bride does he come, her beauty beyond all telling.
The imagery anticipates the hymn of the Athenians to Demetrius Poliorcetes
(Athenaeus 6. 253c-d). The epxo'u at the end of NT Revelation, with its
frequent allusions to the Bridegroom, is familiar.'*-
In Sappho, there is an obvious interest in the grotesque body of the
male. Scholars have been reluctant to discover any double-entendre. But if
they are to give us any idea of the kind of sally in which lambe indulged? Is
it here that the Eleusinian obscenity already noted at the Haloa survived
—
not at the expense of women, however (Archilochus), but at that of men?
So also in yet a third Sapphic epithalamium (fr. 1 15 L-P):
T{cp o' 0) (piX,e vduppe KotA-coq EiKaaSco;
opjittKi PpaSivo) oe ndA.iox' eiKaaSo).
Dear bridegroom, to whom may I compare thee? To a tender sapling most
of all I compare thee.
What is this opita^, this regenerative sapling ("i:i3i . . . non, Isaiah 11. 1)?
Yet the fun is innocent enough, and in its way sacral. The age-old idiom of
the guessing game recurs even in the Christian Gospels.*^
There was then evidence of another side to the iambic manner, in which
even so feminine an author as Sappho could find a place, and this may shed
some light on the baffling Horatian dictum already adduced: Temperat
Archilochi Musam pede mascula Sappho, "Sappho, masculine enough so far
as her meter goes, plays variations on Archilochus' themes," {Epist. 1. 19.
* And cf. daxrip, 22. 16.
''' Matt 11.7, Luke 11. 24. With Sappho's sapling may be compared the phallus pole
(familiar from the Achamians), Maypole and so on. The use of a branch soaked in holy water
to sprinkle the congregation at the beginning of more solemn Masses, while the choir sings
from Psalm 50 (51) (Asperges me Domine hyssopo et mundabor). is a ritual impregnation by
the male priest of the faithful. This does not. of course, in any way diminish the sacredness of
the rite.
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28). This suggests an awareness of a common thread linking the two Greek
poets which however other Horatian passages (e.g. Odes 4. 9. 10-12), by
sentimentalizing Sappho, snap. Horace's treatment of Sappho as a whole
would be another part of the indictment of his attitude to women.
In discussing Sappho's alternative version of the iambic, Demetrius
wondered if there could be a xopoq bmXeKxxKoc,. But there were at least the
ritual beginnings of such exchanges. Describing the rites of Mysian
Demeter at Mysaeum, in a passage where yiXwc, and oKCOiifiaxa again
attract attention, Pausanias reports (7. 27. 10):
(x<piKO|iEV(ov eq x6 kpov xuv dv5pa)v, ai yuvaiKeq xe iq aijxouq tca'i dva
liepoq Ei; xdq ywaiKa^ oi dvSpeq yiXoizi xe ic, dA,^Ti^ou<; xpwvxai koi
OKCDHjiaaiv.
When the men arrive at the temple, the women indulge in laughter and
jokes at their expense, and in turn the men do the same for the women.
We can extrapolate from this. Burkert remarks: ". . . there must have been
occasions [i.e. at the Thesmophoria] on which men and women derided one
another.'"*^
With this the rites of Apollo Aegletes on Anaphe may be compared
(Ap. Rhod. Az-g. 4. 1720-30):
o 5ri ocpeai; onnoxe 5aW(; 1720
vScop oi9o|iEvoiaiv eni^A-EiPovxac; 'i6ovxo
MriSEiric; 5ntoal <l)air|K{6£q oijkex' eneixa
'I'oxEiv £v oxtiGeooi ye^co o6evov ola GanEidi;
aiEv Ev 'AXkivooio pooKxaoiai; opocoaai.
xdq 5' aioxpoiq ripcoEc; eheoxoPeeokov Eneaoiv 1725
yX.Eijri yriGoouvoi • Y^UKEpf] 5 ' dvESaiexo xoioiv
KEpxo)iiri Kai vEiKoc; £7teoP6Xov. ek 6e vu KEivrjq
HoX.7tfi(; npcocov vrjoq) Evi xoia ywaiKEq
dv5pdai 5ripi6a)vxai, ox' 'A7i6A.Xci)va 6ur|A,ai(;
AiyA-Tixriv 'Avdcprii; xiiniopov IXdoKuvxai. 1730
When the women, Medea's maids from Phaeacia, saw them pouring water
offerings over blazing torches, they could no longer keep the laughter pent
up in their breasts, for many were the sacrifices of oxen they had been
used to seeing in the palace of Alcinous. And the heroes girded at them
with crude words, and took pleasure in the glee. And a pleasing banter
was kindled among them and loose-tongued exchange. And, because of
that song of heroes on the island, that is how the women strive with the
men, whenever they seek to placate with their sacrifices Apollo the
Glorious, the champion of Anaphe.
Mo^Ttri (1728) may in fact describe song and dance. The Eleusinian x^eiJTi
recurs (1726; cf. yiXw, 1723). 'E7teoP6>.ov at 1727 here (if it is from enoq
** W. Burkert. Greek Religion. Eng. tr. (Oxford 1985) 244.
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pd^Xco and not from EKEia^akXa) rather recalls the iov ^aXXa felt to lie at
the root of "iamb."
This ritual and a parallel were noted in Callimachus' Aetia (fr. 7. 19-20
Pf.):
Kw? 6e, Geai, .[...] |iev dvTip 'Avaipaioq in aiclxpoic,
T\ 5' eTti 5\)a[(pTmoi<;] AivSo^ ayei Guairiv;
How is it, goddesses, that the man of Anaphe sacrifices [to Apollo] with
crude language, and Lindos celebrates its sacrifice [to Heracles] with
blasphemies?
Later, these rites are specifically compared by Callimachus with the worship
of Demeter Rarias at Eleusis.''^ X?iev)[ri] is found here too (Aetia I, fr. 21.
9-10 Pf.):
xA,eiL)[. .]5ei .... 05 d7tEKp\)\|;avTo Xa[
\'f\ai[i]eq ev Atio\j<; iiiiaoi 'Papid5o(;
. . . glee . . . they concealed . . . fasting on the days of Rarian Demeter
Apparently, women were not silenced on these occasions. In Rome, the
fescennina iocatio immortalized by Catullus in poem 61 would be another
example of this age-old "flyting" between the sexes. Yet he spares the
bride. It is the groom who is the butt of his quips ( 1 19 ff. Mynors).
The rites recorded by Callimachus and Apollonius seem to point to
some early stage of what became the iambic repartee, yet one in which the
women were allowed to give as good as they got. In literature, iambic
Catullus also preserves a dialogue between the sexes (poem 62), in which
the girls certainly have the chance to utter their regrets about their loss of
virginity, but in which the men, rather than uttering any abuse, link that with
nature's eternal cycle of growth and change. The Archilochian iambic, by
contrast, had suppressed the woman's right of reply, and an epigram
composed by Dioscorides in the late third century derives its pathos from
the fact that it represents the other half of a missing dialogue. Its last line
and word may allude to and seek to answer the slur in line 27 of the new
Archilochus fragment {AP 1. 351. 7-10 = Gow and Page, Hellenistic
Epigrams no. XVII; cf. West, Iambi et Elegi Graeci, I, p. 15):
'Apxi^oxov |id Geouc; ko'i Sainovai; o\jx' ev dyviiaiq
£'i5o|iEv o\j9' "Hprit; ev lieydA-w lejievei-
ei 5' r\\itv ndx^oi Kal didoBaJloi, ovk dv eKeivoq
'^
'Pdpiov, Horn. Hy. Dem. 450. The passage is vividly evolced by J. G. Frazer on pp. 393-
94 of the abridgement he made in 1922 of his The Golden Bough (repr. Ware, England 1993).
See also Burkert (above, note 14) 292. Pfeiffer is rightly puzzled (pp. 28-29) by the
relationship of this feast and its observances to the regular mysteries of the goddess at Eleusis.
These queries are beyond the scope of the present argument.
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TlBeXev £^ finecov yvriaia xeicva xekeiv.''^
We (daughters of Lycambes) never set eyes on Archilochus either in the
street or in the great precinct of Hera. Had we been lewd and lascivious,
he would never have wanted to beget by us legitimate children.
Clearly at least some of this poetry found its true home in the "iambic"
worship of a goddess, here "in the precinct of Hera." But Hera was the
patroness of marriage.
In some ways, at least where women are concerned, Aristophanes
illustrates the resources and scope of the iambic much better than what we
now have of Archilochus. The end of the Peace, celebrating a wedding, is
divided by the Venetus into fi|xix6pia (1332-57). This produces another
version of the yophc, SiaXeKTiKoq scouted by Demetrius. This time,
however, the dialogue appears to be between men, though, in this imitation
of the popular style, with its frequent repetitions and even rhymes, the
woman is certainly not depreciated. There is plentiful use of cx(ppo5ioioi
A.6701. The text is reproduced here from that of Hall and Geldart (OCT):
HMIXOPI
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Xo. 'Y|iTiv 'YuEvai'o),
'Ynf|v 'YuEvai' (b.
Tp. cbxaipeTE xotipEt' av- 1355
5pe<;, kSv aw£7iria9£ jioi
nXuKomxaq e'5eo9e.
Thrice-blessed, how well deserved your good fortune! Hail, Hymen,
Hymen hail! What shall we do with her? What shall we do with her? We
shall reap her fruit! We shall reap her fruit! Up then, you whose task it is,
and let us carry the bridegroom, you men. Hail, Hymen, Hymen hail!
Yes, you will keep house well, not gathering trouble, but gathering figs.
Hail, Hymen, Hymen hail! His fig is big and fat, hers so sweet. That you
will say when you eat and drink deep. Hail, Hymen, Hymen hail! O
farewell, farewell, you men and, if you follow me, your treat will be cakes
to eat.
Homer knew the lovers' oapiaxvc, {II. 22. 127-28). The Alexandrians
valued it (Callimachus, fr. 401; [Theocr.] 27; cf. Apoll. Rhod. 3. 971-72).
In the Odes Horace himself offers an oapiaxijq between two lovers, Lydia
and an unnamed other (3. 9). Yet this is a piece of light-hearted froth,
which can only serve to enhance the contrast with the Horatian epodes
translated above. And their nastiness persists into the final book of odes (4.
13, directed against Lyce). Although their author was perfectly aware of
Callimachus' lamboi, his own lambilEpodes spurn Callimachean courtesies.
The objects of the crude assaults in poems 8 and 12 (!) are not so much as
named. And how much "Lesbia" is devalued at 12. 17.
These iambs know nothing of any Amphidromia, with their opportunity
for even a baby girl to receive a name. Yet the name of his sexual partner
did concern the Roman male. In his satires, Horace explains that, among
the many conveniences of employing a professional, was the chance for the
man to impose any name he found exciting {Sat. 1. 2. 125-27):
haec, ubi supposuit dextro corpus mihi laevum.
Ilia et Egeria est: do nomen quodlibet illi,
nee vereor ne, dum futuo, vir rure recurrat . . .
When she has put her left side under my right, she becomes Ilia or Egeria.
I give her whatever name I like. I do not need to worry in case, while I am
enjoying myself, her husband may get back from his out-of-town trip . . .
But the name and personhood are inextricably intertwined (again,
something perfectly familiar to the Hebrew mind). To paraphrase
Herodotus, oij cppovxiq 'OpaT{cp. In other aspects of his poetry, there are
senses in which Horace is far more Callimachean than the professed Roman
Callimachus. But not in this one most sensitive spot. Here, he reverts to the
Archilochian vein. Why?
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The universally occurring jubilee over harvest home illustrates the profound
concern of the primitive tribe with the defeat of hunger and starvation.
Sometimes the desperate need to secure the rich bounty of the earth may
have persuaded our ancestors, by a kind of sympathetic magic, to sacrifice
in the shape of a girl of marriageable age part of their own precious future,
so that from her fertile blood a larger increase might flow, benefiting the
entire community (Propertius 4. 8. 3-14). Sometimes this sacrifice was
perhaps accompanied by evocative celebration in song and dance.
Sometimes perhaps the victim was even ritually cursed, separated from her
tribe ("consecrated"), so that she could more easily pass over into the
unknown.''^
If this was the origin of the iamb ("one-step dance"?), it is clear how
much the Greeks civilized this primal impulse. Eleusis no longer
emphasized the loss or death—which were presupposed—so much as the
resurrection and recovery. And its women were not merely the victims of
curses, but were allowed a response, even a dialogic response. Hence
perhaps ultimately that series of stunningly outspoken heroines, doomed
and yet somehow mimetically more than ever alive, with which Attic
(iambic) tragedy has presented us. But from the same root spring comedy's
reversals of masculine values, the eKKA.rioidl^o\)oai of the Ha^aid, the love
affairs of the Kaivri.
Perhaps at Eleusis also those rites de passage were recollected in which
the young bride goes from her mother's world into the arms of a groom at
first perceived as menacing and alien, afterwards accepted and incorporated
into the cycle of new life. The instrument of such incorporation was
evidently Aphrodisian laughter, merriment, "glee." This is why the iambic
for the ancients could never be divorced from the notion of wit, repartee.
Archilochus was even, according to Pindar (O. 9. 1 ff.), the author of the
primal epinician, with its twanging TTiveX^a.
How then did an iambic so rich eventually become "poison speech" and
not much else? The achievement of its literary progenitor, Archilochus,
seems to have been narrowed and diminished in the tradition (voyepov
'Apxi^oxov, P. 2. 55). Whatever his experiments even with the pre-tragic
""^ Hence perhaps Horace's own iambic "ut inmerentis fluxit in terram Remi / sacer
nepotibus cruor," Epode 7. 19-20. Cf. more generally OT Leviticus 16. 21: "And Aaron shall
. . . confess over him [the scapegoat] all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their
transgressions in all their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat . . ." (King James). The
other goal mentioned by the sacred writer in this chapter of Leviticus was sacrificed (verse 9).
The rich material on the general theme of the scapegoat collected by J. G. Frazer in vol. 9 of
the twelve-volume edition of The Golden Bough (3rd ed.. New York 1935) is summarized on
pp. 538 ff. of his previously mentioned abridgement (above, note 45). If this sort of rite lay at
the root of one aspect of the primitive iambic, perhaps this explains much of the identification
of the sins of the community with sins thought typical of women. Cf. the Rev. J. C. Taylor's
story cited by Frazer on p. 570 ("Wickedness, wickedness" = irislia nequitia < > Lycori tua).
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dithyramb, for the increasingly male-dominated society of the polls, for the
dinner table and the wine party, he preserved and emphasized the nasty
invective against the woman (ritual cursing of the victim) perhaps
characteristic of some aspect of the primitive rite. Semonides added to this
the puritanical demand that even among themselves women should forget
their talk (dialogue) about Aphrodite, though, in his version of the origins of
the Eleusinian celebrations, Euripides tried to show how impossible and
self-contradictory this was. It is clear how little room Semonides left for
Sappho's alternative Muse, though recollections of her different iambic
persisted as late as Demetrius, as in Horace's contemporary Philodemus,
and even in Horace's own theorizings.
Callimachus revived for his eirenical lamboi the memory of the woman
as baby, and therefore of the woman's role as mother, by implication just as
important to Apollo as that of the warrior and king. Yet in his Iambi, as
elsewhere, Horace, though so mealy-mouthed when it came to attacking
enemies who might defend themselves, where women were in play ignored
Callimachus' civility and chose instead the old crudity. Perhaps this also
explains his determined disparagement of whatever was going on to rescue
the Sapphic alternative in contemporary elegy (exigui elegi, A.P. 77;
miserabiles elegi. Odes 1. 33. 2-3), even of whatever had been achieved by
Catullus and Calvus (Sat. 1. 10. 18-19). It is the shrilling of a sour note
within his universe of discourse which will diminish all his chords. But of
this more anon.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Ad Themistium Arabum II'
GERALD M. BROWNE
22. 1-2 dA.>.a tk; exepa (puoiq 6 vo\J<; e^co TiavTE^cbq oco|iaTiKO\)
8iaoTT||iaT0(;: Ar(abic) "but the intellect is always some other nature,
entirely exterior to every dimension of the body" (5. 1-2), i.e. aXX' a<z{>
xiq exepa . . . TiavxeAwq <7ravx6(;> oco|iaxiKO\) 5iaaTT]\iaxoq. Ar here
employs LJIj to render dei/aiei, as elsewhere (e.g. 22. 16 = Ar 5. 15; 48. 32
= 65. 9; 52. 36 = 74. 15; see also below, on 123. 19-20); it may also use li^l
(see on 64. 16-17). For an expression comparable to (i<ei> xiq exepa, cf.
55. 9-1 1 r\ |iev xiq aiei [Ub: 79. 15] xtXtia . . . fi 8e dxeA,Ti(; Kai ael [ li<l:
79. 16] aUti .
24. 10-12 x{ o\)v x6 oiKeiov eKdaxri . . . navxzXaq 6 Tiiiaioq
dTieoiuTirioev: Ar "and so Timaeus has completely neglected study of the
body appropriate to each and every soul as to what body it is . . ." (10. 6-7).
The repetition of "body" (|.—>) in Ar suggests that the translator is not
simply making the Greek explicit (as he does in the case of eKaoxfi [sc. xfi
\|/\JXfi]), and so I suggest that his Vorlage had xi ovv <x6 oco^a> x6 oiKeiov
Kxi.. If this is what Themistius wrote, homoiarchon could account for the
omission in the manuscripts available to Heinze.
24. 36-37 . . . 7ieipa)|ievoiq xct naQx] xr\q \\ivxt\c, Kal xd epya EKaoxov
Eiq dpiioviav xivd dvaipepeiv: Ar "... if we tried to attribute the soul's
affections and each of its actions to some attunement" (11. 12-13). Todd
emends eKaoxov to eKaoxou and renders: "if we tried to refer the affections
and functions of each thing's soul back to a specific attunement" (41 and
163 n. 13). But eKaoxov, a case of partitive apposition (Kiihner-Gerth I
286-87) is sound, as Ar saw.
28. 19-20 KoXXaKxq |iev ydp f) avdnvTioiq anb xt\c, TtpoPo^fic;
dp^anevri xcov (pavxao|idxcDv eiq avxb xouxo dnexel^euxrioev . . . : Ar "for
often our memory, which begins from the unfolding of the imagination,
ends at this very thing . . ." (19. 6-8), i.e. tioXXolkxc, |iev ydp <Ti|iTv> fi
dvanvTioiq KxX. Cf. 28. 9-10 xou nd9o-uq xmv aioGrixripicov t\ yuxTl tihiv
aix{a, which Ar turns as "our [LL>, as in the passage under discussion] soul
' See ICS 11 (1986) 223-45 for Part I, including general discussion and bibliography, to
which add: Todd = R. B. Todd (transl.), Themislius. On Aristotle's On the Soul (Ithaca 1996).
N.B. 1 give the Arabic usually only in translation, where [ ] = lacuna and < > = editorial
addition.
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is the cause of the experiences of the senses" (18. 14). The loss of Ti|iTv in
the rest of the tradition occurred through homoiarchon.
31. 6-7 -uTidpxeiv yap [sc. 6 'ApioToxei^rie; cprioiv] (i5\)vaTa xoTq omro
Xiyovai Trpcoiov |iev toe ek xoij KiveioGai ouiiPaivovxa . . . : Ar "for many
impossible things attend those who hold this argument: first there attend
them the repugnances that attend those who hold that the soul is moved
. .
."
(25. 1-3). Unless Ar is simply expanding, the Vorlage may have read
axoTta after o\)|iPa{vovxa; the text has oUL^, which elsewhere renders
otxoTia (e.g. 34. 4 exepa axoTca o\)|ipa{vei = Ar 31. 6; see also Lyons 265
and 324).
31. 10-11 Ttuq a|iepfi(; koi d5id(popoq oijoa kivtixikt) xe dua dv eiTi
Ktti KivrixT); Ar "it is not possible that it move and be moved at the same
time, being as it is unconditionally without division and without
differentiation" (25. 6-7), i.e. nac, <anX(b(;> diiepfiq kx^. Ar has
J^i^^l Jj^, which often turns anXwq (e.g. 39. 33 = Ar45. 1; 58. 6 = 87. 1;
note especially 1 14. 7 anXibq aXr\Biq = 208. 7-8). For the rendition of a
Greek rhetorical question by a negative statement in Ar, cf. e.g. 38. 5 nG>q
ydp . . . ; = "for it cannot be [thus]" (40. 7).
37. 26-27 6 \xzv tvQvq ev xfi ouaxdoei xov vo\Jv xcov aXXav 5ioiK{^eiv
[sc. 5oKei]; Ar "one of the two [i.e. Plato] lodged the intellect with the rest
of the faculties straightway <in> the constitution of the animal" (39. 7-8).
If Ar is not simply interpreting the text (cf. Todd, who translates ev xfi
cvaxdati "in the compound [of soul and body]": 54), the Vorlage may have
read ev xfi ouaxdoev <xo\) ^a)o\)>; cf. 53. 20-21 ziq oijoxaaiv xov
yevvrixiKou ^cbo'u - Ar "for the constitution [.l_^, as in the present text] of
the generating animal" (76. 1-2).
38. 17-18 ei 8e [ir\ 5iaxeA.ei xd nepri xuv evxc^cov Kal xcov ixGijcov
^covxa Kal Kivo\)|ieva, oiJSev Gaunaoxov: Ar "and it is not surprising if the
parts of ringworms, when they are sliced through, and the parts of fish do
not continue alive and mobile" (40. 18-41. 1), i.e. . . . xcov evx6n.cov
<8iaK07ixo|ievcov> Kal kxX. Cf. 38. 3-i xivd xcov evxoncov 5iaK0Jix6|ieva,
where Ar translates the participle with jJai (40. 5), as in the present passage.
41. 36-37 . . . (oq KXiapxoq (piioiv: Ar "... as also Clearchus said"
(49. 10), i.e. co(;<Kai>KXeapx6q(|)r|aiv.
42. 19-21 ei cpuoiKov oco|ia 6 7ieA.eKU(; fiv Kal x6 eiSoq xouxo ei/ev, aq
5ijvaa9ai xe^veiv o\) ;iapd xfiq xexvriq d?i/Vd Ttapd zr\c, (p-uoecoq . . . : Ar "if
the axe were a natural body and had this form, so that it could cut not by art
but as if it were by nature ..." (51. 3-4). Perhaps Ar's Vorlage read . . .
d^^d <c6o7rep> itapd xr\q (pijoeco(;.
45. 16 . . . xT\c, xeXeioxepa<; xov 7ipd7|iaxo<; e^eox; xauxa ovonaxa: Ar
"... these names apply only to the disposition of the thing when it is
complete" (58. 3^), i.e. . . . xauxa <xd> 6v6|iaxa.
51. 2^ xd ydp (p-uxd (pr|ai Kdxco (lev piC,ovaQai 5id xd xfiv yflv
(pepeoGai Kdxco Kal ooov ev avxolc, |idA.^ov yeuSeq, dve\j 6e xoiq K^-dSoiq
Kal ooov ev auxoiq [laXXov nvpoideq: Ar "for he says [that plants take root]
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with their roots downwards, because the earth naturally moves downwards,
and similarly everything of heavier earthly substance that [is in them], and
their branches rise upwards, and so does everything that is fiery in them"
(70. 8-11). Ar may have translated avev 5e <a{)^dvea9ai> xoii; kXcxSok;
KxX.; cf. 44. 15 to yap aij^avonevov oc^a xoiq k^(x8oi<; tni tov ocvco totcov
a-u^dvexai = Ar "for that which grows [j_^UI] at the same time causes its
branches to rise [L.',.u; cf. >1jj in the present passage] to the place above"
(55. 10-1 1). Note also that aij^rioiq = .j-ij: Lyons 300 and 324.
51. 19-20 ipaivexai ydp liovov tcov oxoixeicov x6 Ttup xpetponevov Kal
a\)^av6(ievov, cooxe . . . : Ar "for fire alone of the elements appears by itself
[supplied by translator from icaG' ea-uxriv in the preceding line] to be
nurtured and to grow (they said); and so . . ." (71. 9-10). Apparently Ar's
Vorlage had . . . au^avonevov, <c6i; (paciv> cooxe . . . ; homoiarchon could
have caused the loss of the phrase in the manuscripts available to Heinze.
The subject of (paaiv is dXXoi in line 17.
56. 21 . . . cxTiep auxfi owaGpoii^ei Kal eauxfi 9r|oa'up{!^exai; Ar " . .
.
which it gathers together to itself and stores up for itself (82. 15), i.e. dnep
a-uxfi ouvaGpoi^ei, balancing eauxfj Grioa-upii^exai. Note that ami] is
taken up by the scribe in his capacity as reviser: "which [it gathers together]
itself and stores up for itself (see Lyons n. 135).
56. 35 xiva ydp eoxi xd Trdo^ovxa Kupioq, Kal xlva xd d^A-oioij^eva,
5icbpioxai . . . : Ar "for there has been outlined . . . what the things are that
actually experience and what the things are that actually change ..." (83.
14-16). Ar may have read Tidoxovxa Kupicoc; . . . dA.^oioi)|i£va <K-upicoq>;
the second K-upicoq can easily be understood, but such repetition is not
uncommon in Themistius: cf. e.g. 56. 38-39 xf\ Koivuq X,eyonevTi 5-uvdnei
Kal xqj Koivcoq ^eyo|ievcp Tidoxeiv; sim. 86. 24-25.
57. 20-21 dve^aTidxrixoq ydp nepl xd xpco|iaxa f| 6\\iiq, oxav . . . 6id
KaGapou xou depoq xdq evepyeiaq noifixai: Ar "for error does not befall
sight in the case of colors when ... the employment of its activity is in air
estival and pure" (85. 5-7), i.e. 5id <9epivou Kal> KaGapou ktX Visual
similarity (Gep- : -Gap-) may have contributed to the loss of the words
elsewhere in the tradition.
64. 16-17 eyKaxcpKo56|ir|xai ydp ev xoiq coolv dfip -utio XT\q cp-uaecoq xfj
UTiviyyi oun(p\)fi(; . . . : Ar "for the ears are constituted by nature so that in
them continually air may be bound to the membrane of hearing, the ear-
drum ..." (102. 5-6). After drip we should add dei, lost through
homoiarchon in the manuscripts available to Heinze. Cf. 65. 18 fixei to ouq
del imb xf\<; xoiauxriq Kivfiaecoq = Ar "we feel always a ringing in our ears
from this movement" (104. 10); here dei is turned by LJlj, but it may also
be rendered by li;l, as in the passage under discussion: see above, on 22. 1-
2, and note e.g. 106. 5 = Ar 192. 15; 112. 29 = 205. 15 and 121. 30 =
224. 12.
66. 29 xoTJxcp ydp xpfixai enl 5iJ0 epya: Ar "for nature uses this for two
activities" (107. 11). The subject of xpfixai is not obvious from what
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precedes, and the verb is not likely to be passive (as Todd assumes: "for it is
used for two functions" [87]); therefore read—with Ar—xoiJTcp yap xpfJTai
<fi (p{)oi(;> ETil Sue epya, a pattern of expression comparable to 66. 33
Xpfitai Ti (fivaic, = Ar "nature uses" (107. 15).
69. 33-35 ovzca 5e apa e^ei Kal etii :r\q oacpprioecoc;, xoii; nev evxonoiq
OLKaXvipeq eivai to 6o9pavTiK6v opyavov . . . : Ar "thus it is likely to be
the case with smell too, so that [,_^] the organ of smell in ringworms is not
covered .
.
." (1 14. 7-8), i.e. . . . eiti xT\q oacppriaecoq, <ii>q> toi<; \xev kzX.
For ax; c. inf., see Heinze 170 and note especially 42. 19-21 (quoted above),
where aq corresponds to ^a>, as in the present passage. Haplography
caused the loss of the conjunction in the rest of the tradition.
72. 7 oxe56v yap a-uxai 5oKot)oiv eivai 5ia(popal xuncbv: Ar "for
these kinds seem essentially to be the kinds of flavors" (118. 14-15), i.e. . . .
6oKot)oiv eivai <ai> Siacpopai xrni&v, for the article, cf. especially 82. 13-
14 01 nev ouv xponoi io\> Kaxa o-unPepriKoq ouxoi = Ar "now these are the
ways of attainment by way of accident" (141. 11-12).
72. 26-27 Kal xoi) Ka0' ea\)xfiv eKaaxri i^eyd^ou Kal |iiKpo\)
aioSdvexai: Ar "and each one of them feels—together with what it feels
—
the large and the small by itself (119. 14-15). Comparison with 109. 20,
where x6 ouvavxi^auPdveoGai is translated in Ar as "the fact that it
achieves—together with what it achieves—" (199. 7), suggests that we
should restore the Vorlage as . . . niKpoiJ <o\;v>aio9dveTai; cf. also 107.
29 = Ar 195. 13, and for a\)vaio6dvonai rendered by ^ '^>>, as in the
present passage, see Lyons 244 and 376.
75. 17 x6 Siacpavei; 8e ovk fi^A.oiot)xo XeuKov aiJxo f\ neA-av
yiyvo^evov [sic]: Ar "and the transparent is not changed by light and so
becomes white or black" (125. 17-18). Ar read djio xou (pcoxoq after
yiyv6|ievov: cf. the next clause, oij5e 6 ev xoiq coolv eyKaxcoKoSo^riiievoq
drip aijxoi; oi^vc, y\ papuq yiv6^evo(; drto xou \|/6(pou = Ar "nor is the air
constituted in the ears itself changed by sound and so becomes itself sharp
orheavy" (125. 18-19).
75. 36-76. 1 o\)5ev otjv 0au|iaox6v, ei Kal ini xmv dA.X.cov
evavxicooecov xauxo oxJuPaivei, el'oco [liv xioi 6\)vd)ieoiv SKdoxriq
aiaOavojieGa . . . : Ar "and so it is not surprising then that^ that same thing
happens [in the case of] the rest of the oppositions as well, so that we feel
each and every one of them by an internal faculty . . ." (126. 19-20). Ar's
Vorlage had a conjunction before the clause beginning with eioco, and 1
would restore it as . . . o^nPaivei, <ei> ei'aco kx^. Formally (though this is
not obvious in Ar), this clause is the object of ouSev . . . 6au|iaax6v, while
the preceding ei Kal clause is concessive. Todd's translation captures the
structure, although he overlooked the need for a conjunction before Eiaco:
"So even if the same thing happens in the case of the other pairs of
' I.e. jl; perhaps emend to jl = Ei(as in 100. 22 = Ar 182. 7),
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[tangible] opposites too,^ then there is nothing odd about our perceiving
each of them [separately] by specific internal capacities . . ." (97).
76. 16-17 b 5e eTii^Tixei npbq xov nepi xriq oapKOi; X,670v
'AA,e^av5poq, ovx iKavov: Ar "and as for that with which Alexander
pursues the argument about flesh and with which he challenges it, it has no
validity" (128. 1-2). Ar's Vorlage seems to have had something more than
the transmitted text, and I suggest that we restore it as ... Xoyov
<evioxdnevoq> 'AXe.t,avdpoc, kxX.: cf. 6. 11 6 6e evioxa^evoq Tipoq xouxov
xov A-oyov . . . (the Arabic is lacking).
79. 9-10 al'oGrioiq 8e fjniv ouSenia xoi) yivonevou: Ar "but it has no
perception <of> that" (134. 9). The subject of the discourse is the animal,
as opposed to the plant, and Tifiiv seems out of place. Ar does not translate
it, and perhaps the Vorlage read eoxiv instead.
82. 13 . . . eiq Tiv [sc. aio9r|oiv] xeA.e\jxaJoi Kal al Xoijcai: Ar "... at
which terminate sight and the rest of the senses" (141. 1 1). Ar's Vorlage
had . . . xe^Euxcbov <Kal f] 6\\iig> Kal al A,oi7iai; cf. 82. 27-28 . . . eiq 'r\M Kal
f| 6\j/i(; Kal f| yzvaiq ana xeA.e\)xcooiv = Ar " . . . at which terminate together
sight and [taste]" (142. 7); cf. also 82. 39-83. 1 = Ar 143. 2-3.
83. 36-37 Xeyw 6e xauxov eoxi x6 Kax' evepyeiav aKouaxov Kal r\
ocKofi: Ar "and I mean by my statement 'one and the same' that what is
heard in actuality and hearing are one [and the same] thing" (145. 4-5), i.e.
A,eYa) 5e xauxov <oxi xai)x6v> eoxi kxX. Homoioteleuton was responsible
for the loss of text in the rest of the tradition.
85. 27-28 Kttl vuv Xeyzv, Kal vuv oxi Kal vvv Xiyei. ana apa, cooxe
. . . : Ar "it now says that it is now, at the same time, and so . . ." (148. 19).
Ar's Vorlage read Kal vuv Xiyei Kal oxi v\Jv ^.eyei (with the editio princeps
[Aldine 1534] and Spengel [ed. 1866]: see Heinze ad loc.) and did not have
apa after d|ia, i.e. Xiyz\ etna, cooxe . . . For dna in clause-final position, cf.
e.g. 86. 29 A.ev)Kaivexai Kal neX-aivexai dna
86. 8-10 Ttwq nev otjv 8iTipr|nevri auxri fi S-uvaniq xSv Siriprmevcov
aioGdvexai, naq 5e dSialpexoq [xcov Siriprinevcov (del. Heinze)}: Ar "for
this faculty in one way, being divided, perceives divided things, and in
another way, being undivided, perceives undivided things" (149. 19-150.
1). Ar appears to have read nwq be. d6ia(pexo(; xcov <nTl> 5iTipr|nevcov.
103. 15 xot)x' eoxi novov dGdvaxov: Ar "[this] alone is immortal and
eternal" (187. 12), i.e. . . . dGdvaxov <Kal d{5iov>. This repeats verbatim
the Aristotelian quote (430a23) found above in lines 9-10; in lines 17-18
below, Themistius abbreviates: T|nwv n£v ydp xoxJxo novov dGdvaxov
Xeycov oijn<pa>va dv eauxm X,eYOi, anXibq 5e xouxo novov dGdvaxov Xiyav
. .
.
(sim. Ar 187. 14-15).
'
1 13. 3-4 oxav nev ydp vofi novov xl x6 xi tiv eivai xfiq uyieiaq . . . : Ar
"for when it thinks e.g. [>Uu] of the essence of health only . . ." (206. 9).
^ Omit "loo": ei ical is "even if," not "even if .
126 Illinois Classical Studies 23 (1998)
The Vorlage probably read . . . voti <oiov> laovov kxX.; cf. e.g. 121. 25,
where oiov is turned by Jju (224. 7).
1 16. 5-6 . .
.
Kttl Y^UKU Kai TtiKpov Kai <wq (add. Heinze)> to eucoSeq
Kttl TO 5\jacb8eq: Ar " . . . and sweet or bitter, and good in smell or bad in
smell" (212. 6-7). Ar supports Todd's deletion (after Torraca and de Falco)
of both instances of to and his omission of uq (192 [Book 3. 8] n. 8).
118. 14-15 KoXXccKic, 5e Kai fi5\) ti XoyiCoiievo-u [iopiov |iev ti xo\)
acbpaToq auvaioGdveTtti, lipenei 5e oA,ov to ^cbov: Ar "and often it
contemplates the pleasant, and one of the parts of the body moves because
of its sensation, but the animal as a whole remains in its place" (217. 16-
17). A reference to the movement of the part (as in Ar) seems required by
the context and probably cannot be merely implicit in the Greek as Heinze
prints it. I therefore propose . . . ouvaioGdveTai <Kai KiveiTai>, fipeixei
KT^.
120. 29-30 ... TO Kivouv 5itt6v, to |iev dKwriTov coonep to TipaKTOv
dyaOov, to 6£ kivouhevov Kai kivouv cooTtep ope^iq: Ar " . . . that which
moves is in two ways, of which one is that which moves without being
moved, like the practical good, and the other is that which moves [and] is
moved, like the appetite" (222. 13-14), perhaps coming from the following
Vorlage: ... to [lev <KivoiJv> dK{vT|Tov . .
.
, to 5e kivouv Kai KivoiJuevov
kt^. The transposition of the last two participles conforms to the
Aristotelian text (433bl5). The phrase to . . . <kivo\)v> dK{vr|Tov is
reminiscent of Aristotle's to TtpcoTov kivouv dKivriTov aiJTo (Metaph.
1012b31).
123. 19-20 toutok; nev oi)v 5id TauTa dvaYKaiov •UTidpxeiv
a'loGrioiv: Ar "[and so for this reason] sensation must exist continually in
these" (228. 6-7, with Lyons' n. 27), i.e. . . . UTidpxeiv <del>a'io9rioiv. Ar
uses LJb to render dei; see above, on 22. 1-2.
123. 27-29 ouTE ydp r\ \\ivx^ |iaX^ov vofjoEi . . . oijTE to ouna
|id^A,ov 8id TTiv ai'oGriaiv: Ar "for the soul will not be more suitable for
thinking more . . .
,
nor will the body be more suitable for eternity because
of perception" (229. 3-5). The Vorlage should probably be reconstructed as
ouTE TO oa)|ia nd^^ov <di5iov> 6id ttiv aioGrioiv; cf. line 24 xo\q . . .
diSioiq ^cboiq Kai dyEvriTOK;.''
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Varia Fulgentiana
GREGORY HAYS
It has been just over a century since Rudolf Helm published the first—and
so far the only—critical edition of the mythographer Fulgentius.' All
students of Fulgentius are greatly in Helm's debt; his insight and good sense
can be fully appreciated only by those who have themselves worked
intensively on this maddening author. As Helm would have been the first to
acknowledge, his text was far from the final word; he left no shortage of
problems for later interpreters to tackle, and his edition should have been a
stimulus to further work. Yet in the century since Helm there has been
surprisingly little progress. A reliable and up-to-date commentary exists
only for the Expositio Sennonum Antiquorum, the shortest and in many
ways the least interesting of the four authentic works.- There is no
concordance, nor is there a reliable translation of the whole corpus.^
Translations of individual works vary in quality, and are not always easy of
access."* Fulgentius's prose is both ornate to the point of obscurity and
' Fabii Planciadis Fulgentii V. C. Opera (Leipzig 1898). The 1970 reprint includes
bibliographical addenda by J. Preaux, but is otherwise unchanged. The only major textual
contribution known to me since Helm is R. Ellis, "Fulgentiana," Journal of Philology 29
(1904) 61-71 (hereafter "Ellis"). I am not convinced by the elaborate rewriting of Mil. 13. 21
ff. suggested by H. Fuchs, "Textbereinigungen," Rh. Mus. 113 (1970) 95. The conjecture of J.
Relihan, "Fulgentius, Mitologiae I. 2Q-2\:' AJP 109 (1988) 229-30 is clearly correct, but was
in fact anticipated by Ellis. Cf. also note 24 below.
- U. Pizzani, Fabio Planciade Fulgenzio. Definizione di Parole Anliche (Rome 1968). On
T. Agozzino and F. Zanlucchi, Fabio Planciade Fulgenzio. Exposilio Virgitianae Continentiae
(Padua 1972), cf. the review of J. Perrel, RELSl (1973) 397.
' On the translation of L. G. Whitbread, Fulgentius the Mythographer (Co\\imbus. 1971), see
the review by R. T. Bruere, CP 68 (1973) 143^5. The lack of a concordance should be
partially made good by the forthcoming Bibliotheca Teubneriana on CD-ROM.
* A useful translation of the Mitologiae prologue is included in J. Relihan, Ancient
Menippean Satire (Baltimore and London 1993) 203-10. There are versions of the Expositio
Virgilianae Continentiae by T. A. McVeigh, The Allegory of the Poets (Diss. Fordham
University 1964) 201-24; L. C. Stokes, Classical Folia 26 (1972) 27-63 (reprising the
translation in her Tufts dissertation of 1969); F. Zanlucchi in Agozzino and Zanlucchi (above,
note 2) 41-69; and O. B. Hardison, Jr. in A. Preminger el al. (eds.). Classical and Medieval
Literary Criticism (New York 1974) 324^0. Pizzani (above, note 2) includes a serviceable
Italian translation of the Expositio Sennonum Antiquorum. A careful rendering of De Aetatibus
10 (only) may be found in C. Stocker, "Alexander der Crosse bei Fulgentius und die Historia
Alexandri Macedonis des Antidamas," Vigiliae Christianae 33 (1979) 55-75; cf. G. Hays,
"Second Thoughts on Fulgentius's Alexander," Vigiliae Christianae (forthcoming). I shall
refer to the translations above by translator's last name alone.
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frequently corrupt; real doubt remains at many points about what the Latin
actually means.
Under these circumstances, it may be worth while to offer here some
interim notes and corrections, the by-product of work on a new translation
and commentary. I shall treat first the Mitologiae, then the Exposilio
Virgilianae Continentiae (including a brief discussion of the title) before
turning to the De Aetatibus. Text and sigla in each case are Helm's (I have
updated the apparatus where appropriate), and references are to page and
line number in his edition.
Mitologiae 11.21ff.
Si his, quibus ignorare aliquid contingit, ne ipsut quidem nescire suum
scire contingent, quanto satius erat eis etiam non nasci contingere quam
nasci inefftcaciler venire. Primum itaque ego scientiae vestibulum puto
scire quod nescias.
nesciendo inefficaciter vivere E: nesciis inefficaciter vivere Ellis
The italicized phrase is diagnosed by Ellis as "transparently corrupt." His
emendation is based on the reading in E (Reginensis 1567, s. xii, described
by Helm, praef. xi as coniecturis infectus), which would in fact be slightly
preferable.^ But Helm's index sermonis is probably right to take venire as
equivalent to evenire (for this usage, cf. J. B. Hofmann and A. Szantyr,
Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik [Munich 1965] 299 with references);
inefficaciter should be taken closely with nasci. As often, striving for
parallelism (non nasci ~ nasci inefficaciter; contingere ~ {e)venire) has led
Fulgentius into unnecessarily contorted phrasing.
The words that follow are translated by Relihan: "And so I think that I
know the most important entryway of knowledge, a thing you may not
know." On his reading, Fulgentius here is "reminding Calliope of his belief
in an ineffable power higher than Helicon."^ But this is to import Christian
polemic where it does not belong. In reality, quod introduces oratio
obliqua, as often in later Latin. Fulgentius is merely harking back to the
Socratic paradox: "I think that the threshold of knowledge is to realize that
you do not know."
Mitologiae 12. 3 ff.
Ad haec ilia: "Tarn secretis misticisque rebus vivaciter pertractandis
ampliora sunt auctoritatum quaerenda suffragia; neque enim quippiam
' For E's nesciendo, cf. e.g. Mil. 9. 15 certando remillunl in mortem; 1 1. 9 ur Psice videndo
perderel el Era non videndo perisser, Exp. Virg. Cont. 104, 1 disciplina doclrinae quamvis
studendo desciscal . . . . De Ael. 139. 18 operis fundamina in meliorem laborando perduxil
* Relihan (above, note 4) 156.
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ludicrum quaeritur, quo ludibundo pede metrica verborum commoda
sarciamus. Sudor hie opus est palestrantis ingenii . . ."
incommoda Ellis
Ellis offers no explanation for his proposed correction, and in fact the
transmitted text is perfectly sound; cf. 25. 9 labia velut cimbala verborum
commoda modulantia (where Ellis proposes commodo\). The neuter plural
is used in both places with the same force as commoditas, "(verbal) facility,
fluency," for which cf. Rhet. Her. 1. 1. 1 copia dicendi et commoditas
orationis (sim. Cicero, Inv. 1. 2. 3); Ennodius, Epist. 9. 30 p. 251. 22 Hartel
omnis verborum commoditas humilitatis terminos egressa calcatur. Thus
quo . . . sarciamus should be rendered, "whereby we might link together a
metrical flow of words in playful measure."
Mitologiae 13. 6 ff.
Solverat ignivomos mundi regione peracta
quadrupedes gelidumque rotis tepefecerat orbem
rector et auratis colla spoliabat habenis.
lam Phoebus disiungit equos, iam Quintia iungit;
quasque soror hnquit, frater pede temperat undas.
astrigeroque nitens diademate Luna bicorni
bullatum biiugis conscenderat aethera tauris.
bicomis DpH2
Baldwin claims to have identified echoes of Lucan in this passage, among
them astrigero, allegedly echoing flammigeros aiBell. Civ. 1. 48.^ But in
fact, Fulgentius is imitating Ausonius, Cup. Cruc. 42, cum face et astrigero
diademate Luna bicomis.^ The echo confirms Fulgentius's familiarity with
Ausonius (he alludes to the Cento Nuptialis at Mit. 13. 3), and also helps
settle a textual issue. Considerations of balance already speak for bicomis
in the Fulgentius passage (Why should Luna go without an attribute while
diademate receives two?) and the parallel with Ausonius surely tips the
balance in its favor.
' B. Baldwin, "Fulgentius and his Sources," Tradilio 44 (1988) 37-57, at 47. Cf. Bell. Civ.
1. 45 ff. Te, cum slal ione peracla I aslra petes serus, praelali regia caeli I excipiel gaudente
polo; seu scepira tenere. I seu le flammigeros Phoeb i conscendere currus I . . . iuvel. But any
passage on sunrise or sunset is likely to include a reference to Phoebus and his horses, and
peracla at line-end is hardly uncommon in the Latin hexameter. I see no reason to think that
Fulgentius was recalling Lucan rather than e.g. Ovid, Her. 21. 85 f. cum iam prope luce
peracla I demere purpureas sot iuga vellel equis or Seneca. Apoc. 2. 4 iam medium curru
Phoebus diviseral orbem I el propior nodi fessas quaiiebal habenas . The reference at 14. 23
to being inserted among the stars ut Neronem poelicis laudibus certainly proves that Fulgentius
knew the opening of Lucan's epic, but to view it as "cunningly . . . signalling]" an earlier
imitation seems over-subtle.
* The two passages are linked already at TLL II 959. 38 f. s.v. asiriger.
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I take the opportunity of calling attention to two other echoes. In the
fifth line, the clausula temperat undas echoes Ovid, Met. 12. 580 deus,
aequoreas qui cuspide temperat undas. The resemblance in this case may
be unconscious or even accidental. Not so in the case of the preceding line,
which appears in nearly identical form as Corippus, loh. 8. 279 tunc
Phoebus disiunxit equos, tunc Cynthia iunxit.'^ Fulgentius's exact dates
remain uncertain, but on any dating thus far proposed Corippus must be the
imitator. '° If so, he is also the earliest evidence for the reception of the
Mitologiae.^^ But I suspect that in reality Fulgentius is imitating Corippus;
the implications of this are considerable, and I hope to discuss them in more
detail elsewhere.
Mitologiae 14. 1 ff. (the description of Satyra)
Hanc [sc. Calliopen] praeibat florali lasciviens virguncula petulantia,
hedera largiori circumflua, improbi vultus et ore contumeliarum sarcinis
gravido . . .
Relihan translates, "wanton in floral luxuriance," i.e. presumably,
"garlanded with flowers," vel sim. This is just possible: cf. Pliny, Nat. 16.
124, ramorum petulantia. But given the collocation with lasciviens, I
suspect we should translate, "wanton with Floral impudence," i.e. with the
impudence displayed by the prostitutes at the Floralia. As one observer has
noted, "Fulgentius's Muses are blatantly lascivious," and the same goes for
Satyra here.'^ Philosophy's description of the Muses as scenicae
meretriculae at Boethius, Cons. Phil. 1.1.8 suggests that this may be a
generic motif.
Mitologiae 14. 6 ff.
Musae autem latera sarciebant altrinsecus duae, quarum dexterior verenda
quadam maiestate subnixa elatae frontis polimina argenteis astrorum
crispaverat margaritis, cuius faleratum exoticis diadema carbunculis
' Cf. TLL Onom. II 793. 16 s.v. Cynthia.
'"The preface of the De Aetalibus (131. 10 ff.) locates him in North Africa, while the
reference to a dominus rex at Mit. 5. 14 has led scholars to place the composition of the work in
the Vandal period. But no attempt to identify the rex more precisely carries real conviction.
The Dracontian echoes identified by R. Helm. "Der Bischof Fulgentius und der Mythograph,"
Rh. Mus. 54 (1899) 1 1 1-34, at 117 ff., would be more helpful if the direction of the influence
could be established.
'
' Helm (previous note) 1 19 f. is sometimes taken to have shown that the opening of
Boethius, Cons. Phil, imitates the prologue of the Mitologiae (e.g. by J. Relihan, "Satyra in the
Prologue of Fulgentius' Mythologies," in C. Deroux [ed.J, Studies in Latin Literature and
Roman History IV, Collection Latomus 196 [Brussels 1986] 537-48, at 538 f.; K. Pollmann in
Der Neue Pauly s.v. Fulgentius [1]). Helm himself was more cautious, and see now J. Grilber,
"Die Erscheinung der Philosophie in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius," Rh. Mus. 1 12
(1969) 166-86, at 167 n. 6.
'- D. Shanzer, A Philosophical and Literary Commentary on Martianus Capella's De
Nuptiis Phitologiae el Mercurii, Book I (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1986) 41.
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corniculata lunae sinuatio deprimebat ac cerulanti peplo circumlita
hyalinae cavitatem sperae osseo fastigans tigillo versabat. Visiis itaque
luminis lam elata contemplatione caelitus erigebatur intuitus, quo pene
foribus supema intuens pollicem inlisisset.
visus del. Ellis | intuitus delendum susp. Helm
I am not happy with sarciebant, which seems to have troubled Relihan
also.'^ But my business is rather with the final sentence. If visus is a verb
(i.e. visus est) an infinitive in place of erigebatur is required. If it is a noun,
either it or intuitus has to go. Helm chose the second option, while Ellis
preferred the first. I suspect erigebatur intuitus is sound (at any rate
deletion would destroy a good cursus velox). But deleting visus may not be
the answer either. Rather, for visus read huius. The error may stem from an
original uius; cf. TLL VI 2697. 41 f. for this spelling in inscriptions, and
notice the spelling oc, not only at De Aet. 158. 13 quid oc sibi vult in the H-
less chapter of the work, but also (unanimously transmitted) at 170. 13 Ecce
oc ut angelus edicit. For the demonstrative with itaque, cf. Mit. 8. 6 hoc
itaque sacrificali carmine . . . ; De Aet. 153. 24 huius itaque universes
temporis ordines sequi valde prolixum est.
Translate, therefore, "And her gaze was lifted so far skyward in
contemplation of this luminescent object that while gazing at the heavens
she almost stubbed her toe on the doorway."
Mitologiae 24. 2 ff.
In huius [sc. ApoUinis] etiam tutelam corvum volunt, sive quod solus
contra rerum naturam in mediis ipsis aestivis fervoribus oviparos pullulet
fetus . . . sive quod in omeoscopicis libris secundum Anaximandrum sive
etiam secundum Pindarum solus inter omnes aves LX quattuor
significationes habeat vocum.
Anaximander and Pindar are cited as attesting quod in omeoscopicis libris
. . . (the raven) solus inter omnes aves LX quattuor significationes habeat
vocum—i.e. as authorities for the contents of works on bird divination.'''
The implication is that they are earlier mythographers or antiquarians, who
explained the raven's iconographic association with Apollo (god of
prophecy) by its importance in divination. Pindar clearly does not fit this
bill, but Fulgentius's reputation for fabricating quotations has made critics
queasy about emending: an author who can cite Cornelius Tacitus in libra
facetiarum (Serm. 125. 8) is felt to be capable of anything. This is not the
place to argue the source question, but critics should recall that a fabricated
Cf. Relihan (above, note 4) 280 n. 58: "a very odd phrase . . . Perhaps the three of them
together are a sort of crazy quilt of analytical powers."
'* Baldwin (above, note 7) 53 is mistaken to say that Pindar is mentioned "in a group of
authorities on crows." In this context, Olymp. 2. 86 ff. (cited also by M. Zink, Der Mythograph
Fulgeniius [WUrzburg 1867] 68) is irrelevant.
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quotation can be corrupted as easily as a legitimate one. On the following
page (Mit. 25. 17) we will be hearing about a Pisander fisicus with an
interest in allegorizing. It strikes me as at least possible that we should read
Pisandrum here as well, the name of this unfamiliar figure having been
mistakenly corrected on first appearance to that of a better-known author.'^
As for Anaximander, he is most likely the otherwise unknown Anaximander
Lamsacenus cited at Mit. 25. 15.
Mitologiae 45. 22
Et quamvis Nicagorus in distemistea libro quem scripsit primum ilium [sc.
Prometheum] formasse idolum referat . . .
distemitea H: destemistea M: in dicto mystico libro deterr.: Aioq
6e(xiaTe{a Plasberg: de Prometheo Boschartus: bzc\i.. OpoiiriGEttx;
Voss: in dicto Mythica libro Zink: de stemmatibus Baldwin
Emending the titles of lost works by unknown (and perhaps non-existent)
authors is an unpromising task, and none of the suggestions so far offered is
very persuasive. But it might be worth considering diastemata. Fulgentius
uses this musical term at Mit. 76. 1 and 78. 17, and a musical work would
cohere with the statement a few lines later that Aristoxenus . . . similia
profert (assuming, of course, that this is the musical Aristoxenus). As to
what role an allegorical explanation of the Prometheus story played in a
work of this kind, I cheerfully confess ignorance.
Mitologiae 74. 19
Sequitur secunda cithara; quamvis enim de his rebus quas musici disafexis
dicunt, sicut Mariandes scribit, multa de his facial, tamen aliqua non
implet quae viva vox potest.
The puzzling disafexis clearly hides a musical term. I think the answer may
be 5ia e^fiq, a shortened version of the phrase 6ia tmv e^fjc; ((pBoyycov); cf.
e.g. Aristides Quintilianus 1. 8 p. 14. 26 (xcov ouoxrindTcov) xa iiev 5ia
xmv e^flq cpGoYY^v, xcc 5e 5i' uneppaxcbv neA,q)5eixai and often; sim.
Aristoxenus, Elementa Harmonica p. 38. 5; p. 67. 7; Cleonides, Introductio
Harmonica 10; 14.
Taken in conjunction with the previous note, this example suggests that
Greek 5ia- in Fulgentius has been systematically misread as dis- by an early
scribe. If correct, this hypothesis may shed some light on the puzzling
reference at Mit. 68. 23 Aristofontes Atheneus in libris qui disarestia
nuncupantur.
The phenomenon is too common to need extensive illustration; cf. J. Willis, Latin Textual
Criticism (Urbana 1972) 173-77.
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Mitologiae 11. \1 ff.
In omnibus igitur artibus sunt primae antes, sunt secundae; ut in puerilibus
litteris prima abecetaria, secunda nota, in grammaticis prima lectio,
secunda articulatio, in rethoricis prima rethorica, secunda dialectica, in
geometricis prima geometrica, secunda arithmetica, in astrologicis prima
matiiesis, secunda astronomia, in medicinis prima gnostice, secunda
dinamice, in aruspicinis prima aruspicina, secunda parallaxis, in musicis
prima musica, secunda apotelesmatice. De quibus omnibus breviter
rationem perstringam necesse est. Aliut est enim aput grammaticos aliena
agnoscere, aliut sua efficere; aput rethores . . .
Pueriles litterae have a dubious claim to being an ars, and their inclusion
adds an unwanted eighth member to a list of seven liberal arts, albeit with
arithmetic and dialectic replaced by soothsaying and medicine. Heavy
repunctuation might be applied as a last resort: sunt secundae {ut in
puerilibus . . . nota): in grammaticis . . . etc. But the phrase should probably
be deleted as a marginal observation that has slipped into the text (perhaps a
later reader's attempt to clarify the rather opaque distinction Fulgentius is
drawing here). It is significant that the intrusive pueriles litterae do not
reappear when Fulgentius goes through the list a second time at 78. 5 ff.
Expositio Virgilianae Continentiae (title)
Translations of the title often suggest that continentia is the Latin equivalent
of Greek i)7i6voia: "de Diepere Zin van Vergilius"; "Esposizione del Senso
Riposto nella Poesia di Virgilio"; "Allegorical Content of Virgil," etc.'^
This sense would be unparalleled if it could be confirmed. Elsewhere in
later Latin the word simply refers to the contents of a work at the most
superficial level (cf. TLL IV 700. 46 ff.), rather than to any hidden or deeper
meaning. Note in particular Jerome, Contra loh. 1 totamque paradisi
continentiam [- the story of the Fall] tropologica interpretatione subvertat,
where the contrast between continentia and interpretatio is expressed as
clearly as one could wish. Similarly Macrobius, Somn. Scip. 2. 12. 2 ut
breviter a principio omnem operis continentiam revolvamus, . . . (followed
by a narrative summary of Scipio's dream).
In fact, closer inspection suggests that Fulgentius uses the word in its
normal sense. At 90. 20 ff. Virgil demands primi nostri libri continentiam
narra; tunc demum haec tibi, si visum fuerit, reserabimus. Fulgentius
responds by providing a jejune plot summary oi Aen. I: primum luno Eolum
petit, . . . Dehinc cum septem navibus evadit. Libico in litore accipitur
(etc.), concluding: Habes breviter decursam primi libri continentiam. Quid
de his senseris, audire desidero. Here, clearly, the continentia is not the
'° Respectively M. F. A. Brok. "De Aeneis als spiegel van he! menselijk leven," Hermeneus
24 (1952/3) 210; Agozzino and Zanlucchi (above, note 2) 41; Relihan (above, note 4) 29 and
passim. Cf. Whitbread (above, note 3) 105: "The continentia, or Inner substance of Virgil . . ."
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allegorical inteqjretation, but that to which it is applied—namely, the plot of
the poem—and this is presumably the sense it has in the title also.
Exp. Virg. Cont. 83. 1 ff. (opening)
Expetebat quidem, Levitarum sanctissime, nostri temporis qualitas grande
silentium, ut non solum mens expromptare desisset quod didicit, quantum
etiam oblivionem sui efficere debuit quia vivit; sed quia novo caritatis
dominatui fulcitur et in amoris praecepto contemptus numquam admittitur,
ob banc rem Virgilianae continentiae secreta phisica tetigi vitans ilia quae
plus periculi possent praerogare quam laudis.
dominatus up
|
quia nova caritas imperat, ea dominatus fulcitur Barb
The phrase nostri temporis has several times been misinterpreted as a
reference to the advanced age of the author (for which there is no other
evidence), despite the fact that tempus is not normally used to refer to the
age of an individual (for which in this context the Latin would be aetas or
anni)}'' In fact, Fulgentius is complaining about the anti-intellectualism of
the era he lives in, just as he does at Mit. 3. 4 ff. nostri temporis erumnosa
miseria non dicendi petal studium and De Aet. 129. 1 ff. hoc . . . temporis
cursu : . . ubi nihil plus nisi de nummi quaestu res vertitur.
As to the second italicized phrase, translators show a remarkable
unanimity. McVeigh's version can stand as a sample: ". . . since our
understanding is supported by a new law of charity and since contempt is
never to be allowed within this law of love, I have, for this reason,
investigated . . ."'^ What is this "new law of charity" that "supports"
Fulgentius' s understanding? Whitbread and Hardison seem to take it as a
veiled reference to Christianity, the latter even going so far as to capitalize
the phrase ("I am subject to the New Law of charity"). " Yet the evocation
of New Testament teaching does not really seem in place here. The practice
of Christian charity requires many sacrifices, but it does not demand that its
practitioners publish literary treatises, on Virgil or anything else.
Stokes offers a slightly different explanation. She translates, "the basis
of the new rule is charity," and proposes that the "rule" in question is that of
the Vandal king Hilderic (ruled 523-530), whose reign seems to have
ushered in a period of religious detente between Catholics and Arians.^"
'^ Hardison (above, note 4) 329; "Because of my age I thought complete silence proper."
Similarly Whitbread (above, note 3) 119. who has led astray T. R. Maresca, "Dante's Virgil:
An Antecedent," Neophilologus 65 (1981) 548-51, at 548.
'* Similarly Hardison and Whitbread. Cf. Zanlucchi: "essa [sc. I'anima] d sostenuta dal
nuovo regno deil'amore."
''^ Whitbread (above, note 3) 143 n. 3 explicitly glosses the "new law" as "Christianity, the
spirit of the New Testament."
"" Stokes (above, note 4). For the explanation and its implications for Fulgentius's date,
cf. eadem, Fulgentius and the Expositio Virgilianae Continentiae (Diss. Tufts University 1969)
48 f. I should add that I do not understand how Stokes construes the Latin (the subject of
fulcitur is clearly mens), but this does not greatly affect her argument.
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Under Hilderic's predecessor, the fervent Arian Thrasamund, it would have
been dangerous to publish; only now can Fulgentius safely share his
thoughts with the world. But there are objections to this reading also. Even
leaving aside the circularity of the argument—we cannot be sure that
Fulgentius wrote under Hilderic— it is hard to see anything in the treatise
that could have caused offence to even the touchiest Arian. A more serious
problem emerges if we examine Stokes's rendering in full: "the basis of the
new rule is charity, and contempt is never allowed in this precept of love."
How are we to take the second clause on this interpretation? What is the
"contempt" that is not allowed? What is "this precept of love" and what
does it have to do with the "new reign of charity"? Once again we are left
with fudge.
A different approach is needed. I suggest that, as often, Fulgentian
bombast conceals a relatively simple and stereotyped train of thought. The
key lies in caritatis, which refers not to Christian charity, but to ordinary
amicitia?^ The times are unpropitious to the publication of literary works,
Fulgentius tells us, and he had vowed to lay down his pen. If he takes it up
once more, it is only because he is bolstered by the recent cortimand of
friendship, i.e. by a friend's recent (or renewed) request for a work from his
hand. Dominatus is admittedly difficult to parallel in this sense, but the
semantic shift from "rule" to "(verbal) command" is not in itself an
implausible one (compare the semantic development of imperium), and such
shifts are common in Fulgentius. 2-
At least two considerations speak for this interpretation. First, the
clause as reinterpreted leads satisfactorily to the one that follows (in which
amoris praecepto corresponds to caritatis dominatui): A friend has
demanded a treatise from Fulgentius, and it is never right to refuse a friend
{in amoris praecepto contemptus numquam admittitur). Secondly, this
interpretation brings the preface of the Expositio into line with those of the
three other works, all of which exploit the same tired pretence that the
author is writing only reluctantly and in obedience to the urgent entreaties
of his addressee. ^^ The most sustained parallel appears in the preface to the
De Aelatibus (129. 1 ff.): Oportuit quidem, virorum excellentior, hoc nostra
quo nuper regimur temporis cursu perenni potius studere silentio ... Et
^' This sense is classical, e.g. Cicero, Fin. 3. 73 amicilias et reliquas caritates. Carilas is
regularly used with reference to late antique epistolary friendships; see K. Thraede, Grundziige
griechisch-romischer Brieftopik (Munich 1970) 127 f.
^^ For even more extreme examples of lexical Umdeulung, cf. R. Helm, "Einige sprachliche
EigentUmlichkeiten des Mythographen Fulgentius," ALL 11 (1898) 71-79. Elsewhere in
Fulgentius (Mil. 64. 10; De Ael. 150. 19; 165. 24) dominatus seems to have its usual sense,
except at Mil. 13. 2 Plaulinae Saureae dominatus obdormit, where it means something like
"imperiousness" or "severity." The apparent parallel at De Act. 164. 28 (Alexander)
Babilonicum regnum arripuit mille annorum dominatu fulcitum provides no real help in
interpreting our passage.
'' On this stock sentiment, cf. E. R. Curlius, European Literature and the Latin Middle
Ages, tr. W. Trask (Princeton 1953) 85 and T. Janson, Latin Prose Prefaces (Stockholm 1964)
117-20 and passim.
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crede, teste Deo nostra confiteor, volui tuum in his opusculis praeceptiim
spemere, nisi hoc meo indixissem ingenio, tuo nulla moda inabediens
inveniri imperio . But cf. also Mit. 3. 14 additur quia et mihi nuper
imperasse dinosceris ut . . . tuarum aurium sedes
. . . permulceam; 35. 9
(preface to Book 2) studens, mi damine, lua reverenda imperia . . . ; Exp.
Serm. Ant. 111. 1 ff. Ne de tuarum praeceptorum . damine, serie nostra
quicquam curtasse inoboedientia putaretur, libellum . . . retribui. In light of
these parallels we are surely justified in replacing the "new law of charity"
with the more prosaic ties of friendly affection.
De Aetatibus 136. 18 ff. (Noah's flood a presentiment of Christian baptism)
illic aqua angelicae transgressionis fit ultio, hie aqua fit genuini peccati
dilutio . . . : illic peccantis mundi materies in uno germine transplantanda
in alium saeculum aquis purgatoriis enatat, hie unius Christi redemptione
pugnantis rudis homo ecclesiae fontanis renascitur sacramentis.
Pugnantis is obscure (Who or what is Christ fighting?), and out of place in
this diluvian context. Read purgantis, which sorts better with the baptismal
imagery. For the balanced contrast of peccantis mundi with Christi . . .
purgantis, cf. Vulg. Hebr. 1. 3 where Christ is described as purgatianem
peccatorum faciens (and see TLL X 1. 898. 66 for the frequency of the
collocation peccata purgare).
De Aetatibus 146. 8 ff. (Jacob's two marriages)
One of the peculiarities of the De Aetatibus is its "lipogrammatic" form:
Each of the successive books deliberately omits the corresponding letter of
the alphabet. In this extract from Book 5, pulchra refers to Rach{e]l,
maiori to [E]sau:
Numquidnam non propria in his ordinibus mundi imago monstratur, dum
in Lia matronalis invidia, dum in pulehra casualis fortuna, dum in laeob
livor fratrum, dum in maiori quoddam fortuitum; in lob passionum indicia
ae futura corona, in laeob communis hominum vita, dum concubinarum
amori non pareitur, dum uxoris voluptatibus famulatur? Nota igitur quod
in mundo unus pulchro sortitur eoniugio, ahus horridiori damnatur
eonsortio; illic filiorum gratia divino tribuitur aliquando solatia. Subito
iustum malis damnatum eonspicimus, subito impium bonis [divitiis]
ampliatum notamus; aliquando infimior in altum porrigitur, aliquando
sublimis post tumidas pompas prostratus ab omnibus eoneulcatur.
divitiis del. Helm.
The italicized clause gives the impression of being orphaned in this
Gorgianic passage. Moreover, illic suggests that the clause here should
refer to the happy marriage {- Rachel), though clearly the solatium must be
a consolation for an unhappy marriage (= Leah). It is tempting to assume a
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lacuna, perhaps caused by a saut du meme au meme, e.g. illic <filiorum
facultas profunda nonmimqiiain abstrahitur consilio, liio filiorum gratia
etc. In one case infertility mars an otherwise promising union, in another
children console the husband for drawing an unattractive spouse.
DeAetatibus 162. 18 ff. (Judith)
Ecce autem repente dum nulla vox ex adventu pugnantum, nullus cruor
emanat percussorum et tamen pugna node confecta est, caput pera
geslatum est, matronale tropeum peractum est, regale thorum perfectum
est, facta est una pueila Hebreorum salus, fuga Persarum, perpetua nunc
usque fabula saeculorum. Sed hoc proelio nulla vox ex adverso
pugnantum, nullus cruor emanat percussorum et tamen caput pera
gestatur sola nocte adtestante sublatum. Decora namque forma tantum
excellentum operum fuerat lena, quae caput a corpora segregatum, salutem
lugentum adtulerat populorum.
Fulgentius's propensity for saying the same thing in five different ways is
justifiably renowned. Here, however, he says the same thing in the same
way: The word-for-word repetition of the earlier sentence is not in his
manner. Nor is this the only problem with the passage. The ninth book of
the treatise omits the ninth letter (I), and the word proel{i]o therefore has
no business herc^"* The obvious solution is to bracket the second sentence,
but it is not easy to see how it made its way in here; we have to do with
something more complicated than a simple scribal doublet. Is it possible
that a draft version of the sentence managed to slip into Fulgentius's fair
copy 925
The University of Virginia
^'' There are three other such violations in the text as printed by Helm: 139. 23 effe[c}ta;
144. 12 av[e]rsum; 170. 6 a[l\ieno. The second should probably be corrected to aborsum,
which is in fact the reading of Bruxellensis 10098-105; cf H. Silvestre, "Notice et extraits des
manuscrits 5413-22, 10098-105 et 10127^44 de la Bibliotheque Royale de Bruxelles," Sacris
Erudiri 5 (1953) 174-92, at 188 f. The other two may be simple slips on Fulgentius's part. In
addition, as noted by an anonymous reviewer, alALL ll (1898) 294 f., Plasberg's Rom<an>ae,
printed by Helm at 131. 7, is to be rejected since the preface to the De Aetatibus eschews A
(the diphthong ae counts as e).
-'
I am grateful to the two anonymous referees for their advice on presentation and to the
editor for his patience.

Two Notes on the Canterbury Biblical Commentaries
GERALD M. BROWNE
The works in question are published in B. Bischoff and M. Lapidge,
Biblical Commentaries from the Canterbury School of Theodore and
Hadrian, Cambridge Studies in Anglo-Saxon England 10 (Cambridge
1994); I use the editors' sigla (PentI and Evil) to refer to them.
I
PentI 3 Cudere^ .i. manducare—"Cudere ['to forge']: that is, to devour."
(298[Text]-299[Translation]; N.B. ./. = id est)
Edd.: "It is not clear why the Commentator should have glossed cudere
with manducare, which is in no sense a synonym" (430). They note that in
the Old Testament glosses in Karlsruhe, Badische Landesbibliothek, Aug.
perg. 99, fols. 37-52,- cudere is glossed with condere uel scribere (136).
Perhaps the Commentator, who sprinkles Old English words in his
work (see the list on p. 588 of the edition), was here subconsciously
associating cudere with Old English cwudu "cud."^ This association would
explain his glossing the word with manducare.
II
Evil 18 Asse ueneunt^ A. uenduntur. Asse graece A. duo aerea minuta—
"Sold for a farthing: that is, sold off. A farthing in Greek (daodcpiov) is
equivalent to two copper mites." (400[Text]-^01 [Translation])
I suspect that the transmitted text should be emended: . . . Asse
<, assario> graece A. duo aerea minuta—". . . for an as, assarion in Greek,
i.e. two copper mites." As the editors note, assarius, the archaic form of as,
"was borrowed into Greek as doodpiov, and is attested in this form in the
' From Jerome's Preface lo the Pentaleuch; .see, e.g , R. Weber et al., Biblia Sacra iuxla
Vulgatam versionem. 4tii ed. (Stuttgart 1994) 3. 5.
- Partially published in E. Sleinmeyer and E. Sievers. Die allhochdeuischen Glossen V
(Berlin 1922) 135-225.
^ Cf., e.g., J. Bosworth and T. Northcote Toller, An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary (Oxford 1898)
181.
*
I.e. Matt. 10. 29.
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Greek text of Matt. X.29" (511). The word assario could have dropped out
of the text through visual similarity to the preceding asse (homoiarchon).
For the pattern of expression, cf. Evil 69 Legio^ autem graece dicitur
legion—"Legion: the word in Greek is legeon (Xzyzwv)" (408[Text]-
409[Translation]).
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
5 I.e. Mark 5. 9.
Quomodo auctor Psalterii Vercellensis Bedae
Collectione Psalterii usus sit
GERALD M. BROWNE
P. Salmon in editione sua Psalterii quod dicitur Vercellensis (CC Cont.
Med. 47 [Turnholti 1977]) demonstrare conatus est quomodo auctor eius
Collectione Psalterii Bedae Venerabili adscripta usus esset. namque citavit
Salmon psalmos 7 (6, 20, 32, 50, 63, 80, 100) in quibus uterque eundem
textum (nisi quod Beda e Psalterio iuxta Hebraeos hausit, auctor Vercellensis
e Psalterio Romano) usurpavisset; pss. 44 (6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 17, 18, 22, 24-
26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 40^2, 44, 53, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 65, 69, 70, 78,
84, 85, 93, 100, 101, 108, 110, 113, 119, 120, 137, 139, 140, 142) ubi
Bedae versus auctori alteri fuissent prooemio; pss. 28 (3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 16,
21, 27, 29, 38, 39, 43, 55, 68, 79, 83-85, 87, 89, 91, 105, 107, 117, 118,
124, 141, 144) ubi auctor Bedae versus fragmentis eiusdem psalmi
inseruisset; pss. 24 (non citatos) in quibus pro Bedae versibus alios ex
eodem psalmo depromptos substituisset; pss. 47 (1, 2, 13, 14, 23, 28, 33,
36, 45, 52, 57, 71, 77, 86, 92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 103, 104, 106, 109, 111,
112, 116, 120, 121, 123, 125-28, 130-33, 135, 136, 144-50') quos—apud
Bedam repertos—omisisset: vd. p. 41 una cum n. 1 et p. 44 una cum nn. 1
et2.
Nuper, cum Bedae opusculum ad Bibliothecam Teubnerianam ederem,^
Salmonis demonstrationem animadverti non semper accurate factam esse,
atque hoc non tantum ubi textus a me reconstitutus et editio a J. Fraipont
confecta^—qua Salmon usus est—inter sese discrepant, itaque primum, quo
clarius appareat quomodo Bedae Collectio a Psalterio Vercellensi differat,
indicem praebeam in quo ea ambo comparabo"*:
' I.e. 46, non 47, ut apud Salmon.
^ G. M. Browne, Collectio Psalterii Bedae Venerabili adscripta (Stutgardiae et Lipsiae, sub
prelo).
' CCSL 122 (Turnholti 1955) 452-70.
" Sigla:
omisit
+ addidit
idem praebuit
s substituit
B Beda
V Psalterium Vercellense
Illinois Classical Studies 23 (1998)
(ps.) 1. 1-3B-V
2. 10-12B-V
3. 4, 7b B + 2, 3, 9 (et—tua) V
4. 2c B + 2a, b, 7, 10 V
5. 2, 3, 4a, 9 B + 3a, 4b, 8 (- ego autem), 12 V
6. 2-5 B + 6 V
7. 2, 3 B = V
8. 2a B + 2b, 3a, 5, 10 V
9. 3, 33 B + 2a, 5, 1 1, 14, 16a, 20a, 35c, d, 38b V
10. 6a B - V
1 1
.
2a (salva nos [sic] Domine) B + 2a (quoniam—sanctus), b, 8 V
12. 3-5aB + 1,2, 5b, 6a, b, dV
13. 7cB-V
14. 4b B - V
15. 1, 2 B + 9a, b, 10a (quoniam), d, e (- 2) V
16. la (intende—meam), b, 5, 6b, c, 7, 8b, c, 15a B + la (exaudi—et),
8a, 9a, 13a, b (- 15a) V
17. 2 B + 3a, c, 28-30a, 49, 50 V
18. 13b, 14a, 15a, c B - 15a V (pro '"6" apud S "'^" legendum)
19. 8bBs 10 V
20. 14 B = V
21. 20, 21a, 22a B + 2a (Deus Deus—me^), 4 {Laus Israel), 5, 6, 10-
12, 21b, 22b V ("5" apud S deest)
22. 6a B + 6c, d V
23. 5aB-V
24. 1, 4b, c, 5a, b, 7a, b, 11, 16a, 17b, 18, 20a B + 2, 3, 6, 7c, 8a,
16b, 17a, 20b, 22 V
25. 8a, 9a, 1 lb B + 8b, 9b V (""" apud S deest)
26. la, 7, 9, 1 1, 12a, 13 B + 8b (- la, 1 la, 13) V
27. 2a, 3a, 7a B + 1, 2b, 3c, d, 9 V
28. 2c B - V
29. 1 1, 13 B + 2-4, 9, 10c, d (- 1 1, 13a) V
30. 2, 3a, 4a, 6a, 16, 17 B + 3c, d, 4b, 5, 6b, 8, 9a, 10a, 11, 15b (tu—
meus), 18a V (v. 9 a nee, v. 16 ab in incipit, non ut apud S)
31. 1, 5a, b, 7a B + 5c, d, 7b (- 1) V
32. 18, 22 B - 18 V
33. 2,4,5,9, 10, lib, 21,23aB-V
34. 1, 2, 3b, 9, 18a, 28 B + 3a, b, 17, 18b, 22-24, 25b (- 9) V
35. 6a, 8a, 10-12 B + 6b, 7c, 8b, 9 V
36. 25a, b, 28a-c, 40a B - V
S Salmon
N.B. Psalmorum versus secundum colometriam in R. Weber el al., Biblia Sacr,
Vulgatam versionem, ed. 4 (Stutgardiae 1994) adhibitam cito.
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37. 2, 16, 21b, 22, 23 B + 3-11, 18b, 19, 20 (- 16, 21b) V
38. 8 (praestolatio—es), 9, 1 1 B + 6a, b, 13, 14 (- 8, 1 1) V
39. 2, 3a, 14b, 17a, 18c B + 12(- tu autem)-\A?i, 15a, b {qui—meam),
18a(-2, 3a, 17a)V
40. 5, 11a B + lib {et^—me), 12b (- 1 la tu autem) V
41.2B+ 12c V
42. l,2aB + 2b, 3, 4c V
43. 26 B + 5a, 9b, 23b, 24 V ("9" apud S deest)
44.7a, 18bB + 7b, 8aV
45. 2 B - V
46. 3b, 7 B - V
47. 15 Bs 10, 11 V
48. 16B-V
49. la, 8-lOa, 11, 12, 14, 15, 23 B - V
50. 3-6a, 11-14, 16, 17, 19 B - 19 V
51.3b, lOBs 11 V
52. 7c B - V
53. 3, 4 B + 5a, b, 7-9 V
54. 2, 3a, 24c B + 3b, 4a, 5, 6 V
55. 4, 5b, 10c B + 2, 3a, 4b, 8c, 9a, b, 10b (- 4a, 5b) V (v. 9 a vitam,
non a posui—ut apud S—incipit)
56. 2^a B + 8, 10-12 (- 3^a) V
57. 12b B-V
58. 2, 10, 1 1, 17b, c, 18 B + 3, 4, 6a, 12a, c, d, 17a, b (- 10a, 1 1) V
59. 13, 14 B + 7, 8a (Deus) V (- 14) ("8" apud S deest et pro "'*3" "i3"
legendum)
60. 2-6, 8b B + 9 (- 3b [in-me], c, 8b) V
61.6(a&—wea),7Bsl3V
62. 2, 3b, 4, 5, 8 B + 6, 7b, 9b (- 3b) V ("8" apud S deest)
63. 2 B = V
64. 6a (exaudi—noster) B + 3, 4b, 5c, d, 6 (versus totus) V {spes—
terrae 6c etiam in cod. T Bedae Coll. repertum: vd. app. meum ad
loc.)
65. 4, 8, 9a, 20 B + 13, 14a (- 8, 9a, 20) V (""*" apud S deest)
66. 2, 7b, 8a B s 3-6 V
67. 2, 4 B s 29 V
68. 17-19, 30 (salus—me) B + 2, 5a-c, 6, 7, \Ah{Deus)-\6, 20, 21a,
30a V
69. 2, 5a. 6 B + 3, 4a, b, 5b, c V
70. 1, 2, 4, 5 iquia—Domine), 12 B + 3, 5b, 6b, 8, 9, 18b {Deus—
me), 23, 24 V C'^" apud S deest)
71. 17a, bB-V
72. 28a, bB-V
73. 12 (Deus—initio), 19 B + 21b, 23a (- 12a) V
74. 10 B s 2a, b V
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75. 10 B s S (tu—tibi), llaV
76. 2, 3a B s 12b, 15a V
77. 38aB-V
78. 8, 9 B + 13b, c V
79. 3b, 8 B + 2 V (pro '"*" apud S "^" legendum)
80. 2a B - V
81.3, 4s8V
82. 2, 19 B- 2, 19a V
83. 9a, 13b B + 2, 4c (rex—meus), 5, 6a, 9b, 10a, 11a V (""" apud S
deest)
84. 5, 6 (noli—nobis), 8 B + 6b, 7 V
85. 1, 3-7, 11, 12, 15a, 16, 17 B + 2, 8-10, 13a, 15b V ("5" et '"5"
apud S desunt)
86. 7 B - V
87. 3, 14 B + 2, 4, 10, 16 (- 14) V (pro '"6"' apud S """' legendum)
88. 6a, 15b B s 9, 12, 15a, 48, 49 V
89. 16, 17a, c B + 1, 2, 13, 17b (- 17a, c) V
90. 9a B - V
91. 5a B + 2, 5b V
92. 5a B - V
93. 18bB + 19bV
94. 6, 7a (quia—noster) B - V
95. 6a B - V
96. 10 B s 9 V
97. 3a {recordatus—suae) B - V
98. 5a B s 3, 4b, c V
99. 2 (servile—laude), 3 (scitote—sumus) B - V
100. l-2a B = V
101. 2, 3 B + 4a, 12b, 25 V C"^" apud S deest)
102. 1-4 B + 5-22 V (vd. etiam S pp. 77-78) (pro "'»"2 apud S "5"
legendum)
103. 1,31 B-V
104. 4, 5aB-V
105. 3, 47a, c, d, 48a (benedictus—Israhel) B + 4, 6, 47b (et—nos) (-
3, 48a) V
106. 1,8, 9B-V
107. 13, 14 B + 2, 7b (- 14) V
108. 21,22a, 26 B + 22b V
109. 2b B - V
110. la, 3a, 7b B+ lb (- 3a, 7b) V
111. l,7a,bB-V
112. 2 B -V
113. 9, 10a B+ 10b V
114. 4bB + 5aV
115. 13 {et—invocabo), 15 B s 16a, b V
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116. 2bB-V
117.6-9,21 Bs25, 28 V5
118. 7, 10 (ne—tuis), 18, 29, 36, 41, 50, 64, 67 (antequam—
ignoravi), 68, 76, 88, 92, 103, 108, 116 {confirma—vivam), 117
(auxiliare—ero), 124, 132 (respice—mei), 135 (et—tua), 137, 149,
153 {vide—me), 159 (iuxta—me), 165, 169, 170 B + 4, 5, 8
(non—usquequaque), 12 (Domine—tuas), 19, 26 (sed doce—tuas),
28 {et confirma—tuis), 34 (da—tuam), 35 {et deduc—tuorum), 37,
38, 40 {et in—me), 43, 49, 58, 66, 71-73, 75, 77 {veniant—
vivam), 80, 84, 86 (iniqui—me^), 94, 105, 107, 109 {anima—
semper), 114, 116 {efi—mea), 120, 121 (ne-me), 122, 125, 130,
\32{secundum—tuum)-35{faciem—tuum), 143 {tribulatio—me),
l44{inteHectum—vivam)-46, 150, 154, 156, 157 {multi—me^),
159 {Domine), 168 {quia—Domine), 173, 175, 176 {erravi—
Domine) {- 50 [haec— mea], 67, 92, 116 [et vivam per
homoiarchon], 137, 165) V (""^" apud S deest)
119. 2B = V
120. 1 B - V
l2l.6{sit—te)B-W
122. 3 {miserere—nostri) B + 1, 3b, 4 V
123. 8 B-V
124. 4 B + 3b V
125. 4 B-V
126. lb B-V
127. 1 B-V
128. 8b B-V
129. 2 B + 1, 3, 4a, b V
130. la B-V
131. 14a B-V
132. 3b B-V
133. 1 {qui—Domini) B-V
134. 3aBs 13 V
135. 26B-V
136. 96B-V
137. la, 8b, c B + lc-3, 7a, c V
138. 8 B s 5, 13 {tu—meae), 15, 16a, b, 24 V
139. 2 B + 5a, b, l{Deus—meae)-9h V
140. lb, 2a, 3 B + la, 4, 8, 9 V
141. 8a B + 4b, 6a {tu—mea), b, 7 V
142. la, c, 2, 8-1 lb {in—tua), 12c B + lb, 3-7, lib {et educes—
meam), 12a, b V
143. la, 2a B s 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11a, bV
'28c,dV = 21 B.
^ Vide app. in editione mea.
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144. 2, 21 B + 1, 4-7, 10-13b, 15, 16 (- 21) V
145. 2a-cB-V
146. la (laudate—estl 1 1 B - V
147. 18 {mittet—illas [sic]) B - V
148. 1-5, 11-14C B -V
149. 1, 4b-6 (exultationes [sic]
—
gutture eonim) B - V
150. 6B-V
Ex hoc indice manifestum est auctorem Psalterii Vercellensis:
(a) in psalmis 5 (7, 20, 63, 100, 1 19) eadem selectione qua Beda usum
esse (cf. Salmon p. 44);
(b) in pss. 42 (5, 6, 8, 11, 15, 17, 22, 24-26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 40-
42, 44, 53, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 65, 69, 70, 73, 78, 84, 85, 93, 101, 102,
108, 110, 113, 114, 137, 139, 142) Bedae versus ad prooemium destinasse
(cf. Salmon p. 44 n. 1);
(c) in pss. 29 (3, 4, 9, 12, 16, 21, 27, 29, 38, 39, 43, 55, 59, 64, 68,
79, 83, 87, 89, 91, 105, 107, 118, 122, 124, 129, 140, 141, 144^) Bedae
versus fragmentis eiusdem psalmi inseruisse (cf. Salmon p. 44 n. 2);
(d) in pss. 28 (15, 16, 18, 26, 31, 32, 34, 37-40, 50, 55, 56, 58-60,
62, 65, 73, 82, 87, 89, 105, 107, 110, 118, 144^) quosdam Bedae versus
retinuisse, ceteris omissis;
(e) in pss. 18 (19, 47, 51, 61, 66, 67, 74-76, 81, 88, 96, 98, 115,
1 17, 134, 138, 143) pro Bedae versibus alios ex eodem psalmo depromptos
substituisse (cf. Salmon p. 44);
(f) pss. 52 (1, 2, 10, 13, 14, 23, 28, 33, 36, 45, 46, 48, 49, 52, 57,
71, 72, 77, 80, 86, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 103, 104, 106, 109, 111, 112,
116, 120, 121, 123, 125-28, 130-33, 135, 136, 145-50), qui apud Bedam
leguntur, omisisse (cf. Salmon p. 41 n. 1).
Urbanae, III.
' Hue pertinent et hi in (b) cilati psalmi: 5, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 44, 54, 58, 62, 69, 70,
, 85, 108, 137, 142 (quos Salmon in p. 44 n. 2 non enumeravit).
" Hi psalmi, praeler 18, 32, 50, 82, iam in (b) aut (c) cilantur.
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